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TOWARDS THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TAX POLICY 
 
1.  Introduction: The extension of fiscal competences 
 
Over the last 60 years, we have seen an extension of legislative competences in many Western 
states. Tax policy is symptomatic of this increase in governmental power. Naturally, the 
proliferation of tax bases, and the rise in tax rates, are generated by an increased governmental 
activity, both in terms of number of functionaries and produced public goods. As repeatedly 
exhibited by public choice theorists, executive branches of government have a strong incentive 
to spend more – rather than less – money (Gwartney and Wagner, 1988). As shown by 
Buchanan and Brennan (2000b: 44-46) the politically ‘most efficient’ fashion to maximize 
revenue (i.e. raising ‘least resistance’) is to disperse the fiscal burden over the constituency 
through a very diverse range of fiscal measures. Indeed, the public choice model predicts that 
taxation has a ‘natural’ inclination towards diversity of fiscal bases and rates. These theoretic 
predictions have been materialized in the last 60 years, as we indeed have witnessed an ever-
rising fiscal revenue, collected by a labyrinth of rates and bases, and even various fiscal 
assessment techniques. Nonetheless, the ever-expanding rules that realize governmental 
income do not simply mirror the increased financial needs of the state. Moreover, taxation has 
become one of the core instruments that governments use to execute their policies: legislative 
and executive bodies try to achieve redistribution, employment, innovation, (nature) 
conservation, urban development or health care improvement through the deliberate design 
of fiscal stimuli, for instance through the imposition of tax cuts and discriminatory-rate 
structures (Rosen, 2004). Taxation appears here as a policy vehicle to steer people’s behavior 
in a moral, social, economic or ecologically optimal way. Other drivers of the complexity and 
expansion of our tax codes are the efforts of special interest groups (Buchanan and Tullock, 
1999: 285-286). Generally speaking, when benefits exceed costs, particular economic or social 
groups are expected to organize themselves in the political arena, and influence the 
administrative regulations, enforcement practices and legislation (Boudreaux and Pritchard, 
1993: 115). In terms of our subject, fiscal “rents” entail minor costs for the whole constituency 
and huge profits for the beneficiaries, and our tax codes have been very responsive to voting 
and lobbying strategies whereby parties capture political profits through special derogations 
(Butler, 2012: 58-64). Richter et al. found a correlation for the U.S. between tax lobbying and 
the effective tax rate: when US firms increase their lobbying expenditures by 1% in a given year, 
they reduce their effective tax rates by an average of 0.5 to 1.6 percentage points the following 
year. Another study confirms that fiscal lobbying is currently one of the most profitable 
businesses: Alexander et al. (2009) estimate the return on investment from political influence 
for the US Job Creation Act (2004) to be as high as 22,000%, meaning that every dollar 
invested in lobbying yields a return of $220. Brown et al. (2015) found that investing in 
relationships with tax policy makers (e.g., via PAC support) results in future tax benefits. 
Various sources like the U.K.’s House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2013: 10) 
and the Corporate Europe Observatory (2017) confirm systematic entanglement between the 
legislator and the private interests of wealthy individuals and corporations (so called ‘pro-
active-tax-planning’) for Europe through big accounting or lobbying firms. The Center for 
Responsive Politics (2016) also underlines the interaction between the public lawmaking and 
private interests, for instance by revealing that 38 out of 42 Apple lobbyists previously held 
government jobs. This might explain why, legal-technically, we have seen a rise in special 





credit’ and ‘active financing exemption’, which help multinationals and wealthy individuals 
slash their global tax debt. Allison Christians (2017: 152) one of the most established tax 
lawyers of our time, describes the state of affairs as follows: “Special interests consistently exert 
influence on tax policy discourse through their advisors and within a broad spectrum of 
discrete and pooled capacities. This results in tax policy as favorable as possible to those who 
have the resources to shape it.” The pressure of special interests on the democratic process is 
not only a rise in measures and complexity, but also has a socio-economic angle, according 
Shaun Hargreaves Heap (2017: 259): ‘About the only thing we can say with much confidence 
about our currently complex tax systems is that they spawn an industry of tax accountants, 
lawyers and lobbyists who game the system for the benefit of their clients, who are mainly rich’. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that fiscal exemptions have been ‘democratized’ and, 
converting large proportions of votes for political power, many factions of the constituency 
have contributed to the growth of new twigs, such as the mortgage interest deduction, company 
cars or stock options, on the ever growing fiscal tree. Richard Wagner (2016: 142) states these 
legal-political factors have generated ‘a tax code so large that no one can read it and which 
creates nearly a unique tax liability for each tax payer’. In the US President’s Economic 
Recovery Advisory Board (2010: 10), taxpayers and businesses spend 7.6 billion hours and 
incur related, out-of-pocket expenses, each year simply to comply with federal tax filing 
requirements alone. It makes one wonder what our economies would look like if individuals 
and businesses invested those resources in true productive activities.  
 
That said, the governmental proclivity to maximize taxation, the ambition to achieve political 
goals via specific tax measures, or the partisan strive to tinker the tax code through voting and 
lobbying is not illegitimate per se. Nonetheless, a democratic system involves not only a 
judicial, legislative and administrative sphere where revenue can be maximized, behavior can 
be steered or fiscal profits can be realized; it must also monitor whether these administrative 
and legislative initiatives are operating in accordance with the constitutional rules. This 
constitutionalist perspective, that controls whether political actions are legitimate from the 
perspective of the underlying rules that govern this political-legal game, has gathered 
remarkably less attention in the international literature on taxation that this PhD addresses. 
 
2.  The constitutionalist outlook 
 
2.1.  Constitutions  
 
The fact that we perceive some rules as fundamental, as defining how the game will be played, 
is expressed by our intuitive protest in the case that legislative bodies would dismiss them by 
means of a simple majority (Buchanan and Congleton, 2006: 19). Indeed, some rules constrain 
majorities, and are ‘constitutive’ for the order that gives legitimacy to the majority in the first 
place. The collection of those rules is what we call ‘the constitution’. Boudreaux and Pritchard 
(1993: 112) point out that constitutions establish the ‘higher law’ in a country, meaning that 
the legislative and administrative measures that are the products of the legal-political sphere 
need to be in accordance with it. Constitutional law - by means of superior status – structures 
the ‘hurly burly of daily politics’ by providing ‘the rules of the game’ (Anderson et. al, 1990). If 
the essence of living under political authority is that some persons (e.g. a minister) or collective 
bodies (e.g. a parliament) can coercively define, alter and enforce the rules that apply to the 
whole community, then it seems apt to conceive of a constitution as ‘the rules of the rules’: a 
set of principles that delivers the conditions of legitimacy of rule-making in the polity. Indeed, 





‘legal’, powers to take property, put people in prison, produce specific goods funded by others, 
or transfer means to parts of the constituency. These practices, in respect of their coercive 
nature, are not without risk. History, empirical models and reason inform us that rulers are no 
saints, and that, in the absence of additional regulation, political agents are inclined to utilize 
the coercive processes to enrich themselves and their supporters, impose their life views on 
others, and/or harm individuals, minorities and even whole populations. Constitutions, both 
theoretically and historically, are institutional responses to the risk of living under political 
authority (Ostrom, 2008: 98-99; Buchanan and Brennan, 2000a: 27-33). They can be 
conceived as insurance mechanisms (Buchanan and Brennan, 2000b) to safeguard the 
interests of members of a political community, when some get vested with the power to 
make/execute decisions for/on the collectivity, or parts of it. Indeed, constitutions make up 
‘the contract’ between the citizens and their government, and are aimed at regulating and 
minimizing the dangers that the establishment of the state, and the inequality of power 
correlated with it, exerts on its citizens. 
Constitutions do so in a twofold fashion. Moreover we can distinguish between ‘negative’ 
constitutional rules and ‘positive’ constitutional rules. Negative constitutional rules insulate 
specific domains from collective decision-taking processes. By means of the recognition of 
‘rights’, i.e. claims to certain goods or actions that create a correlative duty of non-intervention 
on all others (Hohfeld, 1913: 32), governments are prevented to impose decisions within 
certain spheres. As such, the meaning of ‘rights’ in constitutional theory is that they hold as 
‘fences’, insulating jurisdictions of individual choice from the domain of collective choice. 
Within spheres that form the subject of the personal rights, for instance our physical body or 
religious affiliation, decisions or transactions typically occur on a voluntary basis. The 
recognition of these rights prevents governments to impose decisions in spheres where 
coercion would arguably be very harmful (Buchanan and Tullock, 1999: 63-85). Whereas the 
‘negative’ rules thus limit the range of action of those who exercise governmental prerogatives, 
the ‘positive’ rules will regulate how they can actually reach legitimate decisions within their 
lawful jurisdiction. Such constitutional principles do not forbid governments to act, but 
prescribe the structures and procedures to be followed. Positive constitutional rules, such the 
duty to organize elections (introducing competition amongst politicians, see Boudreaux and 
Pritchard, 1993), the separation of powers (Ostrom, 2008: 99), the prevalence of a majority-
rule (Buchanan and Tullock, 1999) or generality of the law (this PhD, essay 4) are designed so 
that the exercise of political power is oriented at the well-being of the citizenry, and, more 
negatively, minimize the possibility of oppression within those domains that fall outside the 
realm of individual choice (Boudreaux and Pritchard, 1993: 127), by regulating and 
conditioning the exercise of political inequality on the basis of history or empirical reasoning, 
these institutions increase the expected benefit of living with political power (Leeson, 2009; 
Ostrom, 2009: 96-99).  
 
2.2.  Constitutional thinking: a story of two tales 
 
Whereas we can find some historical and normative consensus on the abovementioned 
description of what a constitution is, and does, such an agreement cannot be found among 
social scientists as to how to detect the proper constitutional rules that form its content. 
Moreover philosophers, economists and lawyers have formed different methodologies to 





When it comes to revealing the proper constitutional checks that actually limit governmental 
action, two traditions have developed themselves separately.  
2.2.1.  The tradition of legal positivism  
 
According to one tradition, the rules that constrain a specific politico-legal order, are the rules 
that the order itself recognizes as its constraints. When one wishes to evaluate the legal 
arrangements that parliaments and executives adopt, lawyers working in the positivist 
tradition will rely on the prevailing constitutional framework to scrutinize legislation or 
executive orders. Constitutional control is here a function of the broader ‘hierarchy of norms’ 
that applies in legal systems, and wherein constitutional norms traditionally take up the 
highest step (Bouckaert, 2004). Accepted legal scrutiny here commences from 1) the existing 
constitutional provisions as agreed by politicians 2) their meaning as established by judges, 
and 3) the related interpretations lawyers grant these judgments.  
Often, daily contributions to constitutional law have a descriptive nature, and they try to 
disentangle the very meaning of the constitutional texts themselves, for instance in relation to 
sophisticated novel legislation. Indeed, due to the increasing legal complexity, contemporary 
lawyers have an educative task, and try to resolve the information asymmetry that divides the 
state and its citizens. But also when taking a more critical stance, and screening of, for instance 
administrative actions on their compatibility with specific provision, the constitutional lens as 
it appears in this custom, remains of a endogenous nature: to criticize enforceable rules of a 
legal order, one needs to ‘look from within’. The path to check upon the validity of rules is to 
find other enforceable rules with superior status inside that system. With an analogy, if one 
wishes to criticize practices within a specific culture, one can only rely on principles that culture 
itself holds. Constitutional analysis, in this tradition, professes a sort of ‘consistency audit’: the 
measures enacted by a political system need to be in accordance with the set of rules that that 
system has declared as its own constraints. The proper content of those ‘higher rules’ depends 
on what the system itself declares, and falls outside the object of critical analysis. The 
methodological skills that emerge here are knowledge-accumulation and jurisprudential 
analysis. Due to an extensive knowledge of the existing framework of constitutional rules, 
combined with a mastering of the art of proper qualification and distinction between various 
factual elements, the legal positivist can check whether new taxes and administrative measures 
are in accordance with the underlying set of rules that currently governs the state. In this 
tradition, the legitimacy of a political measure (e.g. a property tax) gets derived from its 
accordance with a set of semi-fixed rules on which representatives vote.  
Although the field of prevailing constitutional law is an important source of constitutional 
thinking, and recourse to constitutional rules is probably the most effective source to regulate 
governmental action, a healthy dose of intellectual precaution remains warranted regarding 
‘endogenous benchmarks’. Two empirical insights indicate why constitutional legal research 
might remain a kind of reservation regarding ‘the rules-in-place’. Firstly, even at their birth, 
the ‘official’ constitutions – the one states uphold themselves - are highly imperfect tools for 
the goal they serve. The point of a constitution is to find a model of political power that serves 
the interest of each single citizen, and, in its ideal form, rests on universal consensus (Ostrom, 
1997: 273). In reality constitutions are not contracted by all members of society, but rather by 
a small minority. Peculiarly, the minority deciding on the constitutional rules is precisely that 
group that the rules themselves are supposed to protect us against, i.e. politicians. The 





their own powers. Indeed, the rules, which are going to define the game, are mainly determined 
by one side, namely governmental officials. This highly imperfect procedure no doubt 
influences the constitutional content, which can be expected to be shaped in the interest of the 
political bodies. Secondly, once a constitutional democracy has been set up, it suffers from 
something we could call natural and ‘gradual erosion of individual liberty under majoritarian 
democracy’ (Gwartney and Wagner, 1988: 4). By this we mean that, after the establishment of 
a constitutional democracy, those in charge have an interest in undermining the system of 
constitutional protection, which is in everybody’s long term interest. In order to execute the 
agenda, and try to uphold the promises made to voters and supporters, or often simply to 
secure power, politicians will have a strong incentive to engage in ‘silent and gradual 
encroachments’ of the constitutional constraints they face (Padover, 1953: 46-47). This 
becomes exacerbated by the fact that the politicians themselves are often vulnerable to 
pressure from specific groups that aim to manipulate the legal order to their benefit. While 
behind a veil of uncertainty, unaware of our future position, we all have an interest in the 
limitation of power, once the game has been set up, pressure will emerge to tinker with the 
constitutional order. These reasons might indicate why, over the last 200 years, we have seen 
an enlargement of the legislative and executive branches of government. Already in 1977, noble 
prize winner James Buchanan described the United States, notably the state with the strongest 
judicial review in the world, to be in a state of ‘constitutional anarchy’: ‘where the range and 
extent of federal government influence over individual behavior depend largely on the 
accidental preferences of politicians in judicial, legislative, and executive positions of power’ 
(Buchanan, 2000a: 19).  
An awareness of the imperfect nature of prevailing constitutions, and the natural, ‘gradual 
erosion’ of a constitutional order, with statutory law and continental legislation freely 
overgrowing many parts of society, nurtures a curiosity to look outside that which has been 
decided within the realm of power.  
2.2.2. The tradition of political economy and political philosophy  
 
Inspired by the tradition of social contract thinking, a constitution is the agreement that 
minimizes the risk when free and equal individuals establish a government. Echoing Thomas 
Hobbes, individuals contract a government because the prospect of security is pareto-superior 
compared to the ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ (1976, chapter 13) life in the state of 
nature.1 The risk is, of course, that the delegation of power to some individuals – that comprises 
‘the state’ - forms an extension of the state of nature. How do we know for sure if the politicians 
and executives holding such monopolistic powers, will employ these for the benefit of those 
who gave them these powers in the first place? Hence, the individuals establishing the state - 
astute contractants - will negotiate the terms of their transfer of liberty, so that political action 
is oriented to their welfare (Rawls, 1999a: 3, 10). 
The traditions of political philosophy and political economists make up the study of the 
agreements that free contractants would make, were they implied in contracting of the state. 
The constitutional test screens whether the existing political order could be legitimized “as if” 
it emerged contractually.2 Where the legal positivist accepts the given politico-legal order as 
                                                          
1 Pareto-superior means that (at least) one person benefits and no one is made worse off (David Friedman, 1990: 
438).  
2 The ‘contractarian’ aspect of social contract theory is thus largely a metaphor. See Buchanan and Brennan, 1999a: 





given, philosophers and economists will locate a normative benchmark as exogenous to the 
enforceable provisions of the system. Indeed, the existing legal framework is the object of 
evaluation, but does not itself form the yardstick for critical assessment.3 But how to set up a 
framework that discovers the constitutional rules, requisite for the assessment of a legal 
system, outside of the ‘official’ rules of that system? Three traditions can be distinguished, 
although, these are largely intertwined, and many authors merge at least two of the three types 
of methods.  
The analysis professed by political economy depicts rules as constraints for human behavior, 
as background settings against which individuals’ strategies will emerge (Wagner, 2016: 53; 
Buchanan and Brennan, 2000a: 8-10). Building on Adam Smith (1976, book1: 28-30) rules are 
gauged on the effect they resort: ‘The same individuals, with the same motivations and 
capacities, will interact to generate quite different aggregate outcomes under differing sets of 
rules, with quite different implications for the well-being of every participant.’ (Brennan and 
Buchanan, 2000a: 4) Particular politico-legal institutions, such as property rights, 
redistributive programs or political decision rules, will be gauged with respect to the behavioral 
patterns these institutions will generate when self-interested individuals start acting upon 
them (Ostrom, 2014: 92). Ideally, the optimal rules – that form the content of a constitution - 
are met by a unanimity-requirement: only when each single individual agrees to a certain set 
of rules, can we make sure they optimally satisfy the preferences of all individuals.4 Naturally, 
since in political reality unanimity cannot be achieved, this question remains a hypothetical 
one.5 Hence, political economists establish models, empirical predictions and even 
experiments to inform us on the potential outcomes of specific legal arrangements. If a specific 
arrangement creates a positive-sum for each player (i.e. Pareto-superior) or if specific 
institutions promote the surface where no one can be made better off without making someone 
else worse off (i.e. Pareto-optimal); then political economists will reason that constitutional 
choice could embrace this rule, as it could count on unanimous consent (Boettke et al., 2011: 
309).6 For instance, Buchanan (2000a: 33-41) famously established that the option ‘property 
rights’ installs a better perspective for each participant than ‘no property rights’, hence, 
constitutional consensus can be reached on the acceptance of property rights. Another example 
is the work of Lin and Vincent Ostrom (2014) that leans on both field research and theoretic 
models, to conclude that ‘fragmented’ political authority is a Pareto-superior vehicle for 
governance than centralized authority.  
Another domain connected with constitutionalist heritage is delivered by political 
philosophers. Philosophers, just like economists, will use rational arguments to estimate the 
content of the set of rules that ought to coordinate and monitor the political community. One 
stance of philosophers remains contractarian: the content of the constitution is that which is 
                                                          
3 This somehow overstretches the distinction: often existing legislation will animate and coincide with philosophical 
or economic principles. However, political economy / philosophy does not use prevailing legislation as a benchmark 
as such.  
4 Buchanan established the unanimity principle in Calculus of Consent (see page 85 and further). His defense of 
this principle is directly connected with his rejection of interpersonal utility comparisons and his rejection of welfare 
economics’ objective welfare function (Buchanan, 1959).  
5 The models from political economists are thus seen as ‘estimations’ of what could emerge from unanimity. 
Although unanimity is theoretically maximally efficient in terms of preference-satisfaction, its decision costs are too 
high. Hence, political economists screen which type of rules minimize negative externalities following from less-
than-unanimity. See Buchanan and Tullock, 1999: 85 – 119.  
6 In other terms, how unanimity could revolve around specific rules (Buchanan and Brennan, 2000a: 23). In the 
end, however, the proper constitutional rules are those, which would effectively be chosen by participants, rather 
than argued for by economists, as only individual choosers know their own preferences. Therefore, the proposals of 





contracted by its participants. Nonetheless, the setting of constitutional choice will be modified 
so that the chosen principles adhere to a non-utilitarian standard. Individuals are not just 
allowed to choose rules, they must choose under specific constraints. The most famous 
proponent of this view is John Rawls, who famously designed a hypothetical situation where 
the choosers lack any information over their personal characteristics, social position, and 
conception of the good (Rawls, 1999a: 11; Gaus and Thrasher, 2015: 46). Indeed, by creating a 
‘veil of ignorance’ the constitutional principles that merge out of the ‘original position’ are not 
simply gauged on expected utility for its members, but will attain a standard of ‘justice as 
fairness’. For Rawls himself, this means participants will opt for institutions that maximize the 
amount of economic goods for the least well off. One could say, where the political economists 
use models to ‘simulate’ real choices, and approximate what people would actually choose, 
political philosophers have an inclination to shape models, in order to proclaim substantive 
moral principles that people ‘should choose’.7 
Other philosophers will depart even more from the subjective-contractarian account to detect 
the constitutional content. The rules that ought to order a political community are ‘natural 
laws’, inherent in mankind itself. As the constitutional content can be revealed through an 
objective-rational analysis of human nature, the metaphor of the contract often vanishes in 
these writings.8 Contributions like those of John Locke, Robert Nozick, Peter Vallentyne and 
Frank Van Dun, deduce normative principles from an essential appreciation of humans as 
autonomous agents. Coercive action is only justified when conceptually and/or logically 
compatible with the idea of each individual as a possessor of sovereignty over his own person. 
The fact that we are actively choosing beings who make their own plans is not a morally 
irrelevant observation, but justifies that people have certain ‘domains’ that are secluded from 
the enforceable claims of others.9 (Mack, 1986: 487). These zones of discretion – typically one’s 
own person and external objects - are the object of a ‘right’, i.e. claims that create duties of non-
intervention on others, governments in particular (Mack, 1986: 491; Bastiat, 2011: 50). 
Generally speaking, the framework of natural law thus discloses the proper limits for 
governmental action through logical implications of the unique trait of humans to shape their 
own lives. Proponents thus derive legal institutions such as property rights or freedom of 
speech from deontic moral reasoning (Nozick, 2004).10 Perhaps the most famous contribution 
here is that of Immanuel Kant, who used this methodology to pronounce the Categorical 
Imperative - moral principles must apply in the same way to all rational beings without 
exception - hereby giving rise to the constitutional constraint known as ‘generality of the law’, 
or ‘the rule of law’ (see essay 4).11  
                                                          
7 This paragraph deliberately overstates the difference between Rawls and Buchanan. Buchanan added conditions 
to the setting of constitutional choice as well, (albeit of a more realistic nature) and Rawls, from his end, did not 
always employ fully idealized settings (Gaus and Thrasher, 2015).  
8 The agreement metaphor is not really necessary since all humans are expected to agree to the insights delivered 
by reason. Nonetheless, some natural rights authors still use it. See for instance Richard Epstein.  
9 Natural law, drawing on strong intuitions, is often much closer to the layman’s normative thinking than the 
empirical framework the political economist will use. More importantly, its basic reasonings had enormous 
influence on positive law as well, for instance through the work of Samuel Pufendorf and Hugo Grotius.  
10 As expressed by, for instance, Robert Nozick (2004) utilitarian considerations of expected general welfare cannot 
justify the violation of natural law.  
11 Hayek and later Buchanan famously described the ‘rule of law’ as the constraint that laws will apply equally to all 
citizens. Using different justifications, this is simply a legal translation of the Kantian imperative that moral 





3.  Central Research Questions 
 
This PhD represents an endeavor to connect the legal evolutions described under 1 
(introduction) to the constitutional benchmarks as expressed in 2 (the constitutionalist 
outlook). Specifically the query has been to check whether both prevailing fiscal measures and 
normative ideas on taxation are in accordance with the set of constitutional rules that regulates 
the political process wherein taxation arises. The game-comparison is instructive here. The 
increasing fiscal revenue, the widening array of governmental techniques to fund state activity, 
the various strategies adopted by voters and interest-groups to minimize their burden, an 
accelerating number of tax lawyers and the increased relevance of the legal service-industry 
that wealthy clients use to circumvent their tax-obligations, are emergent patterns within ‘our 
game’ of fiscal politics. As partakers in that game, when we participate in collective choices 
(e.g. voting tax rules); in the execution of enforceable measures (e.g. working in a fiscal 
administration), in the education on taxation, or in the market of legal services (e.g. setting up 
a construction to minimize the individual tax burden), we acquiesce in the rules-of-the games, 
accept these as given information, and as such contribute to the patterns.  
This PhD, however, demands an intellectual move away from the viewpoint of a specific player 
within a game (i.e. voter, bureaucrat, executive, attorney) to a perspective that is external to 
the game, from which we can evaluate its proper design. Moreover our concern is not simply 
to understand the rules that govern our system (i.e. positivist law education) or to advise the 
best strategy within a specific set of rules (i.e. legal services), the focus here is on choosing the 
best set of rules (Buchanan, 2000b: 369). In other terms, we aim to explore which tax rules are 
in accordance with the ‘rules of the rules’: the negative and positive rules that embody the 
interest of each single person, and form the content of the constitution.  
But isn’t tax policy overly complex and technical? How can we ‘marry’ a field so technical that 
only a handful of specialists understand it, with a domain so fundamental and philosophical as 
‘the rules of the rules’? Although one’s personal tax debt is a phenomenon determined by a 
wide array of rules, exemptions and deductions, the fiscal essentials of any tax system are not 
manifold. Winer and Heitlich state that although ‘actual tax systems are complicated and often 
elaborate, underneath their rather baroque appearance lies a simple skeleton, consisting of a 
limited number of parts’. Complexity did thus not emerge from taxation as a phenomenon, but 
from the complex array of answers the legislative and administrative machinery has given to 
them, over time. The main foundations of a tax system that will attract our attention are 
threefold: 1) what holds as an acceptable tax base; 2) how we can measure this base and 3) 
what type of rate-structure we should we apply to this taxable entity. The first question relates 
to the type of economic phenomenon (talent, income, consumption, etc.) governments can use 
as a benchmark for taxation. The second question concerns the debate on how to quantify a 
specific economic phenomenon, namely which methods can we use to measure for instance 
‘income’. The last question revolves around the distribution of the tax burden amongst 
citizens: should a regressive, flat or progressive rate apply, and connected, which credits, 
deductions and exemptions are to apply. The first question, on what to tax, has been 
disentangled in two issues. As both tax theory and tax practice tend to differentiate for labour 
and capital income, the first two chapters of this PhD have been divided into ‘labour income’ 
(dealing with both the tax base and measurement) on one hand and ‘capital taxation’ on the 
other. Hence, this PhD consists of four remaining parts. The word ‘essay’ is deliberately chosen 





Essay 1: How can a political system tax persons?  
 
Essay 2: How can a political system tax capital? 
 
Essay 3: How can a political system measure income?  
 
Essay 4: Which rate structure should divide the fiscal burden amongst the citizenry?  
 
4.  Employed methodology  
 
So far we have listed a couple of core questions that any tax system should answer. They form 
the object of investigation. But what is the mean of inquiry? Chapter 2 of this introduction 
advanced the different strands within constitutionalism. Before developing this methodology 
further (4.2.2.) it seems apt to have a look at how other academics deal with these issues. 
Moreover, this PhD should be read as an alternative approach to taxation, and each essay will 
criticize the fiscal strategies proposed by conventional tax theorists. But who is this conversant 
I am arguing against, and moreover, what deeper foundations inspire their framework? In 
other terms: where does the conventional tax theorist come from.  
4.1.  Conventional tax literature  
 
4.1.1 Optimal Tax Theory  
 
Optimal Tax Theory is the mainstream normative approach to taxation (Hamlin, 2017: 5). Its 
method of developing the best tax system can be depicted in a two-step sequence (Wagner, 
2016: 34). First, ‘the economy’ is sketched. Property rights and freedom of contract are 
assumed, and peoples’ utility functions are known through some scalar that displays the values 
they attach to specific transactions and goods (Buchanan, 2000b: 282-283). Consequently, 
economists describe how, under the presumption of fully informed rational agents, perfect 
competition turns this data into a ‘mass point’: a static equilibrium that embodies the 
optimum, in which goods and services are allocated to their most valid use (Altson et al., 1996). 
At this stage, the aggregate value of utility that all participants generate appears as a known 
number. Standard economists, however, agree that the prevailing economy is an incomplete 
version of the static ideal, as real-life private markets cannot produce public goods or find 
solutions to deal with negative externalities (Samuelson, 1954).  
 
Once the static portrait of the economy has been sketched, politics comes into play to optimize 
the defective economy and steer the utility function in the proper direction (Wagner, 2016). 
The political sphere is often depicted as a kind of additive, separate entity from the economy, 
and ‘political personages are thus reasonably analogized to mechanics whose task is to 
maintain the economy in the proper order’ (Wagner, 2016). Optimal Taxation is thus the theory 
of fiscal tools that these mechanics can use to boost the welfare function. While other 
economists are concentrating on which types of expenditure increase overall utility, or on how 
to regulate market failure, tax theorists’ role in the public fabric is to raise this money while 
minimizing the utility loss (Hettich and Winer, 1999: 102). Indeed, as each tax will both raise 
the price for a consumer and decrease the income for the seller, this will cause consumers and 
producers to substitute away from that activity (Myles, 1995). Hence, optimal tax systems 
reveal the type of tax structure that raises money for the political process, while minimizing 





taxes” as an optimal form of taxing labour (rather than true income, see essay 1) and have 
pleaded to tax capital through a “mark-to-market-approach” (rather than realized capital 
gains, see essay 3). When concentrating on existing tax systems in order to maximize output, 
policy advice typically builds on the ‘private responses’ to various taxes, and the proper 
(re)configuration of the tax system depends on parameters such as the elasticity of the taxed 
transaction and the income available for the taxpaying unit (Hamlin, 2017). As these private 
responses tend to vary for different persons, goods and services, ‘in theory, every distinct 
transaction should be taxed at separate rate that takes into account all relevant direct and 
indirect effects on efficiency and distribution’ (Hettich and Winer, 1999: 104). And indeed, 
optimal tax theorists have been proposing discriminatory rate policies in both income taxation 
and VAT (see essay 4) respectively, regarding height, skin color, gender, level of income, type 
of income; and regarding the type of product purchased. As fiscal policy is ‘parasitical’ to the 
economy, the ideal tax system envisioned by conventional tax theorists is as complicated as an 
economy in itself (Hettich and Winer, 1999: 105). 
 
4.1.2 Tax Fairness Theories  
 
Most Optimal Tax theorists give no explicit value to ‘fairness’. The best tax system is the one 
that generates the least overall welfare loss. This narrow utilitarian view has been attacked by 
other economists and philosophers who believe taxation should play a broader role in society 
as an instrument to install distributive justice. By distributive justice, these theorists hint that 
the structure of ownership (income, wealth, consumption) must follow a certain pattern 
(Nozick, 2004: 155). Competitive ‘free’ markets generate a static equilibrium, in which the 
pattern of distribution does not adhere to any moral standard. According to this view, the task 
of taxation is to repaint the current distribution as displayed in a snapshot – i.e., some external 
criterion, not present in the ‘free market’, ought to install a certain order, and thus ‘redistribute’ 
the shares that ‘the market’ ‘distributes’ (Buchanan J and Brennan G, 2000a: 108-109). In 
other words, the taxing and spending process is a means through which the distributional 
results of the market may be modified according to more ethically legitimate patterns 
(Buchanan, 2000b: 145).  
 
As a result of this viewpoint, revelations of the increasing wealth gap have triggered a ‘new 
wave of egalitarianism’. Indeed, after the findings on capital accumulation, many studies added 
a ‘tax fix’, addressing how tax reform could prevent a possible capitalist dystopia. Moreover, 
various methods have been suggested to alter the distributive market forces. One famous 
example is Piketty (2014), who advocates a global property tax as the best way to promote 
equality in society. Piketty was joined by Tony Atkinson (2015) who also supports fiscal 
redistributionism. Specifically, Atkinson advocates a proportional or progressive property tax 
based on all up-to-date property assessments (see essay 2), a progressive lifetime capital 
receipts tax (a tax on inheritance and gifts inter vivos), and steeper progressive income 
taxation (see essay 4). Interestingly, philosophers have joined their colleagues from the social 
sciences in theorizing on the political role of taxation. For instance, Ingrid Robeyns’ upcoming 
‘limitarianism’ states that it is ‘morally objectionable to be rich’, and we have a moral duty not 
to have ‘too much’ (2016). Therefore, justice requires marginal taxation rates of 100% on 
everything we own or gain above a specific level (see essay 4). Lastly, leaning on both Piketty 
and Meade before him, Martin O’Neill wants to address the ‘underlying patterns of ownership 
in society’ and looks to ‘restructure the economic game from the very start’ (O’Neilll, 2017: 262-





transfers (both inheritance and inter vivos), and shifting the tax incidence from 
workers/consumers to companies and their shareholders (O’Neill, 2017: 263-266). His 
‘predistributive agenda’ also has a non-fiscal chapter, which endeavors to put parts of the 
private economy under ‘democratic control’ and install more social forms of corporate 
governance (O’Neill, 2017: 264, 266). 
4.2.  Towards a constitutionalist approach  
 
Different theories have different ways to come at the research questions that forms the focal 
point of this PhD. This PhD will demonstrate how an alternative approach to optimal and 
fairness tax theories yields equally alternative answers to the research questions. Being an 
applicatory work, bringing constitutional thinking to the domain of taxation, the following 
articles will not defend the use of our constitutionalist outlook as such. Hence, this 
introduction will juxtapose the different views on politics and taxation that nurture the 
conventional and the constitutional approach, respectively. In other terms: where does the 
conventional tax theorist (both the optimal and the fairness-flavor) come from?  
4.2.1.  On Taxation and Romance: the methodological shortcomings of 
conventional tax theory 
 
The ‘optimal’ and ‘fairness’ accounts of taxation are clearly counterparts. Indeed, they depict a 
long-standing difference between utilitarians – who see it as a moral duty to enhance utility – 
and egalitarians – who believe the principle of equality (in all its forms) has inherent value. 
Nonetheless, for our purposes, we could describe their discussions as an example of the 
‘narcissism of small differences’. The focus lies on seemingly important variations, while from 
a distant perspective the antagonists are actually equals. Both theories lack what we could 
call “a constitutional reflex”: nowhere in these approaches does one find traces of the dual 
idea that governmental competences should be checked by 1) rights that limit its lawful domain 
and 2) rules that restrain its operation within the sphere it is allowed to act. Indeed, if optimal 
tax theorists propose a different treatment for nearly each different kind of transaction, or if 
redistributive theorists wish we could seize 100% of income (see essay 4), what is their deeper 
understanding of the fiscal process? We are less focused on what a state may need to enhance; 
here, we pay more attention to the underlying assumptions regarding the machinery that will 
generate this enhancement. Moreover, we focus on what ontological and epistemological 
qualities both theories – bundled as conventional tax theory – attribute to the state, and to the 
institution of taxation in particular.  
First, both theories present a specific causal sequence between ‘the market’ and ‘politics’. 
Taxation – and politics at large – is presented as independent of the economy. The outcome 
generated by ‘the pure market’ can be captured through a static photo, a snapshot, which 
delivers the first imprint of an economy (Wagner, 2016: 35). The economy, however, is 
secondary to politics, and taxation is a toolkit to repair and perfect the results of human actions 
that take place through market processes. The image that emerges in traditional fiscal writing 
is that politics, and taxation in particular, can unilaterally determine the economy.  
Second, the market and politics are populated differently. Where the modeling of the market 
will typically assume various self-interested agents, tax policy is portrayed as something a 
‘single agent’ can choose (Buchanan and Brennan, 2000a: 128). More importantly, this 
monolithic entity is assumed to be a benevolent actor: when fiscal competences are 





that goal (Buchanan and Brennan, 2000b: Xiii-Xiv). Indeed, tax theorists seem to assume that 
potential political actors will share their own genuine motivations, and thus powers will be 
employed ‘with a single-minded dedication to follow the dictates of welfare economics’ or 
distributive justice (Wagner, 2016: 13). Empowering governments to maximize utility or re-
organize the patterns of welfare is not evaluated on how they deal with opportunistic behavior, 
as the political subjects are presumably programmed to only shape competences according to 
the objective quality taxation ought to realize. Buchanan and Congleton had this 
methodological blindfold in mind when they stated (2006: 87): ‘nowhere in the whole of this 
approach to taxation is there any recognition that persons and groups will invest valuable 
resources in the politics that may operate to produce favorable or unfavorable tax treatment’. 
Lastly, optimal tax theorists’ models imply some specific epistemological assumptions. First of 
all, when constructing the equilibrium, objective values for consumption, labour or capital are 
imputed in the model. In other words, ‘ “utility”, or “that which is maximized,” has presumptive 
existence that is independent of any exercise of choice itself’ (Buchanan, 2000b: 281). Equally, 
in order to enhance the economic outcome (or redistribute alongside an ideal pattern), the 
specific private responses (e.g. the substitutability of a certain good or service) to a certain tax 
appear as a ‘given’ to the political actor. Both create the image that the political agent has 
perfect knowledge of the economic requirements to optimize the economic outcome. In other 
terms, the policy-maker is not simply a benevolent actor; he is an omniscient benevolent 
actor.  
Traditional tax theorists’ proposals are related to their precise understanding of the nature of 
the process: a single, independent, benevolent and omniscient actor vested with the task of 
creating a superior economic or distributive state. According to their interpretation of the 
problem, the phenomenon of taxation is portrayed such that fiscal policy appears to be a 
logical, feasible and effective engineering enterprise. Nonetheless, once we try to disclose the 
properties of taxation, it seems that the methodological assumptions of conventional tax theory 
are shaky, to say the least. Taxation does not shape the market like a chemical analyst can 
improve vaccines in the lab.  
The analyst is first of all not causally separate from his object of investigation. The idea of 
a policy-maker working with an economy displayed through a point mass equilibrium feeds 
the idea that this policy-maker would somehow be ‘outside of this process’ (Wagner, 2016: 48). 
However, policy-makers and citizens occupy the same social space (Wagner, 2016). 
‘Taxmakers’ spend their lives among their object of investigation, as they (and their friends and 
families) are most likely taxpayers themselves. Taxpayers ‘are not just objects to be acted upon 
by some policy maker, but rather exercise their own initiatives, and talk back to the so-called 
policy-makers.’ How taxpayers react to the ‘political responses’ relates to the second matter 
(Wagner, 2016: 60). 
Traditional tax theory has always assumed that policy-makers have a divergent motivational 
structure, and that they stand above the normal forces that drive individual action: whereas in 
the market we assume self-interested species, the analysts who ‘run the lab’ are modeled as 
benevolent individuals focused on the common good, i.e. maximizing welfare or distributive 
justice. However, observations, knowledge of everyday life, and empirical reasoning insists 
that political actors are not less self-interested than other private persons, and will actually 
respond to taxpayers’ opportunistic strategies when doing so serves their self-interest (e.g. 





his object. As such, the implicit behavioral ‘asymmetry’ implied by tax theory is not empirically 
or theoretically plausible (Butler, 2012: 77). There is no evidence that people undergo a 
personality transformation when they enter the political arena, thus there is no reason to 
assume fiscal policy-makers would be more benevolent than common citizens (Gwartney and 
Wagner, 1988: 7). As opposed to the motivational romanticism of traditional tax scholars, we 
propose to apply the self-interestedness postulate within politics.  
Lastly, the epistemological properties of Optimal Tax Theory’s models incorrectly portray the 
economic reality. The value of a specific good or service, or its precise substitutability, is not 
like measuring the time of a run. These are unknown facts, similar to guessing how people 
would value watching a running race, or what they would do if the price of a particular good 
changed (Wagner, 2016: 38). The fact that entrepreneurs engage in various costly statistical 
tests and marketing studies to acquire a risky, imperfect, estimation of such data, signals that 
something remarkable is going on here. Why would we assume governments to have 
information no single person can acquire? On the assumption that we know these things, 
economists engage in ‘demonstrative reasoning’ and showcase how specific policies enhance 
the common good. From this point on, economics trickles down to a pure mathematical 
exposition. The show, however, is one of an illusionist nature: things do not get value because 
some third party says they do. In reality, the values we attach to goods and – connected – the 
way we respond to price-changes (i.e. a tax), are subjective matters that are revealed through 
the choices we make. In other terms: welfare economists engineer a process on the basis of 
information, which is in reality the outcome of that very process. One of the genuine reasons 
for actually having a market system is because our ‘utility scalars’ and the ‘substitutability’ of 
one thing for another, are not things directly known to any of us (Kirzner, 1985). Against the 
epistemic romanticism of traditional tax scholars, we propose ‘epistemic subjectivism’: 
when it comes to the value we attach to goods or our precise reactions to changing prices, we 
have no prior objective knowledge. Such knowledge is only tacitly present and scattered over 
millions of people, who will reveal the answers through the choices they make under specific 
constraints and ever-changing circumstances (Hayek, 1945). This insight reveals why even a 
simple question, like whether a surtax on soda would increase general welfare, is simply 
unsolvable. We do not know how much value people attach to soda until we can observe it from 
their responses to such a tax.  
4.2.2.  ‘After-Romance’: the meaning of constitutional regulation 
 
Most of this PhD will focus on specific fiscal policies, i.e. answers on question 1-4. We will dive 
into specific and technical fiscal matters, for instance whether a state can use market values to 
calculate a taxable income (see essay 3). The articles do not permit us to reflect much on 
methodological foundations. The purpose of this essay is exactly to reveal the philosophy 
behind the competing methodology. The purpose of this introduction is to convey that different 
approaches (optimal vs. constitutional) mirror a different view on taxation itself. When 
optimal tax theorists propose to include ‘potential income’ to the domain of governmental 
exaction, or when redistributive scholars theorize taxation up to 100%, they do so with respect 
to specific assumptions on taxation. In particular, the wide range of flexibility it grants fiscal 
authorities, is spurred by a romantic image of the state, the latter view being an artifact from 
aristocratic times (Wagner, 2016: 34). In this anachronistic and idealized account, 
governments are single actors, secluded from society, with supra-human traits in terms of 
morality and knowledge. Why restrain an independent, omniscient benevolent government? 





(2000b: 225) sketch their romanticism by means of an analogy on neighbors’ discussing how 
to restrain their dog:  
It is costly to build a fence or to purchase a chain. It is possible to prove that the no-
fence, no-chain solution is more efficient than either, provided that we model the 
behavior of our dog in such a way that he respects the boundaries of our property. As 
we have put this example from personal experience, the exercise seems, and is, absurd. 
But is it really very different from that procedure which argues that tax structure X is 
more ``efficient'' than tax structure Y provided that we model the behavior of 
government in such a way that it seeks only to further efficiency in revenue collection? 
Once we have modeled tax-makers as naturally motivated to enhance our welfare, the model 
predicts that unlimited competences will favor general welfare (Buchanan and Brennan, 
2000a: 47). Similar burdens rest on the epistemic romanticism. It’s possible to conceptualize 
government as having all data on what we find valuable and our responses to possible fiscal 
stimuli. Indeed, the idea of “limited government” becomes a proposition of ignorance once we 
model governments as omniscient. Constitutional constraints are like limiting professional 
doctors in performing simple operations that save people’s lives.12  
The idea of ‘constitutionalism’, an underlying contract that regulates political action, gains 
particular relevance in the light of the political realism as described above. The challenges the 
knowledge and incentive problem exert on centralized politics, nurture the debate on the 
proper scope of government. A constitution, which should be seen as a contract that serves the 
interests of all participants, forms the general framework that mediates the prospective risks 
of political power. It was in this sense, Hume (1963: 117-18) suggested that we do not model 
constitutions on romantic presumptions, but rather on the opposite:  
In constraining any system of government, and the several checks and controls of the 
constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all 
his actions, than private interest. 
This methodological insight has increased in relevance throughout history, when events 
clarified that political models established on highly unrealistic behavioral or epistemological 
accounts, theoretically in the possibility to design Utopias, in reality generated Infernos. 
Whereas the conventional approach immediately jumps to what governments ‘should’ do, the 
constitutional approach starts off from background assumptions on what they reasonably ‘will’ 
do. Only if normative legal theory models the world as it is, can it be said that its proposals 
have any real value.  
On a non-ideal account, tax makers are self-interested individuals who are not causally 
independent from taxpayers and who face severe epistemological constraints to do good. The 
image of the state changes from a ‘benevolent omniscient despot’ into something like a 
‘peculiar investment bank’ (Wagner, 2016: 162). Policy makers are not angels but rather 
bankers, albeit with the special prerogative to raise money through the use of coercion. As these 
public bankers are subject to restraints – electoral competition in particular – they will bestow 
the public resources on those groups whose support is necessary to retain power (Gwartney 
and Wagner, 1988: 10). Through this non-ideal lens, the risk appears to be that the institution 
of taxation divides society in a number of ‘contributors’ and a group of ‘beneficiaries’ 
                                                          
12 For an illuminating analysis of the equation between the domain of science and that of politics, Buchanan and 





(Buchanan and Tullock, 1999: 132-149). It was this potential ‘bug’ in the democratic system 
Madison (Padover, 1953: 40-41) had in mind when he said:  
It remains to be enquired whether a majority having any common interest, or feeling 
any common passion, will find sufficient motives to restrain them from oppressing the 
minority. If two individuals are under the bias of interest or enmity against a third, the 
rights of the latter could never be safely referred to the majority of the three. Will two 
thousand individuals be less apt to oppress one thousand or two hundred thousand one 
hundred thousand? 
Indeed, when we depart from the romantic view on politics, an unregulated taxing and 
spending process allows the politically powerful to enrich themselves through imposed 
transfers from the relatively powerless. Fiscal policies will turn into exploitative processes 
whereby governmental officials and their supporters enrich themselves by taking from less 
powerful citizens.13 The potential harm through a ‘tyranny of the majority’ gets exacerbated by 
democracies’ inclination to favour small minorities. Moreover, politicians are more likely to be 
successful when defending the intense, concentrated interest of a few groups (e.g. farmers) 
rather than the weak diffused interests of the constituency as a whole (Gwartney and Wagner, 
1988: 19). Normatively speaking, not only are the majoritarian and minoritarian rent-seeking 
activities unfair as they embody pure ‘takings’, they demand economic investment (e.g. 
lobbying) which is otherwise allocated more usefully, they distort prices (cf. arbitrary tax 
exemptions) and hence generate a reduced size of the economic pie for all (Butler, 2012: 58-
62). 
In absence of the benevolence-assumption, we have to admit there is no ‘invisible hand’ 
inherent to democratic processes that assures the ‘taxing and spending’ state will transfer 
money to those groups that merit it either morally or economically (Buchanan and Tullock, 
1999). In constitutional-contractual terms: there is no guarantee that the power to tax, simply 
backed by some majority-requirement, will serve the interest of all participants. Additionally, 
even if we would assume the existence of benignly motivated officials, these would lack proper 
knowledge to execute moral or economic policies, as they often do not have access to the 
informational requisites. At the post-romantic stage, the need for an insurance policy to 
restrain possibly malevolent and fallible governments appears: a constitution is the regulatory 
device that defines the basic structure of the political process, in order to safeguard the interest 
of all players. It is an insurance mechanism that protects the constituency, and the least 
powerful participants in particular, against fiscal exploitation or ill-informed policies. It does 
so by creating permanent or quasi-permanent rules additional to the majority-requirement 
(Buchanan, 2000b: 147). Non-retro-activity of the law, the duty to organize elections (and thus 
electoral competition), generality of the law (non-discrimination against specific groups) or 
freedom to establish a political party (e.g. one that proposes less exploitation) are all positive 
constitutional principles that protect tax payers against exploitative tendencies through 
regulation of the political sphere. This set of rules aims to organize the political sphere so 
that the fiscal outcome does not harm those tax payers outside the realm of power. The right 
to private property, or the right to physical integrity, are negative constitutional principles that 
protect taxpayers by limiting the scope of fiscal authorities. They demarcate legal barriers to 
the propensity of powerful groups to realize political profits or counter-productive policies. 
Personal rights limit the outreach of taxation as such, by allocating certain spheres within the 
                                                          
13 To the extent that the amount of political power is a function of the economic power, richer citizens will be able 





domain of individual choice. Together, this set of rules forms the content of the fiscal 
constitution, which appears necessary on a non-romantic account of the political process. Its 
purpose is to avoid that when self-interested individuals with limited knowledge on the 
preferences of others, would act against the interest of the public at large. 
5.  Four central research questions – revisited  
 
It’s one thing to see why, generally, government should be limited and regulated in their 
actions, it’s another thing to, specifically, elucidate the constitutional principles and analyze 
how they restrain the fiscal process. Once we achieved access to the empirical worldview that 
grounds a constitutional perspective, the stage is set for such “analytical constitutionalism”. 
This PhD is an exploration on how the constitutional method regulates the fiscal process, and 
moreover, how it points to conclusions that differ from the ones given by the conventional 
method. Specifically, we will analyse how a couple of rights and principles shed light on the 
abovementioned issues. The central research questions form the skeleton around which we 
build our constitutionalist approach. We will examine how precisely the right to one’s body and 
mind influences the tax incidence (essay 1), how the right to private property rules out certain 
forms of capital taxation (essay 2), how the right to autonomy constrains governments in their 
measurement of capital income (essay 3), and how the positive principle of generality of the 
law regulates rate-policies. (essay 4). To disclose the proper benchmarks for constitutional 
analysis, and reveal the proper principles that the constitutionalist perspective employs to 
tackle fiscal politics, a pluralist methodology has been utilized:  
Essay 1 hinges on the natural law tradition to uncover a notion of ‘rights over the self’. 
By means of logical deductions from the axiom that ‘every person has a claim to pursue 
his own ends’, we disclose the ‘natural’ claim each person has over the use of his own 
physical and mental capacities. Analytical deductions will show us how precisely this 
personal right disciplines the fiscal authorities in their inclination to tax labour income.  
Essay 2 transfers the right to private property to the discussion concerning capital 
taxation. To the extent that this institution is acknowledged by most Western 
constitutions, and it’s meaning has been has been shaped by Positive Roman Law, this 
essay blends elements of legal positivism with the conceptual narrative of natural law 
theory. This methodological fusion will be used to distinguish between capital and 
capital gains taxes.  
Essay 3 elaborates further on the subjective notion of value, which has already been 
touched upon in the previous essays. Moreover, this section combines economic 
insights on price theory with analytical insights on the right to autonomy, to explain the 
limits governments face when measuring income.  
Essay 4 bridges normative requirements from political philosophy with behavioral 
insights from political economy to reveal the proper meaning of “generality of the law” 
in fiscal issues. This empirically driven essay will explicitly address the challenge of self-
interested intentions within the fiscal process when scrutinizing rate-policies. 
Resonating the observations that formed the introduction of this PhD, and integrating 
the findings from the previous essays, this conclusive essay will reveal the fiscal 
alternative this PhD proposes to both prevailing fiscal reality and the romantic theories 





6.  On constitutionalist co-travellers and interdisciplinary approaches to law 
and public policy. An afterword.  
 
Within legal research, this thesis presents itself as an alternative approach to the positivist one, 
in the sense that we took recourse to the domains of both philosophy and economics to reveal 
constitutional benchmarks. Within tax literature, this thesis tackles both the optimal tax and 
the tax fairness theorists, in the sense that we advance on an alternative, non-idealized image 
of government. The previous could somehow give the impression that there is but one scholar 
going against a tide, the latter carrying the masses of ‘methodological traditionalists’. While it 
is true that the coming essays contribute a different way of thinking within tax literature, much 
of what the reader will encounter is the result of various contemporary influences I had the 
chance to undergo, and the coming essays try to build on research traditions that have been 
established for decades at various universities around the world, notably Ghent University 
itself.  
My first degree, ‘Moral Sciences’, embodies a curriculum set up at this University in the early 
60’s of the former century. Its founders, such as the late Professor Leo Apostel, were convinced 
that if philosophers wanted to theorize on social phenomena, such as law and politics, 
knowledge of philosophy, and the great historical contributions, did not suffice. The tradition 
of applied philosophy established here in Ghent, was inspired by an interdisciplinary 
methodology, and protagonists such as the late Jaap Kruithof, Etienne Vermeersch, Freddy 
Mortier or Johan Braeckman, have made original contributions to normative thinking in 
Flanders and beyond, by borrowing insights from both social and natural sciences. 
Additionally, this PhD was completed at the Department of Interdisciplinary Studies of Law, 
Private Law and Business Law. The endeavour to build on social sciences and philosophy is no 
personal initiative, but a product of the rich tradition this Law Faculty has built up during the 
last decades. In this way, my ‘meta-juridical’ approach surfs on the academic wave that was 
created here thanks to the thinking of the late Koen Raes, who had a strong influence on me as 
a student, the empirical research tradition added by Boudewijn Bouckaert and the critical 
perspective that also marks the work and thinking of Frank Van Dun, Dirk Heirbaut, Mark Van 
Hoecke, Marc De Vos, my own promotor, Jan Verplaetse, and many others. In a way, Ghent 
University’s Law Faculty fulfilled a pioneering role, as the interdisciplinary methodology 
emerged here decades before the international trend that we witness today arose, and which is 
currently influencing many Universities around the world.  
Connected, the constitutionalist window that forms the backbone of this thesis, did not emerge 
in a vacuum, but came about in interaction with many scholars around the globe. Moreover, 
since a few years, philosophers such as Jerry Gaus and David Schmidtz (University of Arizona) 
are no longer specializing in ‘ideal theory’, depicting what the world could look like if only men 
were altruistic or possessed all knowledge to do good. Conversely, the philosophers I met 
during my research visit at Arizona are building up models that explicitly acknowledge that 
human species act under specific motivational and epistemological constraints. My position as 
an Adam Smith Fellow at George Mason University, has enabled me to work together with 
economists such as Peter Boettke and Don Boudreaux, which gave me a deeper understanding 
of the ‘PEE-school’ (politics, philosophy and economics) of thought that goes back to the 18th 
and 19th century’s writings of Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill or Karl Marx, 
when there was no clear distinction between jurisprudence, economics and political 
philosophy. On this account, studying law always has an evaluative side to it, and invites us to 





research is essentially entangled with social contract theory. Other scholars like Mark 
Pennington and Carmen Pavel, too, engage in normative evaluation of specific institutional 
structures while using realistic behavioral models borrowed from political economy. Indeed, 
many scholars from the Department of Political Economy at King’s College London, where I 
had the chance to work for a semester, exemplify how one can scrutinize specific legal-political 
arrangements by means of normative insights delivered from philosophy, and empirical 
constraints borrowed from economics. Furthermore, someone like Richard Epstein (New York 
University) is demonstrating the constitutional perspective for decades now, with his 
normative analysis being founded in both neoclassical economics and natural rights theory.  
Hence, my legal background has facilitated scrutiny of fiscal measures, but the employed 
methodology has many intellectual mothers and fathers. The interdisciplinary approach to 
legal phenomena was nurtured by my education in Moral Sciences and the tradition present at 
Department at which this PhD was completed. The realistic approach to governmental action, 
and the specific awareness of the risks of governmental failures that nurtures the constitutional 
perspective, was shaped by various interactions and a thorough personal study of the field of 
political economy. Combining insights from political philosophy with an empirically based, 
post-romantic image of politics nurtured by political economy, these inspirers, academic visits, 
fellowships and, especially, the study of many contributions, have equipped me to try to give a 
tentative answer to that one simple question:  










ESSAY ONE: ON THE TAXATION OF 






WHAT IS WRONG WITH ENDOWMENT TAXATION: SELF-USERSHIP AS A 
PREREQUISITE FOR LEGITIMATE TAXATION 14 
 
1. Introduction: towards a theory of legitimate taxation 
 
From a normative perspective a tax system can be assessed in two ways. A first kind of inquiry 
deals with the question ‘Why should society levy taxes?’ This research investigates the 
acceptability of the goals of public expenditure. Some of these are widely accepted, such as 
provision of public goods and funding of social security, while other objectives remain more 
debatable, such as correction for market failure and redistribution of wealth (Rosen, 2014: 252-
262). A second kind of inquiry deals with the question ‘How should society levy taxes? ’. If we 
assume that society agrees on (some of) these goals, an important issue remains how public 
authorities can attain these finalities in a legitimate way? Both questions should be treated 
separately. As a matter of principle, public spending should not only contribute to the 
abovementioned goals, a priori it should realise its funding through procedures that are 
compatible with people’s fundamental moral rights and liberties. The significance of this 
‘legitimacy question’ originates from the classical philosophical and legal insight that 
governmental action can only be undertaken within the boundaries set by people’s 
fundamental rights and liberties. As echoed by political philosopher John Tomasi (2012: 76), 
these rights and liberties are the ‘prerequisites for the legitimate exercise of democratic 
authority’.  In order to be normatively tolerable, a tax system should not only be efficacious 
and have the best intentions, it needs to be legitimate as well (Vallentyne, 2012a: 291-301).  
In an age of distrust, when residents seem increasingly unwilling to pay taxes, this ‘legitimacy’ 
requirement demands more attention.15 If public authorities want to restore the damaged 
relationship with their citizens, the rules that guide taxation ought to be justified within a 
balanced theory that addresses taxpayers as active holders of rights and not merely as welfare-
contributors. Hoping to re-establish a solid and durable relation between spending authorities 
and sponsoring citizens, the latter’s fiscal duties cannot simply be a function of economic 
efficiency models. Conversely, a new fiscal contract that aims at increased compliance requires 
– among other things – a theory of legitimate taxation that examines taxpayers’ particular 
moral rights and their relevance within fiscal policy. Surprisingly, up to now tax scholars 
dedicated little to no attention to this ‘legitimacy ’ requirement. In search for the ideal tax 
system, the dominant Optimal Taxation Theory focused mainly on considerations of efficiency 
– often supplemented with some notion of equity. Whether the suggested policy also adheres 
to people’s moral rights and liberties seems to be neglected in current literature (Slemrod, 
1990; Shaviro, 2007; Piketty and Saez, 2012; Bankman and Shaviro, 2015). One of the best 
                                                          
14 This first essay was published as: Delmotte and Verplaetse (2017). As mentioned there, in footnote 1, this 
contribution is written by Charles Delmotte and Jan Verplaetse, and the ideas and concepts expressed in this 
contribution were developed by Charles Delmotte. 
15 The current context of taxation is one of rising distrust between taxpayers and tax administrations. For further 
analysis of the notion of trust see Kirchler et al. (2017: 355-376) and Christians (2017: 151-172). The latter sketches 
the present time as follows: ‘Academics, watchdogs, journalists, and activists express deep scepticism about the 
motives of elected politicians with respect to tax policy in the context of multinationals that are simultaneously large 
political donors, outsize influencers of legal reforms, and direct beneficiaries of tax largesse. This scepticism … is 
arguably the source of a deepening distrust within societies regarding the design and implementation of the tax 
system’. See also Christians (2013: 1373-1414).  For more information on the fiscal crisis and the rise of tax avoidance 
see Avi-Yonah (2000: 1573–1676). Related, the EU (2015) estimates that European tax administrations lose 
annually about € 1 trillion due to tax evasion and avoidance. The OECD (2015) provides more empirical material on 





examples of this myopic search for an ideal tax system is the idea of an endowment tax, or 
taxing citizens on whatever their talents (and thus not their actual income) could make them 
earn. Already in the ’70s, leading economists like Akerloff (1978), Mirrlees (1971) and 
Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) promoted taxation of one’s innate earning ability as the ideal 
tax base. This century, leading tax scholars like Shaviro (2000), Stark (2005), Kaplow (2008), 
Zelenak (2006), Logue and Slemrod (2008) and Mankiw and Weinzierl (2010) defend taxation 
of potential earnings as the optimal tax base. Endowment taxation offers an excellent 
illustration of how a certain tax proposal can at the same time be normatively most appealing 
(since it would gather the necessary revenue in a highly efficient way) and normatively most 
horrendous (since it might degrade citizens into passive welfare-donators). In our view, taking 
people’s talents as the proper benchmark for taxation constitutes a multiple violation of 
people’s moral rights. By pinpointing what is wrong with this measure, we like to uncover the 
normative minima that any taxation policy should respect. These conditions demarcate the 
operative field for public authorities, wherein they ought to realise the abovementioned goals 
in a maximally efficient way.  
In this contribution, we first (section 2) clarify the idea of an endowment tax, the arguments of 
efficiency and equity that are raised in favour of it and the two most heard – but unconvincing 
– objections. Next (section 3) we introduce a novel moral principle (self-usership) to which 
any taxation system should adhere. Derived from the concept of autonomy, self-usership will 
guarantee that each person has a (limited) controlling power over his own body and mind. 
Once we have stipulated what particular rights persons do have over their selves and their 
activities, we will identify the infringements of ET and its illegitimacy. We will argue (section 
4) that any taxation policy that is based on the assessment, valuation and taxation of personal 
characteristics (body, mind, capacities) – or the activities resulting from the use of these 
characteristics – is at odds with self-usership. At the end of this chapter (section 5), we address 
some possible objections, and simultaneously, formulate some conclusions that involve 
income taxation. We will make clear which kind of income taxation will be in line with the right 
to self-usership – and thus possibly legitimate.  
2.  What is endowment taxation?  
 
Imagine John, who works as a local police officer after graduating from high school. He is not 
keen on his job, but considering his average talents, it is the one that pays him the most. He 
works 200 hours a month, and earns €4,000. Every day, on his way to work, he passes David, 
who is gifted with extraordinary mathematical talents that have allowed him to build a 
successful and well-paid career as a civil engineer in a construction company. Because David 
likes to spend more time pursuing his lifetime interest in philosophy, he decided to cut back 
on his engineering work. To fund this shift, a part-time job of 40 hours a month will easily 
suffice. Since David is a valuable engineer, the company still wants to pay him €4,000 a month. 
Most taxation systems will tax John and David equally. A taxpayer’s actual income, rather than 
his possible income, serves as the common tax base. However, leading academics want to 
abandon this basic principle of tax policy. For a few decades, economists (Akerloff, 1978; 
Mirrlees, 1971 and Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989) and more recently, tax scholars (Shaviro, 
2000; Kaplow, 2008; Stark, 2005; Zelenak, 2006) and some philosophers like Ronald 
Dworkin (1981) John Roemer (1993) and Stuart White (1999), have questioned the 
justification of using actual income to calculate taxes – and stress the significance of a person’s 





earn a certain income, rather than his or her actual achievements, as the proper standard for 
taxation. These scholars advocate endowment taxation instead of income taxation, and argue 
that we should tax David and John differently – that is, at their potential market income – even 
if they both earn €4,000 a month.  
Even if endowment taxation sounds too utopian to apply in current society, proponents still 
find that taxing people on their (maximum) earning ability should guide us as a normative 
ideal (Shaviro, 2000; Kaplow, 2008: 96-104). There are several reasons for this. A first and 
purely economic reason is that such a tax promises to be an efficient way to collect the 
necessary revenue (Shaviro, 2000; Stark, 2005; Kaplow, 2008; Zelenak, 2006; Logue and 
Slemrod, 2008; Mankiw and Weinzierl, 2010). In principle, an endowment tax overcomes a 
well-documented discouraging side effect of income taxation that results from the central 
precept that higher income equals higher taxation. Since this tax is detached from people’s 
actual economic choices – and income – it avoids the so-called deadweight loss problem, that 
arises when skilled workers are discouraged from applying for well-paid yet highly taxed jobs. 
Taxing people on their market potential can be considered economically superior since it 
maximises overall welfare gains. In the literature, this reason has been called the ‘allocation 
efficiency argument’. A second reason is rooted in ethical considerations. Most proponents also 
praise taxing talents for reasons of equity. Superficially, it seems quite unfair to require the 
same financial effort from both John and David. Why demand an equal tax contribution when 
their talents, skills and competences are so unequal? In order to enhance equality of 
opportunity and disregard the impact of undeserved circumstances as much as possible, this 
fiscal measure simply translates a basic assumption of ‘luck egalitarianism’ from political 
philosophy into tax policy (Dworkin, 1981; Roemer, 1993; Stuart White, 1999). If tax law 
depends more on a person’s potential income than his actual income, this will compensate for 
bad luck in talent and grant less-gifted persons more equal chances to acquire income, leisure 
and job satisfaction. According to this distributive equity argument, it is appropriate to classify 
David and John in different fiscal regimes.   
In response, opponents launched attacks to challenge the presumed superiority of a talent tax. 
Two of these arguments seem appealing at first, but are nonetheless invalid. The first objection 
concerns the underlying assumption that talents, competences and skills can be objectively 
measured (Rawls, 2001: 157-158; Bankman and Weisbach, 2007: 789; Saez, 2002). If this 
assumption is flawed, then the entire project is in danger. However, recent progress in genetics, 
neuroscience and cognitive neuropsychology might soon offer workable instruments, which 
allow us to assess a person’s endowment. Indeed, some tax scholars (Logue and Slemrod, 
2008: 852) believe that science can already validate an ‘endowment index’ based on personal 
genetic information.  Van Parijs (1997:  63-68), Rakowksi (2000: 267), Murphy and Nagel 
(2002: 121-125) and others have mounted a second, more conceptual, ethics-based attack, 
known as the ‘slavery of the talented’. This argument claims that taxing endowment violates 
people’s free choice of occupation. Though any taxation system will obviously limit personal 
choices to a certain degree (due to the non-negotiability of the general tax regime itself and the 
incentives it creates), supporters of this argument assert that an endowment tax 
disproportionally infringes on personal freedom by coercing gifted people to realise their 
potential. According to this line of thinking, talented individuals (like David, who prioritises 
philosophy) would be unable to pursue a different life due to the high taxes they would be 
obliged to pay. Yet this criticism can be directed to tax systems more broadly, not just to 
endowment taxes. Take, for instance, a country in which it is expensive to live, even if it is 





affect the occupational choice of its citizens. In such a country, John, who might have preferred 
a lower-paid job, will lose his freedom if he does not become a police officer, if he wants to 
survive. Thus the notion of ‘slavery’ – meaning violation of one’s free choice of occupation – 
does not uniquely target endowment taxes. In addition, ‘slavery’ only applies to some forms of 
endowment taxes, but not the concept as such. If an endowment tax system yields sufficient 
tax revenues – to the extent that a maximum taxation rate for talented people like David does 
not exceed, say, 20 per cent of their earning capacity – then few people would find themselves 
obliged to change jobs. Admittedly, David may need to work a bit more than 40 hours a month 
to pay his tax debt, but thanks to the low overall tax rate, he may cut his engineering hours 
substantially, and he would not be forced to perform this job at all.16 In a mild endowment tax 
regime there would be no enslavement at all.  
So if anything is wrong with this measure, the ‘slavery of the talented’ argument does not 
explain why. We follow a different approach and show that this project violates a fundamental 
concept of rights, which we name self-usership. This notion is a weak form of the libertarian 
concept of self-ownership, which is immune to some of the latter’s radical and undesirable 
conclusions, yet self-usership remains solid enough to retain and integrate valuable moral 
intuitions concerning respect, autonomy, privacy and personal rights. After conceptualising 
the principle of self-usership, we will demonstrate that endowment taxation is highly 
problematic, as it violates this right not once but thrice (section 4).    
3.  Self-usership: exploration of an account of autonomy  
 
3.1.  The nature and foundation of the right to self-usership 
 
So why would it be wrong to demand that people contribute an amount commensurate with 
their potential to earn? Rather than referring to the effect of such a requirement on 
occupational choice, we argue that there is a more basic problem: an endowment tax entails an 
a priori violation of people’s rights over their own body and mind, regardless of the weight of 
such a tax. But what specific rights do people have over themselves?   
The traditional conception of self-ownership has been discredited by controversial conclusions 
about the philosophical status of the human body (Nozick, 1974; 331). Critics and supporters 
alike have used self-ownership to justify or criticise extravagant personal rights over the human 
body, such as the right to sell vital body parts or to sell oneself into slavery (Steiner, 1994:  232-
234; Feinberg, 1986: 71-81; Vallentyne, 2012: 160; Nussbaum, 1987: 32-33). Accounts of self-
ownership have thus mostly equated personal rights over the human body with full property 
rights over a material object (Cohen, 1995: 86). Given that self-ownership includes possession 
and usage of body and mind, it also includes a full property right to one’s income, meaning that 
all forced taxation is illegitimate, at least prima facie (Nozick, 1974: 169; Rothbard, 2006: 37-
45). Additionally, even the left-libertarian position does not offer us a way out, since it accepts 
full ownership rights over the self (full rights to income, right to transfer), merely endorsed in 
combination with an egalitarian distribution of natural resources (Otsuka: 2000, Vallentyne: 
2012b, 152).  
Rather than warranting a complete dismissal of self-ownership, these counterintuitive rights 
strengthen the need for a subtler conception that manages to avoid these unpalatable 
                                                          
16 A shift towards ET enlarges the tax base, since it relates to the maximum earning capacity and conversely severely 
decreases the tax rate. In the example of John and David, who have a maximum earning capacity of € 4,000 and € 





implications. Indeed, such a concept is very important if we are trying to capture the 
fundamental difference be-tween an individual’s rights over his or her own body and his or her 
rights (or lack thereof) over the body of others. Why do we need special permission to touch 
someone else’s body, whereas such an authorisation is absurd if we want to touch our own 
body?17 Why can we decide to join a football team ourselves, but not force our neighbour to do 
so? Intuitively, we accept that people have the right to make decisions regarding their own 
body and mind, and do not have such a right regarding the body and mind of others. Hence a 
precise conceptualisation of rights is required to clarify the scope and limits of these personal 
rights (Dickenson, 2007: 14; Munzer, 1990: 41-56; Christman, 1994: 148-154). We believe that 
the notion of self-usership, which stresses the (more limited but undeniable) value of usage 
and disposal of one’s body and mind, performs this task excellently. We define self-usership as 
an individual’s right to control the use of his or her own personal characteristics – including 
body parts (e.g., brain and other organs) and mental and physical capacities (e.g., intelligence, 
athletic abilities) – and to make (legal) arrangements concerning activities (e.g., writing a 
paper) that exploit these personal characteristics as he or she sees fit.   
However, why should we recognise this right? The right to self-usership emanates from a 
notion of autonomy, which entails that each person has the right to pursue his own ends. This 
axiomatic right encloses many specific principles in different spheres, such as freedom of 
religion, the right to private property or the guarantee for (social) security. In our view the right 
of each person to use her or his personal characteristics as he or she sees fit, is equally inferred 
from the generic right of each to pursue her or his own distinctive goals.  
Now, if we say that ‘each person’ has the right to pursue his or her ends, then this concerns real 
existing persons, not some philosophised imagination of them. The right to autonomy relates 
to how people are – not to how they could or should be. Each person is that individual entity 
who he or she is because of her or his particular mental and physical make-up – the indivisible 
building blocks of each person. And the ends each person can pursue are not the ends of 
‘humanity’ or ‘rationality’, but the specific goals of that particular person. If you recognise that 
David has a right to pursue his own goals, you recognise David as he is, including his unique 
characteristics (e.g., mathematical skills) and his personal objectives (e.g., writing a book on 
philosophy). Hence, autonomy ultimately encompasses a notion of ‘personhood’.  
If one’s characteristics are an essential component of a person, control over these 
characteristics is equally vital. A person who is bound to a chair, locked up in prison, forced to 
eat or reduced to a sex slave, has been deprived of his personhood. A person is descriptively a 
person in terms of his specific goals and characteristics, but he is normatively a person to the 
extent that he or she has freedom over the elements that construct his personhood. Autonomy 
thus supervenes on a notion of personhood and re-quires recognition of each person’s control 
over the elements that design that person. Moreover, since each woman or man is – via her or 
his person – embodied by her or his characteristics, autonomy entails at least a right to control 
the use of these characteristics. One cannot force David to use his characteristics to construct 
bridges and still maintain he can live up to his own goals (e.g. to write a book on philosophy). 
The liberty to use another person’s body and mind without their consent would chain these 
persons to the ends of others. Self-usership is thus not a trivial construct; it is a meaningful 
notion derived from the somewhat vague and abstract concept of autonomy.  
                                                          
17 The acceptance of a right to mere possession over one ’ s own body, and a consequential condemnation of trespass, 





As self-usership equals control over one’s person and activities we can also indicate the 
boundaries of this concept. Controlling something means deciding what will happen to it. 
Controlling a car signifies that one can decide whether to drive it, lend it or use it for taxi 
services. Likewise, self-usership means that individuals can decide on the use of their personal 
characteristics. However, this right to decide cannot be confounded with a right to all economic 
benefits others are willing to give (Christman, 1994: 129-135; Waldron, 1988: 431-439). The 
economic profits that are correlated with some particular activities (the ones valued by others) 
do not follow from the right to control one’s person; they follow from a right to transfer 
economic goods – such as money.18 Self-usership relates to controlling rights that give an 
individual governance over what will happen to his person, but this principle does not found 
any right to all the economic valorisations others wish to attribute to a decision. Consequently, 
as will be elaborated further (section 5.2), income taxation is not necessarily illegitimate from 
the viewpoint of self-usership.    
Since control rights must be carefully distinguished from transfer rights, this principle also 
excludes self-enslavement – possible under the traditional conception of self-ownership. Self-
usership gives persons the right to legal actions that control the use of their personal 
characteristics, and e.g. permits John to make arrangements that he will work nightshifts. A 
contract that states that John will sell his own heart to David, or that John will become David’s 
property (who can then do with him whatever he wants, e.g., lock him up, beat him, kill him or 
sell him) is clearly different. Such acts do not fall under an individual’s right to decide how to 
use their personal characteristics. Rather, they permanently relocate such decisional power to 
others and consequently annihilate all personhood.19 Self-enslavement and the sale of vital 
body parts are not expressions of our right to decide about the usage of our personal 
characteristics; both are instead expressions of a questionable right to transfer this sovereignty 
to others.  
3.2.  Self-usership: a bundle of rights 
 
Now that we know how self-usership corresponds to autonomy but differs from self-ownership, 
what exactly does it mean when someone has the right to use the personal characteristics he 
has at his disposal? What kinds of rights can David invoke to secure a life as a philosopher 
rather than as a successful engineer?  
Before unpacking the particular rights that self-usership entails, it is illuminating to 
distinguish between active and passive rights (Tuck, 1979: 5-6; Weinar, 2011). An active right 
concerns the holder’s own action, while a passive right demands a certain action – or rather 
the abstinence from it – of others. For example, if an individual has the active right to possess 
a lawn, but the government has the active right to expropriate it without reason, he might end 
up disappointed about the scope of his property right. Hence, the right to property will entail 
immunity against expropriation that curtails his liberty to exploit his property. An analysis of 
basic rights thus typically does not stop with expressing active rights, granting possible actions 
                                                          
18 In an economic exchange of labour for money, the explanation for a certain income does not lie in one’s self-
control, but stems from the fact that the labourer and the employer grant differential economic value to this labour, 
which gets expressed in their consent of a certain sum of external goods. See for example Gaus, 2010 : 89. 
19 A sale contract does not establish an effective transfer. The effective donation depends on the seller executing the 
right. Thus a sale contract of vital body parts leaves a person at the permanent will of someone else, and is to be 





to its holders, but also limits the active rights of others with passive rights. A right is futile 
unless it goes with a claim to exclude others.20   
Thus, if David has the right to self-usership, which permits him to pursue his philosophical 
passion, his particular ‘SU’-active rights are:  
(a) a liberty right that enables him to use his personal characteristics (body, mind, capacities) 
in activities of his choice, in the absence of (legal) obligations.21 For example, if David wants to 
use his mental capacities for metaphysics, rather than to construct buildings, he has the right 
to do so. 
(b) a management right that allows him to make (legal) agreements such as contracts with 
others regarding the use of his personal characteristics (body, mind, capacities) in activities. 
For example, David not only has the right to rely on his mental capacities; he also has the right 
to sign a contract in which he stipulates that he will use his mental capacities to write a book. 
This right should be distinguished from a transfer right; the latter does not concern agreements 
concerning the use of one’s characteristics, but the permanent transfer of this power to others.  
Both liberty and management rights rule out legislation that prohibits activities and legal 
agreements within the scope of one’s self-usership. However, these rights are insufficient to 
fully describe the right introduced here. Self-usership not only safeguards the permissibility of 
actions and contracts; it equally outlaws subtler intrusions onto one’s personal domain. Two 
passive rights secure the domain of personal governance:  
(c) a non-intervention right that protects the personal domain against interferences with the 
activities in which one is engaged.22 Apart from outright prohibitions that tell a person what 
to do or not to do – which would violate one’s liberty – an individual’s personal sphere might 
suffer from more discrete interventions, created by measures intended to affect their decisions. 
For example, a government that introduces a tax or administrative barrier to discourage 
philosophers still repudiates one’s self-usership by steering people away from certain activities. 
The non-intervention right precludes such practices as it establishes the duty on legislative 
processes not to intervene with the type of activities a person opts for.  
(d) an immunity right that protects individuals against intrusions onto the personal 
characteristics themselves. This passive right secures the personal sphere so that these items 
cannot serve as a basis for legal interference. For example, a government that taxes good looks 
violates this right since it disfavours a certain personal characteristic. The immunity right 
guarantees one’s self-usership, as it excludes the legislator’s power to impose duties on the 
basis of one’s characteristics.23   
                                                          
20 Put in other words: an active right without a passive right is a pure ‘ liberty ’, as it only entails a right to act, but 
not a claim to forbid others from acting. See Hohfeld (1913: 31-32) and Schmidtz (2010: 80).  
21 Liberty points here at the absence of legal obligations. This right is respected when one is not 
obliged to do anything (Hohfeld, 1913: 32-34).  
22 A non-intervention right is, in Hohfeldian vocabulary (1913: 32), thus a claim-right, as it establishes a specific 
duty in others.  
23 The use of the word ‘duty’ is important, as we endorse that those persons who have clear dysfunctional personal 
characteristics (because of a handicap, sickness or accident) can have additional claims (subject of a right), e.g. 
financial benefits, so that a decent threshold will be reached. This does not interfere with any user decisions, but 
rather guarantees self-usership for all. Importantly, in order to be legitimate, the financing of such a redistributive 





So, importantly, as none of the rights is interchangeable, it is possible to violate someone’s 
passive rights without violating his or her active rights. Imagine a state that forbids philosophy 
as either a waste of time or a dangerous activity. Looking for sanctions to get rid of philosophy, 
the government imposes a 10 per cent extra income tax on any practitioner. This anti-
philosophers’ tax does not infringe on people’s liberty right to philosophise. Philosophising 
citizens are still free to practise their philosophers’ skill, as long as they are prepared to pay for 
it. However, since it penalises certain activities that belong to the immediate personal realm of 
the self, such a tax violates the passive right of non-intervention. Or, envisage a racist 
government that imposes a tax on the basis of the colour of one’s skin. This measure does not 
infringe upon one’s liberty right, and does not interfere with any activity. Yet the personal 
sphere is intruded upon, for its elements are taken as a source of obligation for ends that are 
distinct from the person’s.  
4.  Endowment taxation: a threefold infringement of self-usership 
 
This conceptualisation of self-usership allows us to scrutinise the moral permissibility of a 
talent tax step by step. This project necessarily involves the following processes: (a) devising a 
process of endowment assessment (assessment), (b) attributing a tax base to a person 
according to his market opportunities (valuation), and (c) formulating a tax rate that will levy 
a part of that value (taxation). We will argue that in each process of this tax, a particular right 
derived from self-usership is in trouble.  
4.1.  Endowment assessment  
 
Endowment taxation requires information about an individual’s capacities. Intelligence is 
often mentioned, and Rawls (1999a: 54) also mentions the significance of health, vigour, 
imagination; Nussbaum (2001: 78-80) includes her well-known capabilities (practical reason, 
play, affiliation, etc.).  Tax scholars such as Shaviro (2000: 406) supplement this list with 
sound judgement, self-discipline, emotional intelligence and good looks, and Plug et al. (1999: 
207) also target creativity, cooperative and commercial ability, and leadership. Clearly, in order 
to be able estimate our endowment, we have to provide tax authorities with relevant 
information. Aside from technical matters that will complicate assessment of endowment, the 
real issue is how far such an investigation intrudes upon the private realm protected by self-
usership. In contrast to the sources for calculating one’s income or consumption, the basic 
information needed to assess the determinants of an individual’s potential income is simply 
not directly available. It requires active participation in numerous activities such as tests, 
screenings and experiments. If tax authorities require information that goes deeper than 
consumption behaviour, monthly salaries or dividends, they will need instruments and 
practices to delve deeper into someone’s privacy.  
However, if the required information would have to be gauged by tests and (genetic) 
screenings, and a tax authority coerces an individual to participate in the screening, this 
obligation represents an infringement of his liberty right.24 The liberty right regarding one’s 
characteristics implies that no one – including tax authorities – has the right to force an 
individual to use his personal characteristics in a specific way, and therefore to overrule his 
refusal to participate in the assessment process. Thus the liberty right reinforces the 
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individual’s right to oppose and refuse participation in a practice that entails activities 
regarding their personal characteristics, regardless of whatever noble purposes the assessing 
authority intends to fulfil. 
So, the real trouble with a tax on endowment is not that cheaters will attempt to conceal their 
true taxable talents, which is a pragmatic concern that Roemer (1994: 132) and Dworkin (1981: 
324) repeatedly put forward. Rather, the problem is of a more principled nature and targets 
those who spontaneously grant authorities access to private information and demand such 
openness from others. Prior to the question ‘What to do with cheaters?’ one needs to address 
the more basic issue ‘Can administrations legitimately demand access?’ According to our 
liberty right, the answer is clear: self-usership grants us the moral right to deny others access 
or (to abstain from) activities that are intended to provide others with endowment-relevant 
information. 
One objection might be that tax authorities are allowed to use less-intrusive information 
sources to assess an individual’s endowment, such as tagging or proxies. Tags deliver 
information based on personal characteristics that are difficult to hide such as gender, health, 
height or age (Akerlof, 1978: 8; Mankiw and Weinzierl, 2010: 186). Tags are normally beyond 
our control, and are believed to be correlated with more hidden capacities (Akerlof, 1978: 9). 
If tax authorities use information based on voluntary achievements to assess an individual’s 
endowment, they are using proxies. For instance, a person’s intellectual potential can be 
inferred from the proxy ‘obtained university degrees’ (White, 1999: 621), ‘SAT score’ (Zelenak, 
2008: 1180) and ‘money earned during previous jobs’ might indicate their economic potential.  
We do not think this method of indirect assessment is a successful strategy for accomplishing 
an endowment tax. Since by definition there is no necessary link between a proxy and a 
person’s endowment, using proxies as a tax base can be as arbitrary as using an individual’s 
income as a tax base, which defenders of this measure reject as inefficient and unfair. Why tax 
someone for obtaining a university degree if doing so may be a matter of lucky inborn talent? 
Some people work extremely hard to become an engineer, while others combine these studies 
with a time-consuming interest in philosophy. A university degree does not indicate a person’s 
intellectual potential. A similar argument can be made with regard to tags. If a tax system uses 
tags, one does not tax possibilities but involuntary traits, which only on average correlate with 
these possibilities. After all, correlations do not guarantee that low-endowed individuals will 
enjoy a more favourable tax regime, as endowment taxation promises.  
4.2.  Endowment valuation 
 
Before effectively taxing someone using a particular rate, we have to attribute a certain value 
to the object of taxation. If authorities skirt around the information problem and collect 
relevant data in a morally acceptable way, they will still valorise our endowments. Given that 
authorities aim to minimise deadweight losses and equalise people’s economic opportunities, 
a tax base will be imposed according to people’s potential market benefit, i.e., what a person’s 
physical appearance, emotional talents and cognitive skills allow them to earn (Dworkin, 1981: 
316).  
That taxing these hypothetical market benefits might result in the ‘slavery of the talented’ is 
only a minor element of critique. The principle problem with endowment valuation is that 
people’s tax obligations are determined on the basis of their personal characteristics, moreover 





taxpayer’s personal ends. Rather, the market price is the aggregate of the valorisations of all 
consumers in a market, and reflects their ends (Stigler, 1987: 12). So, if David dislikes his own 
mathematical skills, an endowment tax will nonetheless impose a tax base that reflects the 
general desire of others that he continues to work as an engineer. Or take a beautiful girl who 
profoundly hates the beauty industry she refuses to join. Nonetheless, her taxes will be 
calculated on the price others would be willing to pay to see her as a supermodel.  
Admittedly, an individual’s liberty or management right might not be violated by this imposed 
value. An endowment-sensitive tax base as such does not forbid individuals from using their 
personal characteristics in another way. The violation of their right to self-usership is of a 
different nature here. This procedure establishes a duty on a person merely on the basis of his 
personal characteristics. The fact that administrations found fiscal duties on one’s personal 
characteristics – and the general desire of others towards them – clearly invades the immunity 
right, that rescues personal characteristics from being a basis of obligation. Without any prior 
consent of the person over the use and value of such characteristics (e.g. through labour-
contracts and agreed income see section 5.1.), this fiscal procedure intrudes upon an area 
demarcated as the personal domain. 
4.3.  Endowment taxation 
 
After the tax base has been imposed, specific rates will levy a portion of that value. While the 
immunity right avoids interference on the level of personal characteristics, the non-
intervention right protects the activities in which people use these personal characteristics. 
Again, it does not do so in a straightforward way (which is a job that the liberty or management 
right fulfils), but by assuring a realm of non-inference that rules out subtler interventions. Tax 
authorities that respect this right refrain from interfering with people’s personal decisions on 
how to use their bodies and minds. Any tax policy that indicates a preference for some 
behavioural choices, for example via variable tax rates for particular occupations or 
consumption patterns, intrudes upon the personal domain. According to the non-intervention 
right, tax policies have to be user blind and must condemn discrimination aiming to facilitate 
or hamper behavioural options.25 As self-usership does not include the right to income 
(because income does not relate to control of one’s activities sensu stricto, see above), an 
income tax can escape such a violation if it is blind to a person’s particular activities. Many tax 
codes – typically those that discriminate on the basis of occupational choice, legal entity or 
type of consumption – are at odds with the duty of non-intervention. 
Since an endowment tax will tax a potential activity (i.e., the one that yields the biggest 
revenue), it obviously interferes with one’s activities and it fails to treat income user blindly. 
For example, John and David – both earning €4,000 – will be taxed at totally different rates. 
John, performing his highest paying occupation, will be rewarded with an effective tax rate of 
17 per cent, whereas tax authorities will impose on David’s current lifestyle a rate of 85 per 
cent.26 Consequently, we can say an endowment tax constitutes a tax benefit for those who opt 
to undertake the activities the market would favour them to do, and a tax raise for those who 
choose not to live according to the market-preference. In this way, endowment taxation’s 
                                                          
25 The non-intervention right means that a particular activity cannot legally influence the tax rate. It does not imply 
that each particular activity should have the same economic consequence as such. We thank Martin O ’ Neil for his 
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26 John and David have a maximum earning capacity of respectively € 4,000 and € 20,000 a month, so an ET of 17 
% would suffice to attain a government income of € 4,000. This would result in an income tax rate of 85 % on 





discriminatory treatment of income in light of one’s potential activity influences occupational 
choices and thus violates the right of non-intervention. 
5.  Some objections  
 
5.1.  Endowment and income: immunity and consent  
 
One criticism might be that the liberty or immunity right not only constrains governments’ tax 
policies but also precludes particular labour market practices. Are companies that are testing 
future employees’ skills also guilty of endowment assessment? And should we accuse a 
business of endowment valuation when it proposes a salary to a worker? Our answer is no. The 
most important difference is that people engage in economic and social ventures on a 
consensual basis, in contrast to endowment taxation’s coercive information process and its 
enforcement of non-consented values for personal characteristics. The principle of self-
usership permits people to participate in interviews and tests. After negotiation and consent, 
they might accept certain legal and financial arrangements concerning the use of personal 
characteristics, which will involve an income. However, as long as David does not agree to 
undergo measurement of his capacities and does not effectively accept a certain level of income, 
tax authorities lack the right to act according to such measurements and prices.  
Therefore, from a philosophical perspective, income taxation aligns better with autonomous 
personhood than endowment taxation. This kind of taxation does not intrude on the realm of 
one’s body and mind but concerns a levy on economic benefits that supervene on this domain. 
Additionally, a realised income tax does not one-sidedly dictate specific values but merely 
replicates consented valorisations as a taxable basis. Under such a system, David will not be 
taxed on controversial values regarding his innate talent, but on external (monetary) benefits 
he explicitly accepts.  
So, self-usership guards autonomous personhood and makes sure that no one is forced to 
partake in certain activities (e.g. assessment procedures) or has duties imposed on her or him 
on the basis of personal characteristics. Moreover, if taxation wants to respect self-usership, it 
needs to ensure people’s consented actions. The legitimacy of an income tax emerges from the 
fact that it does not impose any alien valorisations regarding one’s personal domain, but founds 
fiscal obligations in consented and external (economic) benefits. Admittedly, for most people 
the market value of their endowment will have a crucial impact on their occupational choices 
and – consequently – their income. If people consent to arrange their lives according to these 
opportunities, then taxation of these extra-personal benefits is legitimate. However, if they do 
not, authorities and markets should respect this choice and refrain from any political initiatives 
that mortgage one’s personal domain.  
5.2.  Consent isn’t everything: non-intervention as an expression of neutrality  
 
Taxation must supervene upon our personal characteristics and activities without interfering 
with them. If someone uses his personal characteristics to trade financial products, rent 
apartments or perform manual labour, this choice cannot be the subject of a legitimate tax 
policy. However, nothing is wrong with a government that imposes taxes on the economic 
outcomes of this choice. Yet the imposition of such taxation ought to be disconnected from the 
activities one undertakes.  
But what about taxes that aim to discourage harmful or polluting activities? Do these conflict 





such activities along independent lines of reasoning. The damage done to others might be so 
clear that the taxed activities simply fall outside the scope of liberty rights, and consequently 
outside the scope of passive rights. Since no one has the liberty right to harm or endanger other 
people, one cannot claim that taxing to deter potential perpetrators is illegitimate. However, 
this does not mean that taxation is a useful tool with which we can discourage any kind of 
harmful action. When damage is caused by a limited number of identifiable people, individual 
liability claims remain the best way to obtain compensation (Shavell, 2004: 177-207). 
However, if damage to public and natural goods is caused over the long run by people who are 
difficult to identify, taxation can be an effective instrument of deterrence and compensation 
(Baumol, 1972; Harrison and Theeuwes, 2008: 68-80). If so, the principle of self-usership will 
not reject the possibility that taxation might be legitimate in these cases. Obviously, if 
authorities use taxes to favour a particular way of life within the vast domain of reasonable and 
respectable ways of life, they violate the requirement of user-blind non-interference. That 
alcohol and tobacco excite one half of the population while the other half is irritated by drunken 
people and spoiled air is not a good enough reason for a special tax concerning these 
substances. The core philosophy behind self-usership is to guarantee people the right not to 
prefer the most profitable or the most innocent option in life. So, this principle prevents 
taxation from becoming a tool for pushing people towards economic optima and welfare end-
states. When people harm others, damage property and destroy natural resources, they place 
themselves outside the protective realm of self-usership. However, its protection persists when 
people do not seek to eliminate risks or hindrances that obstruct the road to perfect welfare. 
That the best possible world is not legally enforceable is the price we pay for the liberty that 
offers self-usership.      
6.  Conclusion 
 
Philippe Van Parijs (1997: 63-68) raised the example of Lovely and Lonely, two identical twins 
with identical preferences but one difference: Lovely, unlike Lonely, is blessed with 
extraordinary looks.  This talent enables Lovely to earn lots of money as a stripper in peep 
shows. Lonely, however, has no such options. That an endowment tax might coerce Lovely to 
work in peep shows, a job she profoundly hates, is the main reason why Van Parijs opposes 
such measure.  
Intuitively, many people will indeed judge something to be wrong when authorities start taking 
people’s market potential as a fiscal target. The popularity of endowment taxation embodies 
tax literature’s neglect of the repercussions of people’s moral rights within tax levying 
procedures. In an attempt to supplement current consequentialist framework within taxation 
theory, we have tried to uncover the problematic nature of this fiscal strategy. By pinpointing 
the relevance of people’s rights within taxation policy, we tried to initiate a deontological view 
on taxation, in which taxpayers are considered natural persons who have obligations but 
equally hold moral rights.   
In this contribution we argued that the problem of endowment taxation is of a more principled 
nature than in Van Parijs’ argument. The boundaries of permissible governmental action are 
delineated by peoples’ moral rights and liberties, and taxing endowment simply transgresses 
these limits. The illegitimate nature of taxing people on their talent can be understood once we 
uncover a specific right of control, which each person has over himself. From a more abstract 
notion of autonomy, one can deduce a specific form of self-ownership that claims that all 





rights such as the liberty right, management right, non-intervention right and immunity right. 
After introducing and explaining these sub-rights, we demonstrated how several breaches 
constitute the illegitimacy of endowment taxes. The screening and test procedures required to 
determine potential income establish certain obligations that infringe on the liberty right; 
defining the tax base according to one’s personal characteristics violates the right to immunity; 
and taxing endowments interferes with the way someone uses his personal characteristics and 
thus violates the user-blindness requirement of the non-intervention right.  
Respect for each person’s self-usership serves as a prerequisite for legitimate taxation – that 
consequently ought to stay away from the personal sphere. As income does not belong to the 
person itself – and his private domain – but is rather a product of consensual economic 
interactions, it serves as a legitimate benchmark for taxation. Governments are therefore 
allowed to impose fiscal and other duties on one’s realised income, as long as these are 
detached from the choices people make on how to use their bodies and minds. With the 
exception of activities that indisputably harm others or damage public goods, taxes cannot be 
used to instruct how people should lead their lives. Respect for the value of autonomy and, 
accordingly, the right to self-usership curtails theorists’ and legislators’ aspiration to shepherd 
taxpayers towards specific ideological objectives via income taxation – unfortunately a 











ESSAY TWO: ON THE TAXATION OF 






WEALTH TAXES, CAPITAL GAINS TAX AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE 
PROPERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE FISCAL TREATMENT OF 
WEALTH27 
 
1.  Introduction and overview 
 
Throughout the centuries, the secular state replaced God more and more as the designer of 
society – with its interventions appearing more and more visibly. According to Benjamin 
Franklin: “In this world, nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.” Despite the 
many historical tax revolts, tax politics have very rarely been the subject of intense public 
debate in the last 50 years. Western governments were primarily judged on results, i.e. 
prosperity for everyone. The way in which fiscal rules contributed to this was left to the 
specialists’ discretion. Partly due to the extreme technical nature of the subject, the annual 
assessment notice was for many years considered a necessary evil. 
This changed with the publication of Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014). In 
his bestseller, the French star economist observed a concentration of wealth amongst the 
richest groups in many Western societies. According to the French economist, this evolution 
could be explained by the role of capital in our economies. In particular, he pointed to the 
unequal spread, the intrinsically accumulative nature, and also the fiscally preferential 
treatment of for example shares, bonds, immovable property, intellectual property and savings 
as the cause of increased economic inequality.  
The book created an academic, political and public polemic on fiscal justice, mainly marked by 
the demand for higher taxes on the richest 10%. This discourse, which also took place here in 
Belgium as a result of the debate on the “tax shift”, distinguished, among other things, two 
concrete proposals: wealth taxes and (higher) capital gains tax rates. The first tax is a certain 
levy on the market value of a person’s wealth, the second measure includes a levy on the income 
realised from one’s capital. This article can be regarded as a contribution to the above-
mentioned academic and societal discussion. In particular, said proposals will be explained 
from the perspective of the right to private property, in an article made up of four parts. 
The following part (2.) will reflect on the growing wealth inequality and the role of taxation in 
this evolution. In particular, the proposal of either having wealth taxes or capital gains tax will 
be situated in the debate on economic inequality.  
Next, I will attempt to outline the potential role of the field of jurisprudence in this discussion 
(3.). From the constitutional point of view, political measures are only acceptable as far as they 
are compatible with specific human rights. Whether certain legislation is legitimate – and 
hence permissible – depends on its relationship with fundamental human rights. The 
discipline of normative jurisprudence will therefore evaluate legislative initiatives in light of 
certain individual rights. The remainder of this paper constitutes a specific application of 
similar normative intent. 
The right to private property will be used as the normative benchmark. I will therefore present 
in part three an analysis of the right to private property (4.) – a conceptualisation which does 
                                                          






not necessarily correspond to its organisation into national or supranational legislation. Here 
I will argue that this fundamental right consists of five sub-rights (or dimensions), i.e. 
possession, use, modification, management and transfer, between which there exists a 
hierarchical relationship, and this in two ways. Each sub-right provides a progressive sphere 
of control over a good.28  Sub-rights such as possession or use contain minimal legal capacity, 
and are hardly controversial. Management and transfer, on the other hand, constitute more 
extensive types of actions – sometimes less evident. Furthermore, the recognition of those 
basal sub-rights, such as for example possession or use, also constitutes the foundation for the 
higher dimensions: elements such as management or transfer presume the recognition of the 
right of possession or use. One could therefore view property as a pyramid, with its base 
containing the more evident sub-rights – which are in addition fundamental to the subsequent 
aspects. 
Lastly, the preceding parts converge in a final chapter (5.). Using the submitted analysis of the 
basic right to private property, I will determine a different qualification for both tax measures. 
Wealth taxes are the most serious violation of the right to private property. After all, the 
taxation of the market value of a person’s wealth removes a part of a good (which is subject to 
his property right) and hence damages the most fundamental sub-right: the right to keep 
something physically and exclusively for oneself (right of possession). Furthermore, the 
remaining dimensions of private property are based on this right of possession, so this 
violation equally constitutes a violation of the other aspects of property. Capital gains tax is 
more compatible, as this possibly respects all dimensions of private property. As the taxation 
of realised income purely concerns the economic surplus that results from certain sub-rights, 
specifically the sub-rights of management and transfer, it does not necessarily constitute a 
violation of these aspects of control. 
2.  Background: wealth inequality and the call for redistributive reforms 
 
2.1.  The vexed question of taxation 
 
By way of introduction it has to be pointed out that there is an increasing societal interest in 
taxation. Where tax law, until a few years ago, was solely the domain of specialist lawyers, the 
technical nature of the material no longer deters public interest. Since the 2014 elections in 
Belgium, the theme of taxation has been in the news on a weekly basis. 
First of all, most of the Flemish political parties (Green Party, 2014: 76; Socialist Party, 2014; 
Christian Democratic Party, 2014) presented a series of tax reform proposals in the run up to 
the 2014 elections. For months afterwards, public opinion put pressure on the elected 
government to meet the electorate’s demands for a higher contribution from the richest 10 %. 
The demand for this kind of tax shift became the glue that held together a series of union 
demonstrations during the so-called “hot autumn”. Subsequently, the Walloon Socialist Party 
(PS) submitted early 2015 a concrete bill for a general wealth tax – a proposal previously 
defended by the Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (ACV). In its annual report of 
February last year the OECD (2015) criticised the high taxes on labour and – indeed – the low 
capital gains tax rates in Belgium. This organisation was not alone: already in 2014 the 
parliamentary commission tasked with fiscal reform (2014: 71) suggested higher capital gains 
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tax rates. In the meantime, the Heart before Head (Hart boven Hard) movement made tax 
justice its key topic for debate during spring 2015. In the same period, even the Belgian 
umbrella organisation for environmental associations (Bond Beter Leefmilieu) rode the same 
wave briefly by translating its traditional point of view to fiscal terms (i.e. greener taxes, 
Bienstman, 2014-15: 33-37). Finally, the summer of 2015 marked a temporary end to the 
undoubtedly continuing discussion. The government opted for a shift: only partially towards 
capital and mainly towards consumption, especially tobacco, diesel, electricity and alcohol.29  
Whereas the government opted for a shift towards consumption, this paper will consider the 
above-mentioned ideas which (for the time being) did not make it into policy: on the one hand 
the introduction of a general wealth tax, and on the other hand higher capital gains tax rates, 
measures which will be defined in greater detail in 2.4. Moreover, as the prevailing tax law 
already mentions certain forms of wealth taxes as well as capital gains tax, equally, this paper 
could be considered a normative evaluation of certain measures already in place.30   
2.2.  The (re)emergence of relative inequality 
 
The preliminary question however is this: where is this heightened attention for taxation 
coming from?  How to explain the fact that wealth became the subject of many ideas regarding 
taxation? The fiscal justice debate is – in my opinion – the result of a heightened interest in 
relative inequality. 
There are two possible normative judgements of economic distribution. One possibility is the 
evaluation of the absolute economic level of individuals. From this angle, an economic 
situation is fair as long as everyone is well off and therefore has enough (Frankfurt, 1988: 134-
158). Vice versa, it goes against the grain to see people in poverty, sickness or without any 
access to welfare. The measures of affluence of different groups are considered here. The 
evaluation is considered positive if those measures, and the level of the least well-off in 
particular, meet certain standards (e.g. maximizing the amount of primary goods, see: Rawls, 
1999a: 57-64). This vision can be described as welfare thinking. 
The other possibility is the evaluation of welfare in relative terms. Not the wealth of individuals 
as such – but the relationship between the levels they attain is where the focus lies. What we 
consider unfair from this perspective, is not the economic situation of a person, but the 
underlying differences between their individual circumstances (Temkin, 2000: 126-161). The 
evaluation is positive where the differences between individuals are minor. In this view, it is 
not the number of resources available to people which is of primary importance, but the fact 
that some have more than others. 
The star of welfare thinking – for many years promoted by the World Bank, the IMF and more 
or less all Western leaders – seems to be waning at the moment. Where during the happy 90s 
growth and general increase in welfare were being stressed, there is now a growing interest in 
the specific welfare relationship between individuals, i.e. relative inequality (De Vos, 2015: 6-
15). The re-emergence of relative inequality  – with inequality between individuals as the 
primary focus – can be illustrated by e.g. the extensive coverage in the popular media in recent 
years regarding the percentage of wealth that reaches the richest 10 or 20%. The Belgian 
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30 Existing real estate taxes (“roerende voorheffing”) display enough similarities for it to be labelled as wealth taxes, 
and this will be discussed towards the end. Various taxes can be considered capital gains tax, as far as they address 





newspaper De Standaard (8-13 september 2014) put inequality in the public spotlight with its 
weeklong series ‘De Kloof’ (‘The Gap’) in 2014, and included, among others, numbers on 
income inequality in Belgium. It is also telling that even the political leader of the United States 
is talking about relative inequality: President Obama (2013) denounced the fact that the top 
10% in the US represent half of the income. Furthermore, at annual meeting of the - generally 
not so egalitarian - World Economic Forum (2015), the rise of global inequality was the top 
item on the agenda. Equally surprising, the IMF (Lagarde, 2014) launched the idea of 
“inclusive capitalism”, whereby the fruits are being shared (more) honestly.  
2.3.  Thomas Piketty and the rising wealth inequality 
 
The second introductory question looks at the cause of the reclaimed interest in economic 
inequality between individuals. Where is this heightened interest in the economic relationship 
between individuals coming from? 
The reason for the change in economic outlook is indubitably the publication of the sensational 
and ubiquitous Capital in the Twenty-First Century, by the French economist Thomas Piketty. 
In a nutshell, the book, which topped bestseller lists in 2014, contains two elements: an 
observation and an analysis. Amongst the researched Western societies, Piketty observes that 
the richest 10% - and certainly the richest 1% - take an increasingly bigger share of wealth. 
Where during the period after WWII there was an evolution towards relative equality, the 
economist clearly demonstrates an increasing wealth inequality between individuals 
throughout the last four decades. The richest 10% in France currently represent 60-65% of the 
wealth (Piketty, 2014: 340), the same segment accumulating up to 70% (an increase of 
approximately 10% since 1980) in the UK (Piketty, 2014: 344), and the richest 10% in the US 
represent 75% of wealth (Piketty, 2014: 348). 
The diagram below shows a compression of the empirical findings for the US and Europe 
(Piketty, 2014: 349). 
                   
The explanation for the regained focus on relative inequality lies primarily in the fact that 





Consequently, the public has become aware of the concentration of wealth in the economic top 
layer of society in several Western nations since the 70s.  
Capital in the Twenty-First Century is not just purely a work of observation. The impact of the 
book has to do with the fact that the economist connects the above observation to an economic 
explanation. According to the French economist, the cause of the increase in wealth inequality 
lies in the role of capital – as opposed to labour. Whereas salaries in recent decades only rose 
piecemeal, private gains from capital (shares, bonds, intellectual property, savings and real 
estate) increased enormously (Piketty, 2014: 199-237). Piketty provided the supporters of 
economic equality with a clear scientific theory: the explanation for the uneven distribution of 
wealth is a priori due to the uneven distribution of capital, which in addition has an 
accumulative nature. In absence of corrective measures, the distribution and nature of capital 
(again: from assets not originating from labour) will lead to pre-War inequality levels, 
according to Piketty. 
2.4.  Taxation as a corrective mechanism 
 
According to the economist Paul Krugman (2014: 3), Piketty has caused a revolution in our 
thinking. This revolution is not limited to the focus on relative inequality, but also includes a 
political-normative aspect. Where once welfare thinking often proposed higher minimum 
wages, better education and measures regarding equal opportunities to create a desirable 
economic situation, the emphasis has now shifted. In the final part of Capital in the Twenty-
First Century Piketty again placed taxation at the centre of public, political and academic 
debate. Consequently, the revolution in economic thinking matches a call for fiscal measures 
to keep the rising inequality in line. Now, to halt “the indefinite increase of inequality of wealth” 
(2014: 518) Piketty himself proposes a wealth tax. To some extent, marginal wealth taxes exist 
in Flanders in the form of real estate taxes (or: ‘onroerende voorheffing’). Piketty’s wealth tax 
needs to be distinguished from the current tax on property in three ways. First of all, it concerns 
a universal tax: Piketty targets all types of capital, including savings, shares and bonds. 
Secondly, the Piketty-tax considers the taxation of the net value of a property, and not of a 
(minimum) assumed income, as used in many countries. Finally, Piketty’s wealth taxes are 
characterised by a progressive rate structure: the higher the market value of an individual’s 
wealth, the higher the rate. 
Thus, these kind of wealth taxes are not simply the same as the existing real estate taxes. 
Despite this, the legitimacy of the latter will be dealt with towards the end of this text. 
The second idea often introduced as part of the discussion, is the introduction of / increase in 
capital gains tax rates.31 Considering the fact that it is precisely capital income which causes 
the widening prosperity gap, the OECD (2015), President Obama (2015), the Flemish Socialist 
Party (2014) and Green Party (2014), but also a huge number of economists like Mirrlees et al. 
(2011: 331-359) and Diamond and Saez (2011: 165-90) argue for more ambitious and more 
consistent taxation of non-labour related income. With this in mind, higher taxes on the 
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voorheffing’). Many types of capital income are actually either differentially or even not taxed. As such, capital gains 
on shares situated within the sphere of everyday management of private wealth (see for instance art. 90, 9th WIB 





income realised from capital, including stocks, shares, real estate, liquid assets and funds, are 
envisaged.32  
To conclude, it can be stated that increased concern for economic inequality has led to an 
increased interest in taxation, which in turn has generated two redistribution proposals:  
1. wealth taxes: specific taxation of the net worth of an individual’s wealth; 
2. capital gains tax: taxes on the income or profits generated by wealth. 
 
3.  Between legislation and constitutionalism: towards an examination of 
legitimacy  
 
3.1.  Individual rights as constitutional constraints 
 
How can the discipline of jurisprudence contribute to this debate?  
Economic inequality is generally speaking not a decisive argument for introducing random 
measures. It is not because a certain evolution is considered negative, that any random form 
of legislation to pursue a more desirable state is justifiable. The judicial point of view does not 
consider society as one big building site waiting for an architect. The constitutional perspective 
leans towards the opposite: every individual has certain rights allowing him to shape his own 
life. In other words, the legitimacy of political remedies in constitutional thinking – as opposed 
to a purely economic frame – is limited by the contours of human rights.33 In this regard 
Tomasi (2012: 76) states: “The basic liberties are prerequisites for the legitimate exercise of 
democratic authority”.   
Therefore, the battle against radicalisation, for instance, will be limited by the right to freedom 
of religion, and, for example, the struggle for equal opportunities will be limited by the right to 
family life, which allows different upbringing – and hence also the development of different, 
often unequal talents. The need for taxation and the wish for redistribution are in this respect 
no exception: individuals have certain rights regarding certain goods and the authorities can 
only intervene within the boundaries set by these laws. Despite the fact that, historically, large-
scale expropriations proved to be the most efficient strategy to attain economic equality, for 
instance in the U.S.S.R., not many will consider this measure admissible. 
From the constitutional perspective, a potential law is only legitimate as long as it is compatible 
with the fundamental human rights. It is important to note that a definition of the latter does 
not necessarily correspond to the presentation of human rights in current constitutional law. 
If the sources for analysing the legitimacy of legislative acts were solely to be determined by 
                                                          
32 This article focuses on the taxation of realised profits – and does not mention the taxation of latent capital gains, 
whereby a mere increase in market value also constitutes “income”. For more information and a defence of the idea 
of taxation of latent capital gains, see Brown (1996) and Shakow (1986). See also essay three.  
33 See also for example John Rawls’s famous principle of “(lexical) priority” (Rawls, 1999a: 53-54), which maintains 
that between individual basic rights (incl. freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of person, free 
choice of employment and the right to personal freedom) on the one hand, and economic (re)distribution and equal 
opportunities on the other, there exists a hierarchical relationship. According to the most influential political 






the law itself, independent scrutiny of political action would be out of the question.34 
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the current constitutional law will further an 
acceptable vision of constitutionalism. 
Essentially, both inheritance and gift taxes determine different tax rates, depending on the 
relationship of the beneficiary or recipient in relation to the testator or donor. It is worth noting 
that in the case of donating or leaving something via a will to non-blood-relatives – incidentally 
the most authentic form of altruism biologically speaking – tax rates are comparatively 
high(er). To illustrate, until recently, if a person wanted to donate immovable property to his 
child, the highest rate was 30%.35 Donating to the advantage of a non-blood-relative (e.g. in 
the context of donating to a godchild) was virtually impossible, with marginal tax rates up to 
80%.36 Regarding inheritance tax, should the testator prefer not to donate in a direct line, but 
for example donate to his orphaned nephew, the legislator increases the highest rate from 27% 
to 65%.37 It is arguable whether the legislator is right in this case. In effect, these differential 
tax rates are at odds with the right to private property. Especially, an essential aspect of this 
fundamental right is the right to transfer, or the guarantee of being able to indicate a new owner 
of his own choosing (see 4.1.). The provision, which determines different succession and 
donation rights according to the “recipient” is a marked infringement of this principle. The 
legal practice whereby the donation and testation outside of the direct line is fiscally punished 
therefore contravenes with the right to private property. The latter fundamental right is being 
prevented as such to play its autonomy-promoting role. 
The discrepancy between fiscal legislation and personal rights is also noticeable elsewhere. For 
instance, the legislator decides on differential rates for different forms of income. If person A 
depends on labour for income, he will be facing a much higher tax rate than person B – who 
receives income from property rentals, capital (e.g. interest) and the selling of shares. From 
the perspective of personal rights, where everyone has a claim to deploy their resources (talent, 
property, knowledge) as they see fit, one can only speculate on the legitimacy of this 
preferential treatment. Indeed, the individual freedom to strive for one’s (economic) happiness 
requires absence of legislative manipulation in this regard. Deciding which action or activity 
an individual will use his body and goods for is part of an individual’s personal sphere of control 
and does not constitute ground for discrimination. As long as the rights of others are being 
respected, individuals are free to use their talent or property for those activities which, 
according to the circumstances, appear optimal. Whether someone’s wealth increases due to 
investments made (dividends), decisions made regarding savings (interest on capital) or the 
application of one’s body (labour) is a personal matter and not a government decision. In that 
sense, the often extremely unequal fiscal burden for different activities can be considered from 
the principle of freedom of person, and the non-discrimination principle which it generates.  
As the previous examples show, a critical constitutional approach will not assign biblical status 
to prevailing law. A contrario, if the field of normative jurisprudence has the ambition to 
undertake critical research on the current tax system – and any of its linked potential changes 
                                                          
34 From the beginning of the 20th century, it is possible to observe a dominance of similar “legal positivism”, 
whereby the methods for analysing law solely depend on institutionally acknowledged sources. Nevertheless, critical 
approaches to law survive under the denominators “philosophy of law”, “economic law” and “political philosophy”. 
Regarding the danger of legal positivism for the rule of law, see among others Hayek (2011: 342-366). 
35 Art. 2.8.4.2.1 former Flemish Tax Code, or ‘Vlaamse Codex Fiscaliteit’.  
36 Recently this discrimination has been mitigated somewhat, with rates of 27% and 40% respectively. See art. 26, 
para. 1 Decreet houdende bepalingen tot begeleiding van de aanpassing van de begroting 2015 (1) van 3 juli 2015. 





– it has to establish itself independently of the prevailing legal (tax) system. The discipline of 
normative jurisprudence attempts to benchmark the (potential) legitimacy of government(al) 
action against constitutional principles, irrespective of whether these have been recognised by 
lawmakers (Van Dun, 2008). Considering the distinction between “legislation” (regulation by 
institutionally recognised bodies) and “constitutionalism” (morally acceptable ‘rules of the 
game’ embodying the interest of each single individual), the personal rights which serve as a 
benchmark can be discovered through independent rational reasoning. Axiomatic principles 
such as the right to autonomy, liberty of person and protection of property, the duty to keep 
one’s promises and pay compensation, or the guarantee to a decent living standard can be 
accepted, irrespective of their recognition by the legislator. Although our legal system often 
partly recognises these principles, they are also equally ignored for unclear or unconvincing 
reasons.  
3.2.  Individual rights: conventional agreements or pre-political rights? 
 
It is clear that this analysis is not the only one in legal theory. The submitted vision can be 
distinguished from – currently popular – opinions, whereby the individual rights are political 
conventions, owing their existence to the public structure within which they are recognised. 
Concerning this present subject, Murphy and Nagel (2002: 173) argue for example, that 
property rights are an example of similar conventional institutions. Our claims on property are 
not determinable prior to legislation, but are really specific products of the government and its 
legislation. Indeed: “In the absence of a legal system supported by taxes, there couldn’t be 
money, banks, corporations, stock exchanges, patents or a modern market economy- none of 
the institutions that make possible almost all contemporary forms of income and wealth.” 
(Murphy and Nagel, 2002: 32). In the words of the soul mates Holmes and Sunstein (1999: 
60): “A liberal system does not merely protect and defend property. It defines and hence 
creates property.” To put it differently: taxes are the prerequisites for property rights and hence 
cannot intervene with them (Banham, 2012: 339-441). In their famous book, Murphy and 
Nagel argue that indeed, it is impossible to, for example, dismiss income taxes based on the 
right to private property: there are ‘no property rights antecedent to the tax structure’ (Murphy 
and Nagel, 2002: 74), hence – our only claim is on net income (see also: 32-33). Conclusion 
(Gaus, 2010: 260): “Without us, there would be no property, so you have no property claims 
against us!” 
Without getting too profoundly involved with underlying theoretical approaches to law, two 
points nevertheless need clarification. 
First of all, the above argument by Murphy and Nagel goes back to a mix-up between the 
existence of a right and its content in respect of its protection.38 Their statement indicates that, 
without a state, there would be no provisioning of protection to the right of private property. 
In this situation of judicial chaos these rights would be less secure, and their content reduced. 
However, this does not mean we would not have any rights, or that these are pure conventions. 
The fact that there is no state to protect rights does not mean we are allowed to randomly 
confiscate anything produced or gained by others. We could refer to the right to life. In a way, 
we all owe our lives to the state, just like our goods: without the guarantee of safety, many of 
us would again – literally – fall prey to others. Without the organisation of a preventive and 
                                                          
38 Content of a right refers to the “object” related to the right. Right to private property is a right, the specific goods 
upon which we exercise property rights then constitute the content of that right. Note that we can have rights 
without an object: as such we are equally entitled to freedom of expression, when we have no specific opinion at a 





repressive criminal law, it is feared that many of us would not be able to cope for very long. In 
that sense our life is a product of the state. However, this does not mean that our right to life 
is the same. When governments are absent or not effective, and this right is not protected, it is 
assumed that this right is still valid, even if its content has become less secure.  
The idea that rights do not exist until governments say they do, is quite hard to believe. Besides, 
Murphy and Nagel do not have to follow me – their own justice system also disagrees with 
them: “That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed.” From the declaration of independence it is clear 
that there are a series of moral claims, and that a state has got the political task to guarantee 
them, i.e. “secure” (Locke, 1948). 
A second, more plausible, mitigation of Murphy and Nagel’s argument could then read as 
follows: our rights can exist in a rational sense, but will only receive content as a result of the 
execution and protection by government. This alternative interpretation is indeed less 
incongruous, but again questionable. The marking and respecting of territories covered by 
usufruct, is older than the state itself – and not limited to Homo sapiens (Pipes, 1999). Even 
though the actual legal training sometimes gives the impression that the rules which exist 
between individuals are being created by legislation, the opposite also seems to have been the 
case. Anthropological study demonstrates that the mutual respect for each other’s goods, and 
the coordination possibilities that follow, has been a spontaneous process, leading to the rise 
of property rights through custom in our societies (Bederman, 2010; Malinowski, 1978). 
Children, early sedentary societies, native population groups and postmodern urban 
environments all acknowledge the right to control things and deny others the right to “free 
entry” (Ridley, 1997: 227; Diamond, 1993: 267). In that sense, governments seem to have 
usurped – rather than “invented” the tasks of legal protection.39 And only partially: even today, 
the majority of the protection of our rights is still in private hands: usually one does not contact 
the authorities to prevent a crime, but entrusts that task to a series of social mechanisms. 
Therefore, phenomena such as education or social control in certain relationships have a 
priceless preventative value. 
Within this context it can be concluded that the content of our rights is influenced by the stately 
institutions erected in recent centuries. This factual conclusion does not in any way touch the 
existence of pre-political moral right, which is rationally defensible, and the effective 
protection of which is the reason why states are accepted. In that sense individual rights are 
the one – and perhaps only– criterion against which to evaluate stately conduct.  
4.  The right to private property: a jurisprudential concept 
 
Given the previous discussion (part 3 in particular), the current contribution will not attempt 
to legitimise prevailing fiscal law nor rely on how Belgian lawmakers describe the right to 
private property. By means of an independent view on this fundamental right, a normative 
frame will be created to judge the current and potential legislation.  
A democracy is traditionally a system that opts for an individualised distribution of property. 
Control over goods in society is not concentrated in the hands of a select group of politicians 
and bureaucrats, but property rights are decentralised and scattered across millions of 
individuals and the legal entities they form. It is no surprise that in our regions, the 
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development and deepening of the right to private property came about in the same period as 
the development of other human rights, such as freedom of religion (Rose, 1996: 329-369). 
John Gray (1993: 315) points out that also the right to private property allows us to arrange 
our life according to our own judgment and preference. As pointed out repeatedly in light of its 
constitutional acknowledgment, for example in the US, the right to private property protects 
individuals against the influence of political and other elites and preserves the freedom of 
certain minorities to live according to their own judgment (Tomasi, 2012: 12-16). In that sense, 
for example, the culture and even influence of the alternative youth movements from the 60s 
and 70s are greatly indebted to the right to private property. Even though they undoubtedly 
thought differently, their alternative way of life was only possible in a judicial system where 
books, records and clothes could be owned, used and traded freely. Hence religious and other 
minorities are also being protected against the possible oppressing influence of the majority by 
means of the constitutional protection of their goods, which they can use for an alternative way 
of living.  
In this respect property is the solace of a constitutional order; no one is guaranteed a world 
according to his own ideals, but everyone has the certainty of being able to shape his own part 
of his ideal world. However minimal the amount of goods we have under our control – within 
that sphere one has the opportunity to live according to one’s own judgment. 
According to the legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron (2010: 3), nobody seriously contests the 
legitimacy of the right to private property anymore. Nevertheless, despite the fact that mainly 
private bodies manage the goods in our society, it is not easy to compose a definition of 
property. Imagine a new state is established, and it starts looking for a new constitution and 
needs a precise description of the right to private property. In the search for the correct 
definition, one can ask: 
Which different types of legal capacity to act fall within the right to private property? 
In other words: what can the owner do with the goods at his disposal? Two important points 
of interest regarding the definition will be provided here. First of all, my understanding of the 
concept of property is independent of the fact that individuals can contractually transfer 
certain sub-rights to each other. It deals with an original concept of property – preceding 
possibly more complex property arrangements (Grey, 1980: 69-85), which can be set up 
through agreements, and whereby different parties hold different property claims (e.g. a loan, 
a lease...). Secondly, following similar initiatives submitted elsewhere (Waldron, 1988; 
Munzer, 1990) my understanding of the concept of property is not a copy of its current 
organisation in Belgian law, but, as stated, an independent conceptualization. 
Generally, it could be argued that having property rights indicates a form of control one has 
over a certain good. This control can encompass different actions and therefore there are 
different sub-rights of private property (Hohfeld, 1913; Honore, 1961: 107-147; Becker, 1977: 
7-22 ; Waldron, 1988: 431-439; Van Oven, 1948: 1-595). Each sub-right (or dimension) 
contains a specific form of control over a good. In order to being able to distinguish the 
different dimensions, two types of property rights have to be isolated: primary and secondary 





4.1.  Primary property rights 
 
The primary property rights contain the direct actions, those operations a person can 
undertake with a good. Five primary sub-rights can be differentiated: 
- a property right starts with the right of possession. This dimension is quite basic, and 
merely means we can keep something exclusively for ourselves, and thus exclude others of 
physical occupation. When I own a house, I am at least entitled to enter the property, and I can 
deny others such action; 
- the second dimension is the use of a property, not only can you enter your house, you 
can also engage in a real activity and use it or consume it: the owner of a house may for instance 
live in it;  
- the third sub-right contains the right to modify, which is a right to change the 
composition of a good. The owner of a house can, for example, construct a Buddhist temple 
inside the house; 
- fourthly, there is the right to manage:  I can decide to let other people use a good by 
means of contracts. Should I wish to open a bed and breakfast, I have the possibility to offer 
others use of the dwelling via the right to management; 
- the final primary dimension is the right to transfer, which is the right to appoint a new 
owner. Should I wish to hand over full control of the property to someone else, I can appoint 
this person via a contract or unilateral disposition as the next owner. 
An internal hierarchy exists amongst the dimensions discussed there, and property can 
therefore be summarised in the schematic diagram below:  












The internal hierarchy is caused by two – mutually connected – relational characteristics of 
the sub-rights: 
4.1.1.  Each dimension provides a progressive form of control 
 
The fact that each sub-right provides more control progressively, has possibly become 
intuitively clear to the reader. The right of possession is a quasi-empty sub-right referring 
purely to “retention”: an owner may keep a good exclusively for himself and can exclude others 
from occupying it, or taking it away. ‘Use’ is an extensive form of pure possession: the fact of 
simply owning a property switches to the right to live in it. The right to modify then goes one 
step further: it is not just about using a good, but it is also about altering its composition. The 
right to manage is an extended form of use and encompasses the right to allow others to use a 
property via contracts. The right to transfer is the most extended form of control: to denounce 
control and entrust it to another person. 
Rights in rem provide certain individuals with the capacity to act with regard to a good. When 
dissecting the right to private property, one can see a progressive structure gradually emerging: 
each distinct dimension adds a more extensive form of control, resulting in a gradually 
increasing realm of action for the property-holder. The right to private property can be 
regarded as a pyramid, in the sense that, from basic aspects like possession to more extensive 
actions like the transfer of a property, each layer adds a more extensive capacity regarding a 
specific good.  
As part of this progressive nature, whereby each sub-right provides additionally more extensive 
authority, the acknowledgement of the more basic sub-rights is evident, whereas the more 
peripheral rights are sometimes more debatable. As a consequence, the right of possession is 
the most obvious dimension; the owner’s claim to right of possession concerns a “logical 
starting point” of a private property right. In that sense it is difficult to imagine a society where 
individuals do not even have a right of possession, and where one can simply appropriate 
anything.40 Also, a situation where there is no regulation regarding who can use what, is one of 
chaos. For scarce goods or materials which can only be used a limited number of times, the 
recognition of individual rights of use is fundamental. As these basal sub-rights constitute 
minimal aspects of property, which consider “isolated” actions (containing no interaction with 
others), even less property-friendly regimes move towards recognising them.41 Therefore, 
communist regimes also guarantee the little disputed rights of use and possession. In the case 
of children’s toys for example, one will often acknowledge the base of the pyramid, and 
recognise possession and use. Or in the case of soft drugs, simple rights of possession and use 
are not prosecuted but instead the “higher sub-rights” are envisaged. 
The more far-stretching rights of management and transfer are not purely concerned with how 
a person enjoys a property, but how one allows others access. Because of this “social” or 
“interactive” characteristic, these sub-rights are often less irrefutable, and lawmakers will 
impose conditions on the owner (permit, certain age, certain study) or the product (not 
                                                          
40 Lita Furby (1991: 457-463) established the universal importance of possession via cross-cultural and 
intergenerational research, and explained this through the facilitating role of this sub-right for personal control over 
the world. The universal importance of private possession and use is that – as owners have a vested interest in the 
conservation of goods – it counteracts overconsumption and destruction. See Ridley (1997). 
41  The right of possession, use or modification contain actions, which are not related to others, and impose simply 





containing any damaging substances, clear information). These rights also influence the 
distribution of goods in a society, and therefore lawmakers will intervene via tax policy, for 
example in the form of excise duties, gift- or succession taxes. Communist societies deny 
individuals these more extended forms of control and will delegate the management and 
transfer to bureaucratic administrations. But also in Western societies state organisations will 
now and again extract management and transfer from individuals, for example for goods 
(security, health) which are subject to positive state obligations.    
4.1.2.  Each dimension assumes the presence of the previous one 
 
Not only does each sub-right provide a more extensive form of control, the higher dimensions 
encompass the more evident ones. For instance, the right to use something also includes the 
right of possession. And in order to being able to temporarily assign something to others 
(management), I myself need to own the right to use. Finally, the right to transfer incorporates 
all preceding rights: therefore, a classic sale agreement will transfer the possession, use and 
management. Except in the case where they were divided amongst different individuals, the 
“higher” sub-rights build further on the previous ones and incorporate the more basic sub-
rights. To use the old French adage: “Qui peut le plus peut le moins”, or “he who can do more 
can do less”: ‘use’ presumes ‘possession’, ‘management’ presumes ‘use’, etc.  
Therefore we have to appreciate property for a second time as a pyramid: the more basal sub-
rights constitute the foundations for the “higher” ones. A right to manage is quite pointless 
without the recognition of a right to use or possess. Because of the relationship outlined here, 
the more basal sub-rights are not just evident (see 4.1.1.), but their presence is at the same time 
the foundation for the higher dimensions. Because of this hierarchy, a violation of a more basal 
right also constitutes a violation of the “higher” sub-rights. For example, if the authorities seize 
my house in case of an emergency, then this not only touches my first sub-right – the right of 
possession – but also my right to use. And in the same way, if an administrative decision 
declares my home uninhabitable, this touches my right to use, but also to manage: I can no 
longer rent it out for residential purposes. The Latin expression a minore ad maius 
encompasses the second hierarchical relationship: if the smaller is prohibited, the greater is 
also denied, or to put more positively: each ‘higher’ sub-right only exists if the lower dimension 
is recognised. 
The reverse is clearly not true: a violation of the higher rights does not necessarily touch the 
more basal rights. It is not because there exists a restraint on alienation of my house, that my 
right to modify or use is interfered with. It is not because children are not allowed to lend their 
toys (management) that they themselves cannot play with them. Because the property pyramid 
adds something to the previous dimension each time, intervention at the top will not touch the 
base. 
4.1.3.  Consequence: the more basal the dimension, the more absolute its effect 
 
If your house does not comply with urban development regulations, a few administrative 
sanctions could be considered: 1) one has to comply with the requirements at the point of 
selling a house, 2) one can no longer live in the house until it complies with the rules, 3) an 
expropriation is issued. 
Intuitively, most of us will consider the latter measure the most serious one, and “opt” for the 





structure, allows us to set up a normative framework to assess governmental interventions 
regarding the right to private property. Moreover, the “low” sub-rights incorporate less 
disputable claims, which do not include any ‘interactive’ aspects, and which embody minimal 
aspects of the right to property. Importantly, these “low sub-rights” are constitutive of 
everything that follows. Indeed, because the high sub-rights also encompass the low ones, a 
violation of the base also impacts upon the rest, and needs to be considered a more severe 
intervention. When we wish to limit a person’s possession (we issue an expropriation) the 
authorities will usually need better justified reasons than when we limit his right to sell (we 
exercise a pre-emption right). Therefore the introduction of an anti-discrimination provision 
in the tenancy legislation which states that I also have to let my property to members of 
minority groups (right to manage), will again be considered a less serious violation than a 
change in the land-use plan, which states that I can no longer live in my house (right to use). 
To put it more positively: because the base of the pyramid encompasses evident aspects of 
property, which are furthermore fundamental to the subsequent aspects, this will be vigorously 
protected in the recognition of the right to private property.42 Once it is understood that the 
right to private property can contain different dimensions of legal capacity, various dimensions 
of control, it then becomes clear that the right of possession constitutes an evident starting 
point which performs a pivotal function for all subsequent, more peripheral sub-rights. 
Without the right of possession, all other sub-rights become unthinkable. In order for a judicial 
system to recognise the right to private property, it has to grant near-absolute protection to the 
conditio sine qua non of this fundamental right. Therefore, Belgian lawmakers protect the right 
of possession against the authorities via the expropriation law (whereby the exclusive 
possession can only be taken away in well-defined situations) and against fellow citizens via 
civil orders in the Criminal Code (e.g. in the case of theft). 
This quasi-absolute effect of the right of possession becomes clearer as the inadmissibility of a 
violation is in principle not a question of seriousness, duration or proportion. The most basal 
sub-right will recognise a certain object as belonging to the exclusive territory of an individual, 
and a violation is simply a matter of entering or removing part of that domain. When someone 
trespasses, this is an unacceptable violation of the right to possess; whether this entry lasted 5 
hours or 20 minutes is of no importance.43 And even though everyone would probably rather 
have EUR 1,000 than EUR 10,000 stolen, this value has no influence on the legitimacy of the 
action: a minor theft is no less a “theft”. The violation of the basis of property is in principle a 
matter of all or nothing: either your right is being infringed or not.  
To understand the normative origin of this quasi-absolute effect, one can draw a parallel with 
the concept of ‘property in one's own person’. Self-ownership can indeed be considered a 
chronology of increasingly progressive sub-rights: from excluding others from penetrating 
one’s body (i.e. possession), to doing sports (i.e. use), to working in exchange for money (i.e. 
management). Indeed, the simple right of possession is again self-evident (quasi-“empty” sub-
right unrelated to others, and rarely contested) and fundamental to other rights. As a 
consequence, the use (e.g. sports) or management (e.g. labour) of our person, for example, is 
impossible without the security of a preceding right of possession. The right to self-ownership 
                                                          
42 Likewise one can detect within “the right to a decent living” the “right to sufficient food”. This sub-right forms an 
evident starting point – which is also constitutive of all other possible sub-rights, e.g. the right to housing, the right 
to education or the right to develop oneself. Because of this dual relationship the “right to sufficient food” will also 
receive more absolute protection. 
43 In comparison with the more relative and higher rights: the rights to manage are e.g. often being restricted by the 





is then also awarded quasi-absolute guarantee. For many, the violation of our body is 
unacceptable, regardless of whether this concerns a small interference (“it was only a slap”) or 
is of short duration (the rape was over quickly). The involuntary removal of a body part is also 
unjustified, regardless of whether this concerns an organ (kidney) or a part of our body, which 
grows back (our hair or nails). Self-ownership is the cradle of our general freedom, and we 
seem to only very rarely allow violations. 
Therefore we can conclude that, due to both its evident nature, and the constitutive role within 
the general structure of the right to private property, the base of the pyramid will be granted 
an almost absolute effect. The right of possession is not only an evident partial aspect of 
property, but it is also the basis for all other dimensions of control. This explains why we rarely 
consider unacceptable violation as a matter of gradation, but rather as all or nothing.  
4.2.  Secondary property rights 
 
Naturally, there also exist secondary rights. The secondary rights do not encompass the direct 
actions with regard to a good – they are not decisions concerning a good as such – but relate 
to the economic advantages generated by exercising the primary rights.44 Given the internal 
hierarchy of the concept of property, primary and secondary rights run in parallel. In other 
words: each primary right has got economic consequences: 
1. the right to possess something gives entitlement to the fruits via natural evolution; 
2. the right to the use of something grants the owner the pleasure and satisfaction that 
this entails; 
3. the right to modify gives entitlement to improved personal pleasure as a result of that 
modification; 
4. the right to manage then provides real income resulting from contractually establishing  
the use of a property, for example rental income; 
5. the right to transfer then provides certain profits which can result from the difference 
between purchase and sale price. 
Within this pyramidal structure of property the secondary rights can be expressed as follows: 
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Important to what follows is that the rights of possession, property and use only provide 
intrinsic advantages: as no real financial flow is being created, the advantages of the rights of 
possession, use and modification coincide with the actions themselves. The secondary rights 
cannot be distinguished from the primary ones. As owner, if you are entitled to modify (e.g. to 
construct a porch), then you are also entitled to the resulting advantages: for example, the 
higher pleasure provided by this porch. Or it is difficult to claim that I am allowed to live in my 
own house – and hence I have the right to use – but I do not have the right to the pleasure 
resulting from this. 
It is different for the right to manage and the right to transfer: when we rent out or alienate a 
property, the economic advantages are conceptually different from the primary right, and 
hence from the actual management and transfer. If I temporarily hand over my liquid assets to 
a specific party (e.g. a bank) by investing and I agree to receive a certain income (i.e. an 
interest), then that income is to be separated from my actual management action. For instance, 
I could also have transferred my capital for free (e.g. a loan with inflation as the only interest). 
Parallel: if I sell the house I inherited from my parents and realise a profit of EUR 100,000, 
then this sum can be distinguished from the right to transfer itself: I could have transferred the 
house for free.  
For the two highest sub-rights we can therefore observe that the primary and secondary rights 
do not converge, as there is a kind of external revenue, not identical to the original action 
regarding a good. From the economic perspective this revenue is the result of a different 
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reason I realise a profit from a sale is not a result from the transfer, but from the fact that the 
buyer attributes a higher subjective value to the house than I do. When we manage and transfer 
goods, the economic benefit is not a result of the primary action itself, but of the economic 
surplus generated by the fact that both parties valorise a good differently. 
For what follows, it is crucial to stress that, for the two highest sub-rights of management and 
transfer, there exists a distinction between the primary right (the action regarding a good, the 
transfer of a good to someone else whether or not temporarily) and the secondary right (the 
resulting economic benefits). A similar distinction concerning the lowest three sub-rights is 
not possible: here, the direct action and the economic benefit coincide.   
5.  The fiscal treatment of wealth: towards a legitimacy-test 
 
Let us return to the beginning, namely the issue of wealth inequality and the role of taxation 
as a means of redistribution. How does the analysis of the right to property help us when 
judging the legitimacy of wealth taxes and capital gains tax? Let me explain by means of a 
simple casus: a 60-year old lawyer with some liquid assets and real estate, with an aggregate 
value of EUR 1 million. 
5.1.  Wealth taxes 
 
A wealth tax - as advocated by Piketty and the Walloon Socialist party (2015) - is a certain levy 
on the net worth of a person’s wealth, calculated according to market value. 
Understanding the right to private property as a pyramid, we cannot situate this kind of 
taxation at the level of management or transfer. Given our conceptualisation presented above, 
this type of measure does not even intervene with the right to use. When considering property 
as a gradual accumulation of increasingly more extensive sub-rights, one notices that wealth 
taxes target the foundation itself: the pure possession. As described, this sub-right will accredit 
a certain object to the exclusive territory of an individual. Wealth taxes can be considered as 
entering and removing a part of this domain. If the lawyer, for example, is confronted with a 
wealth tax rate of 2%, then he will have to transfer some capital into the government’s bank 
account, or deploy different methods to meet his tax obligations. In practical terms, the tax 
authority will extract EUR 20,000 from that which is subject to his exclusive right of 
possession. A wealth tax in itself is simply an expropriation: the good which is subject to a 
property right is being removed. Furthermore, as the higher sub-rights absorb and expand the 
more basal ones, and build on these, wealth taxes constitute at the same time also a multiple 
violation: the eliminated part can no longer be used, managed or transferred. 
To conclude, one could argue that wealth taxes constitute the most serious violation of the right 
to private property. As the right of possession constitutes an evident starting point of the right 
to private property, which in addition supports the remainder of the pyramid, it has an almost 
absolute effect. An unacceptable violation of the building block of property is not a matter of 
degree or assessment, but – as is the case with the penetration of someone’s body – a principal 
matter. Apart from in emergency situations, violations cannot be justified. Just as a small theft 
will not all of sudden become legitimate, there is no principal difference between a wealth tax 





5.2.  Capital gains tax45  
 
How can one evaluate capital gains tax against the right to private property? 
Capital gains tax does not concern itself with possession, but with the income or profits as a 
result of the temporary or permanent transfer of goods (e.g. liquid assets shares etc.) to others. 
When we consider this from our conceptualisation of the right to private property, we need to 
connect capital gains with the right to manage and transfer. 
The first observation (follows from 4.1.) has to be that – considering the pyramidal nature of 
the right to private property – the taxation of income respects the basal rights. As the property 
pyramid each time adds something to the previous, an intervention at the top will not touch 
the base. In terms of self-ownership: taxes on the wages of a footballer will not violate his rights 
of possession or use of his feet. Likewise, the taxation of capital interest (act of management) 
will not interfere with someone’s exclusive possession or use (e.g. as method of payment) of 
the actual capital.   
To come back to the example of the lawyer: suppose he sells his apartment and, following the 
deduction of costs, he generates a profit of EUR 100,000. Under a potential capital gains tax 
rate of 20% he will have to pay an amount of EUR 20,000. As per the hierarchy described 
earlier, this measure leaves the more basal sub-rights intact: a tax of EUR 20,000 on the profits 
resulting from the alienation of his house will not disturb the lawyer in his exclusive possession 
of that house, nor with him living in it, nor with, for example, any renovations he might be 
planning. Because of this hierarchy, we observe that a wealth tax of EUR 20,000 (example 5.1.) 
constitutes a more serious violation than capital gains tax of EUR 20,000: where the first 
measure removes an object from someone’s exclusive territory, the second tax purely imposes 
a levy on the surplus realised as a result of alienation of an object from exclusive territory. As 
the greater does not touch the lesser, the latter taxation does not touch the first three primary 
rights: the right to possess, use or modify is not being violated by capital gains tax. It is not 
because you are required to pay taxes on the profits resulting from selling a house that your 
rights regarding possession, use or modification are affected.  
A second observation (follows from 4.2.) is that capital gains tax possibly does not intervene 
with the actual rights to manage and transfer and therefore leaves the “higher” primary rights 
intact. After all, regarding management and transfer, one can distinguish between the primary 
right (the original action regarding a good, i.e. the transfer to someone else) and the secondary 
right (the income this generates, i.e. the rental income or profits resulting from a sale). A capital 
gains tax rate of 20% on profits resulting from a sale does not intervene with the right to 
transfer his apartment itself. Not the fact that he appoints a new owner, but the realised 
economic surplus is being taxed: if the property was transferred for free, this (hypothetical) 
measure would not actually apply. Similarly, taxes on the income from letting a residence will 
not in itself violate someone’s right to manage: not the temporary transfer of use, but the 
irregular income constitutes the taxable basis. Therefore, on condition that taxation purely 
targets realised income, it does not intervene with the rights of management or transfer, and 
capital gains tax will leave all primary sub-rights intact. This kind of taxation only skims part 
of the secondary aspects of property: that is, the potential economic surplus resulting from the 
two highest primary sub-rights. As this measure respects the entire pyramid of primary 
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property rights, it cannot be qualified as illegitimate, and one needs to consider it as at least 
preferential in relation to wealth taxes. 
It is important to note that not every tax fulfils this condition. If I have to pay taxes purely 
because I transfer or let my property – independent of any income – then a violation of the 
primary rights of management and transfer has taken place. So, for example, gift taxes or 
registration duties are a much more serious violation than capital gains tax: the tax basis being 
the transfer itself, not some kind of resulting economic surplus. Therefore, an imposed 
contribution in order to be able to put a property on the market is again a more serious 
violation than pure capital gains tax: it concerns the actual management and not any potential 
income from managing. Finally we observe that prevailing real estate taxes constitute a very 
serious violation: taxes on fictional income intervene with the possession of a property and 
consequently will be considered illegitimate, just as with the previously discussed wealth taxes. 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Justice John Marshall, US Supreme Court judge from the early 19th century and supporter of 
far-reaching constitutional control over the legislative work, stated (6 March 1819, McCulloch 
/ Maryland: 17 U.S. 316): An unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to destroy; 
because there is a limit beyond which no institution and no property can bear taxation. 
Unlimited fiscal competence creates the possibility to solve many problems, but, at the same 
time, poses risks, as specific measures have the ability to destroy our goods and the autonomy 
it facilitates. 
Wealth inequality, as addressed by Piketty, is a problem that requires solutions. But, as 
maintained by Justice Marshall, there exist limits which render certain measures inadmissible. 
One of the tasks for scholars within the field of jurisprudence is – apart from the study of 
current legislation – to reveal the limits of political action. From this point of view I attempt to 
clarify that property is a concept with an internal hierarchy, a pyramid, whereby certain aspects 
fulfil a more fundamental role. 
From this perspective, capital gains tax does not at all appear to be a destructive measure, as it 
does not target the primary sub-rights of property, but purely addresses the economic surplus 
resulting from certain actions. Moreover, this article does not only indicate capital gains tax as 
the preferential taxation in the battle against inequality. Part 3.1. suggests that an equal 
treatment of income from labour on the one hand, and income capital on the other, flows from 
a recognition of equal freedom of the person.  
Wealth taxes on the other hand, such as the existing real estate taxes or the proposal by Piketty, 
touch the evident base of the property pyramid, which all other aspects lean on. As wealth taxes 
penetrate the most evident aspects of property, which moreover form the foundation for all 
other aspects, they have to be considered unacceptable. If the government wants to increase 
the taxation of wealth - while respecting the demands of constitutionalism - it has to ban all 
wealth taxes  – in its current as well as recently proposed form - from the codex and opt for 
capital gains tax. 
After all, as the late Chief Justice suggested, taxes – whichever noble cause they have in mind 
– are subject to certain limitations. In my own words, economic justice can only be attained by 
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THE RIGHT TO AUTONOMY AS THE MORAL FOUNDATION FOR THE 
REALIZATION PRINCIPLE IN INCOME TAXATION46   
 
1.  Thomas Piketty and the Manifestation of Relative Inequality 
 
There are two basic normative assessments for an economic distribution. The first analyses 
peoples’ absolute level of welfare. One approach states that what matters is not that people 
have the same level of income or wealth, but rather that they have enough, according to some 
standard of sufficiency (Frankfurt, 1988: 134–58). The prioritarian tradition aims higher and 
states that we should target economic distributions that maximize the level of the least well-off 
(Rawls, 1999a: 57-64). When judging a particular economic situation, an underlying system is 
valued positively if it benefits those who are worst off more than an alternative system does, in 
terms of some particular standard (Tomasi, 2012). A third application targets the 
maximization of welfare gains, without any particular regard for the distribution between 
persons (i.e. outcome utilitarianism, see: Sen, 1979: 468).  
An alternative way of scrutinizing a specific distribution uses relative terms—that is, it does not 
matter how much people have; what matters is their economic relation. To judge a situation 
we do not look at what level of welfare people attain; what is important is whether others have 
more or less then they have (Temkin, 2000: 126–61).47 A situation will be deemed to be positive 
if the differences between people’s holdings are small, and deemed to be negative if there are 
huge differences between people’s holdings (Parfitt, 1997: 202–21).  
Applied to income—the accretion of wealth—the following comparison of alternative social 
situations can trigger our proper intuitions regarding the matter: 
Society A Society B 
Richest 10% earn £30,000 per year Richest 10% earn £100,000 per year 
Poorest 10% earn £10,000 per year Poorest 10% earn £20,000 per year 
 
Some of us will intuitively opt for Society B as being the preferred situation, if we focus on 
absolute figures: a prioritarian approach would value Society B for yielding the most benefit 
for the least well-off, and a utilitarian approach would value it for generating the most overall 
welfare. Within this framework it does not matter that the richest 10 per cent own more than 
80 per cent of the assets of Society B; what matters is how well off ‘the poor’ are, or how well 
off society as a whole is in terms of absolute numbers. 
Others will opt for a strict egalitarian standard, and will choose Society A as the preferred 
situation. What people have is only relevant with respect to how much others have, and our 
final goal is to mitigate inequalities. Within this framework it does not matter that the poorest 
10 per cent are above a certain standard of living and able to acquire a decent income; what 
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matters is that the richest 10 per cent do not earn five times as much as them. Equality thus 
has value in itself. 
Although for many years the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and almost 
all Western leaders promoted economic growth, and consequently focused on welfare gains in 
absolute numbers as a normative evaluation for an economic system, the ideal of maximizing 
standards and absolute numbers is currently fading. In the aftermath of the financial crisis in 
the first decade of this century, public attention shifted from a focus on growth and absolute 
welfare gains to an analysis of the distributive character of economic gains in relative terms. 
Many popular contributions have addressed this issue in terms of what part of ‘the pie’ goes to 
which percentile, confirming the relevancy of a notion of relative inequality.48 It is significant 
that public authorities mirror this moral conversion and express political indignation at huge 
economic gaps. President Obama (2013) stated that ‘the basic bargain at the heart of our 
economy has frayed’ in response to the fact that the top 10 per cent of the population in the 
United States yields 50 per cent of the national income.  Furthermore, at the World Economic 
Forum (2015) this year the subject of relative economic inequality was promoted as the core 
topic and the preferred economic prism, thus dethroning the notion of a maximizing analysis.  
Prior to this, the IMF (Lagarde, 2014) had already launched the idea of ‘inclusive capitalism’, 
aiming at a better distribution of profits between the members of society.  
Among many factors, the revival of an egalitarian normative outlook was certainly caused by a 
series of studies informing us of a tendency towards the accumulation of wealth and income in 
the hands of a few over the last few decades. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) recently reported a concentration of wealth since the 1970s, and found 
that since around the year 2000 in many Western countries the bottom 50 per cent of the 
population has been holding a small fraction of the national wealth, while the top 10 per cent 
often holds about 50 per cent of it (Fredriksen, 2012: 5-6). Credit Suisse (Global Wealth 
Report, 2014: 37) confirms this observation and has identified a concentration of wealth over 
the last 40 years, when the relative share for the top 10 per cent started rising in the United 
States, in eight European countries, and in Australia. Concerning the highly correlated issue of 
income inequality, the OECD (Cingano, 2014: 9) found that the gap has never been so high: in 
its member countries today, the richest 10 per cent have an income 9.5 times the size of the 
poorest 10 per cent, whereas this ratio was only 7.1 in 1980. Davies et al. confirm this 
concentration of wealth, and estimate on the basis of research in thirty-nine countries that the 
top 10 per cent of the population in 2000 held 71 per cent of all holdings (Davies et al., 2011: 
250).  Last but not least, Piketty’s research in Capital in the Twenty-First Century certainly 
corroborates this current normative transition, revealing that for many Western countries, 
since the 1970s the top 10 per cent—and certainly the top 1 per cent—are holding an increasing 
proportion of national wealth (Piketty, 2014: 336-376).  
Piketty provides us not only with numbers but also with a causal analysis of the growing 
inequality of wealth, which together form an important empirical justification for certain 
theoretical (fiscal) measures (see part 2 of this paper) that can oppose this trend. The central 
thesis of his book is that over the last forty years the return on capital—by which Piketty means 
income from stocks, bonds, participations, shares, annuities, intangible assets, and real 
estate—has exceeded public economic growth (Piketty, 2014: 199-234). This explains why wage 
earners have seen their wealth accrue to much smaller proportions than that of the capital 
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owners; capital is highly unequally distributed and—given its cumulative nature—it is getting 
progressively more so. This corresponds with the findings of the Global Wealth Report (2014: 
34), which emphasizes the correlation between the capital assets of a household and its wealth 
level. Furthermore, the OECD points in the same direction, showing a noticeable effect of 
inclusion of capital gains on the share of the top one per cent of incomes in countries for which 
information was available (OECD, 2011: 349, 359). This further coincides with the findings of 
Davies, which indicates that a disproportionate number of high incomes are derived from 
capital assets (Davies, 2009: 137).  
We can thus observe the manifestation of economic inequality on two levels. First, empirically 
speaking, wealth is unequally distributed, and a tendency towards greater inequality can be 
observed in many Western countries. Capital plays a key role in this evolution, yielding 
relatively high revenues when compared with labour, leading to a concentration of wealth. 
Second, normatively speaking, by underwriting the problematic nature of this evolution, 
academics and public discourse are—often implicitly—adhering to an egalitarian standard, as 
they are confirming economic inequality to be intrinsically bad. 
This development in economic philosophy cannot be perceived as an isolated matter—Piketty’s 
analysis of relative inequality has already sparked a widespread debate on the political 
measures that should be taken, especially with regard to the key role that taxation should 
play.49 Moreover, if taxation is supposed to be levied in accordance with the ability to pay, 
Piketty (2014: 495–6) has raised awareness of tax codes’ failure to reach capital owners. In the 
light of current economic inequality, Piketty and others (Davies, 2009: 143; McMahon, 2004: 
993–1128; Fredriksen, 2012: 16–18; Hoeller, 2012: 9-11) underline how current policies 
exacerbate this effect, and highlight the preferential treatment of capital income.  
2.  Taxation of Capital and the Mark-to-Market Ideal in Income Tax Theory 
 
Piketty thus triggered a debate on tax justice, causing politicians, organizations, and academics 
alike to examine measures to increase the fiscal burden on the wealthy. The debate has 
specifically revolved around examining various measures that could be upheld to increase 
fiscal contributions from capital owners. In order to conduct a specific analysis of tax justice, 
at least three different types of taxation of capital should be distinguished.  
In order to overcome ‘the indefinite increase of inequality of wealth’, Piketty himself proposes 
the first type, the wealth tax: a levy on the value of one’s holdings, irrespective of whether any 
revenue is being gained. In the absence of any transaction, a wealth tax is ideally levied on the 
market value of one’s assets.50  
Another possibility for targeting accumulative capital is to increase the taxation of revenue. 
Rather than taxing one’s holdings, a capital gains tax is a form of income taxation, targeting 
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only the gains that one’s assets yield (Piketty, 2014: 495–6; Bankman and Shaviro, 2015: 505; 
Wijtvliet, 2014: 642; Mirlees et al., 2011: 331–59; Diamond and Saez, 2011: 165–90; Obama, 
2015). Capital gains taxation can take two forms depending on how income is assessed—and 
taxed. 
One is the market-to-market capitals gains tax, which constitutes the second form of taxation 
of capital. This measure will tax capital as it accrues, and accordingly targets the annual 
increase in market value of one’s holdings. The event that constitutes taxation is thus the 
passing of a year and the increase in market value. This tax resembles the wealth tax in its 
assessment technique of focusing on the market value, but it remains an income tax 
nonetheless; a decrease in market value for a specific period will exclude taxation. 
Finally, there is the realization-based capital gains tax, the third form of taxation of capital. 
Unlike the previous form of income taxation, which simply taxes value fluctuations, this 
measure presupposes the occurrence of a realization event, being the sale or exchange of an 
asset. The event that constitutes taxation is thus (agreement on) the receipt of a benefit 
(normally money) in exchange for the transfer of property. Both are income taxes and aim only 
to tax gains. 
Within the theoretical distinction outlined above, this chapter deals primarily with the last two 
forms of taxation. The general increased interest in tax justice will thus be compressed to the 
issue of the taxation of capital income. To the extent that growing wealth inequality is caused 
by capital income and exacerbated by its preferential fiscal treatment, a primary solution 
appears to be increasing the use of the capital gains tax (Bankman and Shaviro, 2015: 505; 
Wijtvliet, 2014:  642).  
Prior to any general increase in tax rates, one has to outline a particular conception of income. 
When do stocks, bonds, participations, shares, pensions, annuities, intangible assets, and real 
estate yield an income? Given the continued acceptance of—and renewed interest for—an 
income tax, one can detect a normative chasm in terms of which of the above-mentioned 
standards should apply in income taxation. 
Most parts of current tax codes, and people’s common intuitions alike, support the realization 
approach: income is the receipt—or at least a legal agreement over the receipt—of a tangible 
benefit (Kwall, 2011: 79; Schenk, 2004: 377). Consequently, one should only be taxed when 
actually receiving contemporaneous benefits from a sale or exchange of property, or at least 
agreeing to such a receipt. 
In contrast, taxation theory defines income as the sum of (1) the market value of rights 
exercised in consumption, and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights 
between the beginning and end of the period in question (i.e. ‘Haig-Simons’ concept of income: 
see Simons, 1938: 49–50; Haig, 1921: 27). This latter view on income includes the accretion of 
capital, and it consequently allows authorities to tax any increase in the market value of one’s 
assets, irrespective of the occurrence of a sale or exchange (Scarborough, 1994: 1031–49; 
Schenk, 1995: 571–642; Shoven and Taubman, 1980: 211–13; Shuldiner, 1992: 781–93). 
Following this definition, scholars working in the field of income taxation embrace the mark-
to-market approach as an ideal assessment method (Brown, 1996: 1559-680; Shakow, 1986: 
1111-205). Whether or not one monetizes an increase of 10 per cent of one’s fortune is of no 
importance to the ideal income tax. As income occurs with accretion, taxation merely demands 





Tax theory discerns the continued application of the realization principle in existing tax codes 
as ‘the basic defect’ of income taxation, and no serious scholar seems to ascribe it any 
normative foundation (Andrews, 1983: 278; Brannon, 1986: 1763-85; McCaffery, 2005: 889). 
Vilified for reasons of both equity and efficiency, the ‘Achilles’ heel of the income tax’ even led 
a group of tax scholars to support a shift in tax base (Bankman and Weisbach, 2007: 789-803; 
Shaviro, 2004:  91-113). In particular, an impressive amount of contributions have criticized 
the ‘deferral’ of the taxation of economic gains until realization, for creating substantial 
investment distortions and inefficiencies (Brown, 1996: 1559; Cunningham and Schenk, 1992: 
725-814; Halperin, 1997: 967-77; Land, 1996: 45–118; Schizer, 1998: 1549-626; Weisbach, 
1999: 95-136). More specifically, the literature points at taxpayers’ ability to manipulate their 
tax debt under the realization principle. In this sense the realization-based approach can be 
pinpointed as one of the elements causing inequality, as it enables capital owners to circumvent 
their tax duties. Imposing taxation only when investments generate gains leaves the possibility 
of debt-financed consumption (McCaffery, 2005: 888), strategic trading (Elkins, 2010: 375-
407; Gergen, 1994: 209-68), the strategic timing of asset dispositions (Scholes et al, 2009: 185-
9), and portfolio adjustments for financial investments (Bankman and Shaviro, 2015: 477-85).  
Furthermore, the realization principle also conflicts with the traditional aims of equity, as it 
fails to treat different sources of income equally (Kwall, 2011: 93). Once one adheres to the 
view that economic advantages for assets rise with the increase of their market value, a 
realization-based tax can be seen as ignoring vital increases in one’s well-being. The deferral 
of taxation until the moment of receipt is thus presented as a tax benefit in favour of capital 
(Engler and Knoll, 2003: 53-81). Reluctance to tax capital as it fluctuates primarily benefits 
those whose assets contain capital, and this contributes to economic inequality (Kwall, 2011: 
93).  
As hard as it will be to find a principled defence for the realization principle, many tax scholars 
do grant it some pragmatic support (For confirmation of the non-normative nature of the 
realization principle see: Engler, 2003: 1210; Heen, 1994: 549-618; Land, 1996: 45-118). As 
expressed in the seminal work of Robert Haig, the realization principle is to be pictured as 
‘merely a concession made to the exigencies of a given situation’ (Haig, 1938: 65). In particular, 
two reasons are acknowledged in support of this ‘rule of convenience’ (Schenk, 2004: 358). 
First, the realization principle is deemed necessary because a tax on an increase in value 
without realization raises liquidity problems. Under a mark-to-market approach the event 
triggering the tax (the passage of a year and the increase in value) does not generate cash to 
pay the tax (Kwall, 2011: 98). Consequently, taxes on accrued market values force taxpayers to 
sell their assets or to borrow money (Brown, 1996: 1560). Second, a tax on accrued values 
requires an annual valuation of one’s assets. In the absence of any actual receipt, tax 
administrators need to assess—and prove—the precise net value of one’s gains. Moreover, 
many tax scholars recognize the difficulty and cost for tax authorities to monitor the market 
value of one’s assets on a yearly basis (Schizer, 1998: 1594; Schenk, 2004: 630). Additionally, 
a market assessment might be difficult for some goods and might lead to much dispute with 
the tax authorities (Repetti, 2000: 612). Hence the realization principle lingers on in most parts 
of our income tax systems. 
Dominant income tax theory balances the ideals of a mark-to-market approach and the reality 
of the above-mentioned ‘concession’. Researchers nonetheless plead for a prudent shift 
towards market assessment. In this regard, scholars are trying to convince policymakers that 





argument assumes (Schenk, 2004: 360-436). Concerning the valuation problem, proponents 
of the mark-to-market approach believe that for most assets a stable, established market price 
can be detected, and the issue is less insurmountable than previously assumed (Schenk, 2004: 
365-70; Schmidde, 2009: 711; Shakow and Shuldiner, 2000: 529). 
3.  Towards a Deontological Defence of the Realization Principle 
 
If the Piketty revolution results in concrete political eagerness to adopt a more ambitious tax 
on income from capital, the previous section has already outlined a theoretic consensus on the 
ideal assessment method. Although much of taxation theory grants no direct priority to 
mitigate inequality, it nonetheless alerts us to the fact that the realization principle is a benefit 
for capital owners.51  
Any tax (or redistributive) system relies on two questions: what should be taxed and how 
should it be measured? Assuming the appropriateness of an income tax, this chapter will try to 
deliver a deontological defence of the realization principle. By explicating the moral problems 
of a mark-to-market approach I contribute to the debate on tax justice. Moreover, I underwrite 
the moral impermissibility of a capital gains tax based on this assessment technique. To the 
extent that it relies on market values, the conclusions concerning the valuation standard for 
income also shed light on the permissibility of a wealth tax. Furthermore, by showing that the 
right to autonomy delivers a normative basis for the realization principle, I wish to challenge 
the consensus in taxation theory that the principle has no normative foundations. 
The approach exemplified here will be different to the traditional normative framework 
governing taxation theory. Taxation will not be primarily presented as a means to optimize 
economic outcomes, but will also be seen as a matter of justice—here understood as legitimate 
(i.e. morally permissible) coercion. Rather than finding an optimal taxation, the aim here is to 
uncover a just taxation—a taxation policy that is consistent with people’s fundamental rights 
and liberties. The latter are here accepted as ‘prerequisites for the legitimate exercise of 
democratic authority’ (Tomasi, 2012: 76) and create moral boundaries for governmental 
action. Correspondingly, the sort of tax policies that are permissible depend on a prior analysis 
of people’s rights over their holdings and their person. Importantly, as will be elaborated in 
Section 3.6., the presented deontological framework does not disturb redistributive or 
efficiency-related reform, as it opens up strategies to revise the current interpretation of the 
realization principle. 
This section will outline the constraints of the right to autonomy on the proper assessment 
standard of income. First, I will exemplify the common intuition of the presumption of liberty 
(3.1.), after which I will provide a general conceptualization of autonomy (3.2.). Next, I will 
present valorizations as a function of autonomy (3.3.). From this I will deduce the problematic 
nature of general market prices as a basis for interpersonal comparisons, and will articulate 
the normative basis for the realization principle (3.4.). Finally, I will outline how the presented 
theory relates to some concurring work in taxation theory (3.5.) and defend its unification with 
other aims in an integrated approach (3.6.). 
                                                          
51 The traditional prior aim of the dominant ‘theory of optimal taxation’ is to reduce inefficiencies and market 
distortions imposed by taxation. See, for example, Slemrod (1990: 157-78). For an avowal on tax theories’ 






3.1.  The Presumption of Liberty 
 
Stanley Benn (1988: 87) raises the example of a person named Alan sitting on a public beach. 
He has a pebble in each hand and is enjoying splitting them. Benn asks us to envisage a second 
person, Betty, who prevents Alan from continuing his activity by handcuffing him or removing 
all the pebbles out of his reach. Benn notes that Alan would be within his rights to demand a 
justification from Betty, while Betty would not be within her rights to demand an explanation 
for Alan’s pebble splitting. So while Alan might justifiably resent Betty’s interference, Betty has 
no grounds for complaint against Alan. So if a third person were to observe this situation, she 
would not ask why Alan was splitting pebbles, but rather why Betty was preventing him from 
doing so. 
Benn illuminates a basic asymmetry in our normative outlook: we seek justification not for 
why people act the way they do, but rather for why others would want to prevent them from 
doing so. The initial onus of justification lies not on the person acting but rather on the person 
interfering with those actions. Even if most people might find Alan engaging in a useless 
activity, they still think he is under no requirement to justify his actions. The onus lies on Betty, 
who will need to explain her justification for imposing restrictions on Alan’s actions. This is 
exactly what Joel Feinberg (1984: 9) calls presumption in favour of liberty: ‘liberty should be 
the norm, [while] coercion always needs some special justification.’  
Interestingly, we have this attitudinal bias in favour of actions for persons. Imagine Betty 
interfering with some pebbles on a beach, preventing them from flowing back into the sea. An 
observer would not be inclined to ask her why she is intervening in the lives of the pebbles in 
the same way that would be asked if she were preventing other people from acting as they want. 
The principle of nonintervention that follows from the presumption of liberty is one we apply 
when we deal with adult persons. As long as there are no compelling reasons to intervene, all 
people have a moral claim to do as they wish until some justification is offered for limiting their 
liberty (Feinberg, 1984: 10). We do not ask why we can cross a border, why we can have 
consenting sexual contact, or why we can have the freedom to choose our occupation; rather, 
we would demand a justification if those liberties were curtailed. 
3.2.  The Right to Autonomy 
 
But why is this the case? Why does the onus of justification lie on the interferer, rather than on 
the people who are acting the way they are? Why is freedom the norm, and why are we not 
allowed to act with people in the same way as we act with objects, plants, and animals? 
The answer to these questions is tied to a fundamental quality of persons: purposes. We do not 
lie in a particular place in the same way that a pebble lies somewhere. We do not go and swim 
in the sea for the same reason that a crab does so. We consider humans to be ‘persons’ because 
their existence is not merely the outcome of external stimuli, but is embedded in ‘purposes that 
[their] actions [are] designed to promote’ (Brennan and Lomasky, 1993:  9).  
We distinguish ourselves from objects and animals in this world because our actions are the 
outcome of intentions connected to personal goals. According to Benn this phenomenology of 
‘personal causation’ delivers the moral underpinning of our conception of ‘natural persons’ 





The axiom underlying the presumption of liberty is thus connected with an understanding that 
each person acts purposefully. The purpose underlying our actions is to attain our goals and 
the intention to do so is our motivation. However, this in itself does not entail a prescriptive 
attitude: one may, for example, hold the political view that every person’s goals—and thus also 
their distinctive actions—should be matched to one common end. We can find the foundation 
of the presumption of liberty when we grant positive moral status to each person as a 
purposeful entity. Indeed, the right to autonomy arises from a normative appreciation of each 
person having an end of his or her own, which consequently acknowledges each person’s claim 
to act in the light of this. 
Hence, autonomy should be understood as the normative embodiment of purposeful 
behaviour. So, from an understanding that all people have their own purposes, we delineate 
the axiomatic right to act and live according to these. The reason that we do not demand 
justification for how Alan is acting, but rather for why Betty is intervening with his actions, is 
because each person has a separate end, and all people have the right to live and act accordingly 
(Gaus, 2005: 272-306). In terms of autonomy, the focus lies not on the content of the act but 
on the fact that it counts as one’s own. 
The scope of one’s rights is limited by the equal rights of one’s fellow man. Consequently, 
autonomy delineates a moral space around each person, which constructs the territory wherein 
interference is principally illegitimate (Feinberg, 1984: 53). Traditionally, the ‘moral space’ 
that demarcates people’s sovereign domain is constructed by their body, their mind, and their 
property (Feinberg, 1988: 54). One’s physical body parts, mental and physical capacities, 
knowledge, experience, and rightfully obtained external goods all form part of one’s personal 
sphere, and can be used according to one’s wishes in the pursuit of one’s personal ends.52  
The reason that we cannot forbid Alan to split pebbles or impose a religion on Betty, and that 
we oppose forced labour and prosecute rape, and even that we despise manipulation, is because 
we recognize each person as an embodied a choosing being with the right to pursue his or her 
own distinctive purpose. This fundamental axiom discloses the underpinning of more specific 
principles, such as freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and the free movement of persons. 
But it is also the case that contract law (where people are only bound by consent) or the 
precepts of tort law (where people need to compensate for damage to another’s sovereign 
domain) are an elaboration of the right of each person to live according his or her own ends. 
3.3.  Valorizations as a Function of Autonomy 
 
The right to autonomy justifies the radical diversity in people’s actions: people opt for different 
subjects of study, strive for different jobs, and develop different hobbies. People want different 
things because they have different goals and preferences, and the principle of autonomy 
defends this variety as a consequence of people’s moral rights. This also entails consequences 
regarding goods. As stressed by one of the founding fathers of the theory of marginal utility, 
goods have no intrinsic value themselves—people attribute value to their own ends and 
consequently carry this over to economic goods as a means of satisfying these ends (Menger, 
1950: 116). Given the fact that people have different goals and preferences, they will assign 
different values to the same goods. Because of people’s divergent ends, they adopt distinctive 
standards of value (or ‘utility’), which lead to different rankings. For someone who embraces 
                                                          
52 The rights over one’s body, mind, or external property do not necessarily involve the full right to income, so 
income taxation is not necessarily a violation of the sovereign domain. See, for example Vallentyne (2012a, 291-





rock and roll as the highest personal good, concerts might be the most important happening in 
a weekend, whereas another person might build his weekend around his football team. People’s 
distinctive standards follow from their distinctive ends, which ultimately come down to their 
differing views on utility—and economically this leads to conflicting monetary valorizations. 
For the rock and roll fan, a £500 ticket to see the Rolling Stones might be a good buy, whereas 
a classical music adept might deride this price as a sign of the aesthetic decline of our times. 
Someone might consider the price of petrol to be absurd, given his preference for public 
transport, whereas a keen motorbiker might perceive it as a small price to pay for the feeling 
of liberty she gets from riding her motorbike. If everybody had the same goals and preferences 
then everybody would buy the same products, and goods sold to equally wealthy people would 
end up being the same price. Yet people assign different valorizations to goods and services, 
which reflect their different views on well-being flowing from their respective ends. For one 
person the £500,000 salary of a stockbroker would not compensate for the missed opportunity 
to follow her natural calling to be an academic, whereas being a stockbroker might be another 
person’s dream job, and he would gladly accept half that salary to be able to do it. We thus see 
that the valorizations we attach to goods are a function of our autonomy. 
From the perspective outlined here, market prices have no ‘objective’ status. Although in our 
everyday lives we see fixed prices as secure features of goods and services, these should rather 
be seen as compressions of different valorizations that people give to goods. Moreover, the 
market price is the aggregate of the valorizations of all the consumers in a market (Hayek, 1976: 
76). As George Stigler (1987: 12) makes clear, these can be conceived as an election result, 
whereby everybody has some minimal influence on the outcome, even though the result does 
not reflect anyone’s valorizations. The high wages of many football players and the low prices 
(compared to production costs) of academic books are signs of general consumer preferences 
in society, yet they do not reflect any individual valorizations. My personal ranking might put 
the purchase of an academic book much higher than obtaining a football ticket. Similarly, the 
low prices for real estate in the countryside express society’s general preference to live in the 
city, but obviously individuals can have the opposite ranking of value. 
General prices therefore do not tell us anything about the utility standards of potential 
suppliers. The high prices for corporate tax lawyers indicate the high value that many 
businesses attach to fiscal analyses. These do not spell out the value standard of a particular 
lawyer, who might prefer to deliver academic services for an average wage. And the high price 
of renting modern apartments in city centres merely informs us about the preferences of urban 
citizens and businesses to live or work in apartments—it does not give us any indication about 
the utility standards of the owners of these apartments, who might have completely different 
plans. 
However, at the moment of effective consent over an amount of money in exchange for goods 
or services, prices transform into something that is more than sociological (the general market 
price) or psychological (a particular offer in an individual setting); they become information 
about people’s utility standards. A consented price is a confirmation that a particular amount 
of money is seen as a valid valorization according to one’s own utility standards. The fact that 
I effectively purchase an academic book confirms that I find this good valuable and I perceive 
the price as acceptable in view of my ends. And the fact that I accept a ‘high’ price for a house 
in the countryside counts as a confirmation of its value in the light of my somewhat deviant 
living preferences. So with regard to income, when the tenant of the city centre apartment 





according her own utility standards. If the well-established academic changes his profession 
because of a changed purpose (e.g. if he now has a family and wants to provide them with as 
high a standard of living as possible), he confirms the high price for corporate tax services as 
an appropriate benefit within his own standards of value. 
To summarize, we can say that because people all have ends of their own, they will also have 
value standards of their own. Consequently, the right to autonomy recognizes that each person 
has personal valorizations as a function of his or her own subjective ends. From this perspective 
we have to downgrade market prices as an aggregate of other people’s standards. At the 
occurrence of an exchange of property or services for money, people express their subjective 
standards in terms of a quantifiable homogenous commodity: money.53  
3.4.  Autonomy and Taxation 
 
Alan is not only a fan of pebble-splitting: he also works as an engineer for a medium-sized 
company. Considering his love for his family and his appetite for holidays and weekends, he 
did not opt for the highest-paying opportunity. Each year he earns £72,000 with his 
mathematical skills. Besides this he owns an apartment that he uses for artists’ exhibitions, for 
which he paid £200,000. Additionally, he invested £20,000 to support his best friend’s 
company. 
During the hot summer months, however, a number of people discover Alan’s capital 
(including his human capital), and express their value standards regarding some of his means. 
When he comes back he finds several offers in his mailbox. First, the raised general market 
value of his apartment translated into an offer: a local investor wishes to give him £400,000 
to buy it and rent it to small businesses. Second, his friend’s company managed to sign up a 
new big client, resulting in a doubling of the value of his shares. As if the summer has not 
already been profitable enough for Alan, an engineering company has tracked him down and 
given him an offer of working in a management position, earning three times his current wage. 
Finally, Alan has quite an unusual blood type, and an Indian businessman with an identical 
blood type offers him £1 million to buy his kidney via an intermediate company that 
commercializes human organs. 
3.4.1. The mark-to-market approach 
 
Most tax scholars will agree that Alan will come home a ‘richer’ man: income equals an increase 
in value of one’s holdings for a period of time, and tax codes should not remain blind to Alan’s 
very lucrative summer.54 Concerning his external means, his shares undeniably went up 
£20,000 in value and the current market value of his apartment of approximately £400,000 
means an increase in value of 100 per cent compared with last year. An ideal income tax, as 
supported in the cited literature, would include an end-of-year economic appreciation of these 
assets and would attribute Alan a capital income of £220,000. A tax targeting the value of his 
human capital, however, would not be advocated by most tax scholars due to the inevitable 
problems with conducting a proper valuation and to the possible lack of liquidity; a structural 
                                                          
53 As mentioned in Section 3.6., the requirement of confirmation of a particular monetary benefit is not restricted 
to the sale or transfer of property. 
54 As mentioned above, for most tax scholars, a taxation of income merely demands an increase in market value. 
See for example Shuldiner (1992: 781) in which he states: ‘The Haig-Simons definition of income, accretions to 
wealth plus the value of consumption, is generally accepted as an appropriate definition of income for purposes of 
a comprehensive income tax.’ See also Schenk (2004, 572-3) where a global mark-to-market regime taxing 





mark-to-market approach would seem insurmountable. It is indeed difficult to assess the 
market price of one’s skills, and taxpayers who do not use their greatest earning potential 
would often not have the means to pay their tax debt. In our current example these 
‘administrative’ concerns are not at stake, however: Alan has no liquidity problems (he 
inherited several million pounds) and we have a perfect example of the market price of his bio-
capital (£1 million for his kidney and £216,000 for his mathematical skills). 
Yet this analysis indicates that the absence of any valuation or liquidity problems does not 
overcome deeper normative objections concerning the automatic application of these market 
values in the assessment of income. From the perspective of autonomy, the challenge for the 
accretion-based tax is identical in all four of the above situations. As we saw, valorizations are 
a function of autonomy. The prices for Alan’s kidney, apartment, and shares reflect the desires 
of others who want to acquire these means, and the price for his skills stems from people’s wish 
to rely on his skills. All of these prices, however, conflict with Alan’s own purposes: he does not 
perceive his kidney as a commodity and would not sell it at any price. He enjoys his current job 
and does not perceive three times his wage to be sufficient compensation for the loss of free 
time that the new job would entail. Likewise, he bought the apartment to cultivate his aesthetic 
passions and fund young artists, and the money the investor is willing to transfer does not fit 
into any of his plans. Finally, he sees his shares as a financial support for his friend, and so has 
no plans whatsoever to sell them; this rise in share value reflects the interest of other investors 
in the company rather than any of Alan’s own interests. 
The economist’s view on taxation might stress the fact that Alan has come home to a new 
situation: given the valorizations for his apartment, shares, kidney, and skills his economic 
‘position’ has changed. By contrast, the current subjectivist normative outlook would claim 
that nothing has changed for Alan; he has rejected all of these offers and has not altered any of 
his plans—these valorizations have no meaning from the perspective of his own utility 
standard. 
Commencing from a viewpoint of people as active, choosing entities we can see that 
valorizations are embedded in a subjective life plan. Each price reflects particular decisions in 
the light of further ends, which are often unknown to others. Assigning valorizations that 
reflect decisions that one does not plan, and preferences that one does not hold, is incongruous 
to autonomy. Moreover, it defines one’s tax liability according to a value standard that could 
be completely contradictory to one’s own. In general, when we take market prices as the 
assessment basis for interpersonal comparisons, we ignore people’s own vision of well-being 
and impose valorizations that are alien to their own. Under a mark-to-market approach, Alan’s 
tax base is nothing more than a representation of what of others would like him to do; even if 
he had no liquidity problems, he would object to paying taxes on £1 million for his kidney, on 
£216,000 for his job offer, on £20,000 for his shares, and on £200,000 for his apartment. His 
objection would rely on the principle of autonomy, claiming that he was being assessed in 
terms of subjective utility calculations that were completely alien to the standards by which he 
governed his own life. The content of one’s duties (the tax base) gets one-sidedly defined by 
prices reflecting other people’s intentions over one’s means. From the perspective outlined 
here, we can coin this practice as a heteronomous tax base: the taxpayer is being ordered to 
comply with fiscal duties on the basis of unconsented valorizations. 
From this perspective, we can recast the commonly raised problems regarding a mark-to-





or that tax administrators might have a difficult time assessing a true market value. Rather, the 
fundamental problem is that there is no ‘true value’ in the sense that nothing has an intrinsic, 
objective value; consequently, mere market valorizations can conflict with one’s own 
standards. When we grasp how this measurement technique attributes unconsented 
valorizations, the disturbing nature of the mark-to-market approach in the taxpayer’s life, for 
example in terms of liquidity issues, is simply an unsurprising consequence. 
In summary, our right to autonomy discloses our intuitive protest against a mark-to-market 
approach. Valorizations are a function of autonomy, and by calculating tax obligations on the 
basis of non-shared valorizations the market-to-market approach dictates the standard of the 
market and ignores people’s own vision of well-being. 
3.4.2. The realization approach 
 
Imagine that Alan changes his life radically in a couple of years: he remarries and adopts an 
exuberant lifestyle after having lost half of his means due to the messy divorce with his ex-wife. 
His consumption now exceeds his income, but despite his hedonistic lifestyle he does not want 
to withdraw from his responsibility regarding his children, and so plans to finance their 
university studies. Given this situation, Alan decides to sacrifice his shares and apartment in 
order to be able to fund his two children’s degrees. On top of this, he wants to maintain his 
high-flying lifestyle by acquiring an apartment in an upmarket neighbourhood. 
Despite his need for money, he sells his shares back to his friend at 25 per cent below the 
market price for just £30,000. Since he is one of the few friends who supported Alan during 
the last two years, he perceives this as a nice way to thank him. Furthermore, he uses his 
excellent negotiating skills to sell his apartment at £450,000, exceeding its market value. 
Putting aside any maintenance costs that he may have incurred over the years, he realizes a 
profit of £260,000 following these transactions. 
Contrary to the previous situation, this figure is not a general market price but a monetary 
benefit that Alan consented to by means of his own value standard. Each of the figures involved 
arises from particular intentions with respect to his purposes (paying his children’s studies, 
acquiring a new apartment, and thanking his friend). These figures do not reflect the 
estimations of what other people would want in order to acquire his means; rather, they 
resemble Alan’s choices in the light of his subjective ends. 
An appreciation of the right to live according to one’s own purposes unravels the normative 
role of the realization principle. General prices reflect transactions and preferences that might 
or might not fit with one’s ends. Real-life exchanges, on the other hand, consist of people’s true 
actions whereby they exteriorize their own value standard. Consented prices are more than 
psychological information about other people’s goals and preferences: they are confirmation 
of a particular valorization that is a function of autonomy. So the economic equilibrium 
reached when a person consents to a price reflects one’s subjective preferences in terms of the 
most homogenous and quantifiable commodity: money. The importance of the receipt of a 
benefit in exchange for the use or sale of property is that through this event people signal their 
utility standard in an observable way. The value of the realization principle is exactly that such 
a method does not invade one’s tax liability on the basis of other people’s valorizations; instead, 
it replicates a person’s subjective valorizations as expressed in consented monetary benefits. 
By submitting one’s own valorizations as administrative input for tax authorities, taxpayers are 





required to pay a contribution according to their own value standard. The realization principle 
thus protects taxpayers’ liability against external standards and guarantees that their 
obligations will be calculated in terms of their own utility calculations as expressed in market 
exchanges. Consequently, as the realization standard supervenes on their own consented 
valorizations, it will not impose any alien vision of well-being. 
To summarize, we can state that the right to live according to one’s own ends delivers 
normative justification for the generally reviled principle of taxation after realization. In 
particular, the right of each person to live according to one’s own ends and preferences entails 
a duty for tax authorities not to impose any valorizations that one does not share. The moral 
status of the realization principle lies precisely in the fact that when people monetize certain 
assets and goods (such as via sales or transfers), they externalize their preferences in consented 
valorizations. So the realization event, meant as the contractual confirmation of a certain 
monetary benefit, is more than the point in time when one (Kwall, 2011: 80; Brown, 1996: 
1559-1680 and Shakow, 1986: 1111-205) ‘effectuates one’s prior economic income’ (i.e. when 
an asset merely increases in value); it is the morally decisive turning point when one confirms 
a price or offer as being consistent with one’s ends. In the absence of any general objective 
measure of utility, monetization yields a confirmation of valorization according to a person’s 
own standard. Before such a moment, tax authorities fail to have any reliable information on a 
person’s preferences and valorizations, and will fail to construe a tax base without violating the 
autonomy principle. As the realization principle supervenes on one’s own consented 
valorizations, it consolidates the taxpayer’s own view on well-being within the domain of 
income tax. 
3.5. Personal and Market Goods 
 
In an excellent article Ilan Benshalom and Kendra Stead make a distinction that might have 
come to the reader’s mind by now. On the one hand, they picture ‘investment goods’ like 
portfolio holdings and company shares; for these ‘emotionally non-fungible assets’ they state 
(2011: 68) that it is ‘reasonable to assign tax liability for that asset’s fluctuation in value 
according to a mark-to-market regime’. Aiming at an equal taxation of increased well-being (as 
measured by welfare), the authors qualify the market price as a good proxy. On the other hand, 
they envisage personal goods like inherited jewellery, self-created artwork, residential homes, 
and family businesses; for these goods they dismiss the mark-to-market approach as a ‘bad 
proxy for well-being’ (2011: 66). Moreover, the authors (2011: 64) are convinced that for 
personal goods the taxpayer’s ‘subjective value is radically different (that is, significantly 
higher) than the assets’ market value’. Consequently, deferral until the time of monetization is 
required here, since the effective market return serves as a better standard for the extracted 
welfare. Benshalom and Stead (2011: 69) acknowledge that this partial realization principle 
would be an exemption that would cause distortions and inequities. Nevertheless, they note 
that personal assets represent a larger proportion of the wealth of low- and medium-income 
taxpayers than that of high-income taxpayers. Therefore, providing a tax benefit for personal 
assets would make the tax system as a whole more progressive (2011: 69).  
Benshalom and Stead’s analysis is both illuminating and bold. In a clear fashion they identify 
both the aim of progressivity and the special character of personal goods as a normative 
bedrock for an exemption of these assets from the generally embraced mark-to-market 
approach. Nonetheless, for two reasons an overall defence of the realization principle can be 





First, there is no general theory available that can provide policymakers with a comprehensive 
list that differentiates a small number of personal goods from the bulk of investment goods. As 
Benshalom and Stead (2011: 68) acknowledge, the abstract distinction between personal and 
investment goods is in reality a continuum.  However, no ordinal continuum can be 
established: even goods that the authors confidently put at the extremes can be ordered 
alternatively by individual taxpayers. 
For instance, many young urban professionals perceive their home (qualified under ‘personal 
goods’, 2011: 65) as their only form of financial investment. Consequently, their purchase will 
often reflect their anticipation of an increase in market value. Furthermore, families might 
perceive their family jewelry as a form of savings that could be sacrificed in the event of certain 
needs, such as university fees. Concerning the ‘investment goods’, generally, people might hold 
business shares and financial investments for financial reasons, yet it is not clear-cut that their 
market value will always coincide with people’s personal value standards. Many shareholders 
who help to establish a company will have an emotional affiliation with its economic 
philosophy and produced goods that will transcend purely economic figures. Regarding 
investment portfolios, there are a rising number of people who combine the pursuit of profit 
with nonfinancial incentives, thereby obtaining portfolios that also reflect ethical, social, and 
ecological purposes. Such assets are not easily fungible with their more commercial 
counterparts, and the market value is not the sole standard by which people valorize these 
assets. Furthermore, Benshalom and Stead qualify family businesses as personal goods. 
Nonetheless, many of these tend to be sold to bigger entities, and many large companies arise 
from family businesses, so this does not seem to exclude the relevancy of market value as such. 
Conversely, many small businesses without any familial character—which the authors perceive 
as investment goods—do have personal value. Moreover, as the authors acknowledge (2011: 
68), most goods fall between both extremes, and it will consequently be arbitrary to qualify 
them as one or the other.  
In other words, the reasons to reject a partial realization principle are similar to the reasons to 
reject the mark-to-market approach: the list of investments and personal goods upheld by 
policymakers and regulations will be incongruous to autonomy. The imposed distinction 
between market and personal goods will contain a standard of value that will often be 
inconsistent with the viewpoint of individual taxpayers and their ends. Many taxpayers will be 
taxed on the market value of goods that they hold for divergent reasons, and investors will 
obtain comparative benefits using the realization-based tax for so-called ‘personal goods’ 
(2011: 82). The optimal decision from the viewpoint of autonomy is to put the authority over 
the distinction between both types of goods with the taxpayers themselves rather than with the 
legislator. When people agree on the receipt of a monetary benefit (via a market exchange), 
they signal that goods are fungible and so provide administrators with a valorization that 
adheres to their personal value standard (i.e. the agreed price). Additionally, given the fact that 
people’s intentions are multidimensional (e.g. Alan selling his shares to his friend) and that 
most goods are partly personal and partly financial, the exact agreed price serves as the best 
reflection of people’s ends and consequent value standards. 
Second, the right to autonomy serves as a better explanation for our moral resistance to a mark-
to-market approach than the reasons suggested by Benshalom and Stead. Envision once more 
Alan’s apartment, which went up £200,000 in market value and became worth £400,000. His 
neighbour, who held a similar apartment, wished to rely on this price and sold it to a law firm. 





their innovative exhibitions (prior to the break-up of his first marriage). He resented the 
reasons underlying the increased price (the corporate trend invading the neighbourhood) and 
perceived his decision as a way of rebelling against it. Our intuition tells us that it would have 
been very unjust to tax Alan on this increased market value. However, the real reason that we 
do not support Alan being taxed at a capital gain of £200,000 cannot lie in the fact that he 
attributed a ‘higher value’ to it than the current £400,000, as Benshalom and Stead endorse. 
This presumption would, for example, mean that he would be willing to pay a price for the 
apartment that exceeds this £400,000. But it could be perfectly possible that Alan would never 
consider buying his apartment at its current market price. Furthermore, the assumption of a 
higher market value does not justify our intuitive position against taxing Alan. If anything, it 
provides a mandate for taxing him at this higher value rather than not at all.55  
The proper theoretical explanation as to why we should refrain from taxing Alan on the 
increased market value is because a price supervenes on the taxpayer’s intention to sell or rent 
an asset. The attribution of a certain amount of money presumes the relevancy of a specific 
market exchange within the subjective life plan of the person. However, in the absence of any 
real exchange we have no proof that this valorization will be consistent with any of the person’s 
ends. The reason that we oppose Alan being taxed on the increase of £200,000 is because this 
price arises from plans that Alan did not intend to undertake, and consequently tied him to 
these external purposes. At the time, Alan held a deviant preference and the market value was 
inconsistent with his ends. So the reason that we oppose attributing income in the absence of 
real financial gains for these personal assets is not because the market value is a ‘bad’ proxy—
it is because it is simply no proxy at all. Alan’s preferences lay on a metric of value that was not 
expressible in any market price, since he did not engage in any market transactions. Any 
market valorization would have been incongruous to his autonomy, as it would have imposed 
a value standard that was contradictory to his own. 
3.6.  Autonomy-Friendly Optimization of Income Tax 
 
I have tried to demonstrate that the realization principle is more than a pragmatic element: the 
logic that persons are taxed only when agreeing to the receipt of benefits can be seen as 
elucidating the right to autonomy. When tax scholars and egalitarian reformers aim at the 
optimal taxation of capital, such an endeavour ought to be implemented within the boundaries 
set by people’s right to autonomy—that is, with respect for the realization principle. 
As mentioned in Section 2, the realization principle is nonetheless associated with practices 
such as the strategic trading and timing of asset dispositions, portfolio adjustments, and debt-
financed consumption. These result in a decrease of the effective rate on capital-owners, 
causing inefficiencies and—among many other factors—adding to the accumulation of wealth, 
which egalitarian tax reformers wish to mitigate. 
The theoretic framework elaborated here does not aspire to ignore these problems. Conversely, 
a renewed analysis can yield benefits in terms of how to deal with current defects. The 
realization principle protects taxpayers from liability for unconsented valorizations, not from 
taxation as such. Although the current contribution curtails authorities’ taxing competences to 
some extent, it is not hostile to the promotion of efficiency or redistribution. Rather, an 
appraisal of the purpose of the realization principle can help to revise its current application in 
                                                          
55 The granted exemption for personal goods is thus merely founded on the aim of progressivity, rather than on a 





the light of these aims. Once we understand that confirmation of a certain monetary benefit is 
the prerequisite for an income tax, we can then begin to address its current problematic by-
products. 
For instance, capital cannot only be sold or rented, but can also be applied to finance the 
acquisition of new goods by serving as security for a loan. One of the corollaries of the current 
income tax system is its disregard for the resulting debt-financed consumption or investment. 
Alan can put his apartment at risk and utilize its market value to borrow money to acquire a 
new apartment—without paying any income tax. If taxation is only triggered by a net cash flow, 
then taxpayers can utilize their assets to acquire loans, which allow them to consume or invest 
untaxed money. Most fiscal regimes thus permit taxpayers to enjoy the benefits of capital in 
the form of borrowed money used for consumption or investment, without being subject to 
income tax. Not only does this circumvention entail inefficiencies, but McCaffery (2005: 888) 
also considers it to be a failure of the income tax ‘to reach the propertied classes’.  
A renewed understanding of the realization principle provides insights to foreclose this 
inequitable tax advantage that is often enjoyed by more affluent taxpayers. In a secured debt 
agreement people can utilize their assets in a commercial exchange, whereby an asset is being 
collateralized in order to obtain a loan. Collateralization refers to an asset’s market value, which 
serves as a security measure in case of default. Within such contracts a capital owner thus 
agrees to the market value of an asset. To the extent that this value exceeds the initial purchase 
price, this qualifies as the receipt of a particular monetary benefit. So, if Alan mortgages his 
apartment to acquire a loan from the bank, he forfeits his initial protection from non-shared 
valorizations—and the condition for permissible taxation of the occurred gain is therefore 
fulfilled. 
In summary, tax scholars’ righteous objectives of equity and efficiency could be unified in a 
research project on an autonomy-friendly income taxation of capital, which would demand 
confirmation of a particular monetary benefit as a moral condition for taxation. However, this 
condition is not restricted to current applications of the realization principle. For instance, the 
utilization of an increased market value of capital in the conclusion of a secured loan can be 
qualified as a realization event. Consequently, when one’s assets are being used as security for 
a loan, this permits capital gains taxation in an autonomy-friendly fashion. Rather than being 
the unilateral attribution of a market value, such taxation merely replicates the market value 
appropriated by the parties in an agreement. Additionally, by broadening capital-owners’ tax 
base, this measure would increase the progressive nature of our tax system, as demanded by 
Piketty and others. 
4.  Conclusion 
 
Thomas Piketty (2014: 493) stated that taxation is ‘not a technical matter, but preeminently a 
political and philosophical issue, perhaps the most important of all political issues’. My 
analysis has advanced this insight and tried to implement a concept from moral and political 
philosophy to the domain of income tax. From the right of each person to live according to his 
or her own purposes I have codified a particular conceptualization of income. Moreover, I have 
shown that authorities cannot measure one’s income with alien utility standards, and should 
instead rely on shared valorizations. The fact that a mark-to-market approach leads to liquidity 
problems is merely the tip of the iceberg in this matter. I have demonstrated that a general 
market price often arises from exchanges that conflict with one’s own purposes. Consequently, 





utility standard of the market. The value of the realization principle lies exactly in the fact that 
such a technique integrates with a person’s autonomy, as it copies a person’s consented 
monetary benefits within exchanges into the tax base. 
By integrating normative insights from exterior domains, the current contribution has revealed 
a possible foundation for what is commonly described in taxation theory as a necessary evil. 
By clarifying acceptance over a monetary benefit as a moral prerequisite for income taxation, 
my deontological approach has tried to induce tax reformers to accomplish their aims within 
the boundaries of the realization principle, and to refute wealth and income taxation by means 
of a mark-to-market approach. Given this, I have presented the normative framework 
established here as not being hostile to egalitarian or efficiency-related perspectives. Rather, it 
is an appraisal of the right to autonomy as the proper foundation for the realization principle, 
which facilitates variations in its current interpretation in order to address the defects of the 
prevailing taxation of capital. An understanding of the normative bedrock of the realization 
principle, for example, underwrites the taxation of collateralized capital—a measure 

















TAX UNIFORMITY AS A REQUIREMENT OF JUSTICE56 
 
1.  Taxation: what is and what ought to be 
 
Taxation is an essential aspect of governmental action that can be used to attain various goals. 
The basic justification, on which we can presume there is widespread consensus, concerns the 
sponsoring of public goods, provided by levies that adhere to some standard of fairness or 
efficiency (Buchanan, 2000a).57 Additionally, the literature promotes taxation to achieve goals 
such as environmental protection, employment stimulation, health protection or the 
correction of all sorts of market failures (Rosen, 2004; Mirrlees, 2010). Whether one takes the 
first, minimalist, stance or attributes more extensive policy goals to public authorities, Western 
tax systems fail to live up to their raison d’être. A number of sources are signaling that tax 
policy, at least in the US and Europe, basically embodies an ‘anything goes’ regime, a political 
jungle in which well-organized sub-groups of society are successfully fighting for controversial 
privileges at the expense of (the welfare of) their fellow citizens. In this regard, Richter et al. 
(2009) found a correlation between tax lobbying and the effective tax rate: when US firms 
increase their lobbying expenditures by 1% in a given year, they reduce their effective tax rates 
by an average of 0.5 to 1.6 percentage points the following year. Another study confirms that 
fiscal lobbying is currently one of the most profitable businesses: Alexander et al. (2009) 
estimate the return on investment from political influence on the US Job Creation Act (2004) 
to be as high as 22,000%, meaning that every dollar invested in lobbying yields a return of 
$220. Brown et al. (2015) found that investing in relationships with tax policy makers (e.g., via 
Political Action Committee support) results in future tax benefits. Various sources like the 
U.K.’s House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2013: 10) and the Corporate Europe 
Observatory (2017) signal that there is systematic entanglement between legislators and the 
private interests of wealthy individuals and corporations (so-called proactive tax planning) 
through big accounting or lobbying firms. The Center for Responsive Politics (2016) confirms 
the interaction between public lawmaking and private interests, for instance by revealing that 
38 out of 42 Apple lobbyists previously held government jobs. This policy structure might 
indicate why, in the last decade, there has been a rise in legislative measures like the ‘excess 
profit’ tax scheme, ‘patent boxes,’ ‘controlled foreign company,’ ‘foreign tax credit’ and ‘active 
financing exemption,’ which help multinationals and wealthy individuals slash their global tax 
debt. Furthermore, it is important to note that Western regimes have ‘democratized’ fiscal 
exemptions, and by converting large proportions of votes into political power, many factions 
of the constituency have been happy recipients of fiscal rewards, such as mortgage interest 
deductions, tax cuts on company cars and stock options.  
Tax theorists and economists (Avi-Yonah, 2000; Mirrlees et al., 2010; Bhandari, 2017; 
Bankman and Shaviro, 2015; Christians, 2013, 2017; Essers, 2017; Jallai, 2017; Lemmens and 
Badisco, 2017; Vos, 2017; Green, 2017; Peeters et al., 2017) generally recognize that the 
structure of the prevailing tax systems does not adhere to its normative foundations, and that 
the legitimacy crisis associated with tax law that ‘becomes increasingly unresponsive to 
                                                          
56 This fourth essay was submitted to an international journal is currently under review. This paper builds on Public 
Choice Theory and was awarded as a finalist (last three) for the Ostrom-prize for ‘best paper by graduate student’ 
at the Public Choice Society 2017. See: https://publicchoicesociety.org/awards  
57 By ‘consensus’ I mean that nearly all people ‘at least’ accept this task. The field of public finance, however, 
traditionally goes further by including all four. See Rosen (2004). James Buchanan (2000a) famously limits the 





legitimate policy goals and increasingly out of touch with justice’ (Christians, 2017: 152) has 
recently attracted attention within the tax literature.58 One of the driving observations here is 
indeed the interplay between private groups and policy makers and the emergent fiscal 
exceptionalism and the complexity of the system (Tran-Nam and Evans, 2014; Hettich and 
Winer, 1999: 90). Richard Wagner (2016: 142) states that the ‘public entrepreneurs’ in charge 
of tax policy systematically interact with private investors, whereby ‘at this point, fiscal politics 
enters to generate the proverbial flood of exceptions and exemptions that creates a tax code so 
large that no one can read it and which creates nearly a unique tax liability for each tax payer.’ 
Allison Christians (2017: 152), one of the most established tax lawyers of our time, describes 
the state of affairs as follows: ‘Special interests consistently exert influence on tax policy 
discourse through their advisors and within a broad spectrum of discrete and pooled 
capacities. This results in tax policy as favorable as possible to those who have the resources to 
shape it.’ Christians’ solution lies in transparency; she proposes mapping different groups’ 
influence on tax policy in an open-access database. Shaun Hargreaves Heap (2017: 259) 
connects the emerging complexity with a failure to achieve any public policy goals: ‘About the 
only thing we can say with much confidence about our currently complex tax systems is that 
they spawn an industry of tax accountants, lawyers and lobbyists who game the system for the 
benefit of their clients, who are mainly rich.’ In order to prevent various private groups from 
tinkering with the tax rules, Hargreaves Heap proposes to transfer policy making competences 
to an independent tax authority, which should be responsible for implementing constitutional 
objectives such as redistribution or environmental protection. 
 
This article originates from similar observations, and thus aims to supplement recent research 
on how to get public finance back onto a moral track. I focus on the essential requirement that 
the rules determining the division of the fiscal burden throughout the constituency adhere to 
a standard of justice. In the approach employed here, this demand arises from a contractarian-
constitutionalist perspective on justice, according to which the fundamental rules and 
institutions that form the basis of the state need to be understood as part of an exchange of 
agreements between participating members of society (Rawls, 1999a: 3, 10; Buchanan and 
Congleton, 2006: 4). The essential test that the prevailing basic political institutions face is 
whether they could have been contracted by (rather than imposed on) rational individuals 
(Rawls, 1999a: 16). Moreover, individuals in a setting of constitutional choice accept 
limitations on their liberty (i.e. rules that involve coercion) when it advances their interests, 
and this exchange makes them better off (Rawls, 1999b: 52; Buchanan and Brennan, 2000a: 
27-29; Rawls, 1999a: 12; Buchanan and Congleton, 2006: 28-29; Thrasher, 2014: 36). 
However, these contracting individuals are typically unaware of what their position will be 
under the different choice options, once the societal ‘game’ unfolds (Rawls, 1999b: 58; 
Buchanan and Brennan, 2000a: 35; Hayek, 2007: 113-115). As no party is able to tailor its 
specific position, participants will choose between alternatives in accordance with generalized 
criteria of ‘fairness’ and ‘efficiency’ (Buchanan and Congleton, 2006: 6-7; Buchanan 2000b: 
                                                          
58 This involved a certain shift, as the tax literature neglected political reality for a long time. The standard books on 
public economics (Rosen (1999), for instance), do not mention the issue of legal complexity. A shift towards a 
normative assessment of existing tax systems was partly generated by the 2008–2010 economic and financial crisis 
and the subsequent fiscal crises in several European countries, which provoked a stricter form of fiscal orthodoxy, 
with a more stringent monitoring of compliance by taxpayers. At the same time, events like Swissleaks, Luxleaks, 
and the Panama Papers and Paradise Papers have revealed that many multinationals and wealthy individuals use 
various legal techniques to avoid paying national taxes. Lastly, and connected, the field of taxation has gained 
popularity through an increased interest in economic inequality via the immense popularity of Thomas Piketty’s 
Capital in the 21st Century. The interest in the legitimacy of prevailing tax systems is mirrored in a number of 





146). This does not require a rule that each participant has to win simultaneously. Rather, over 
the whole set of political actions, its working properties must be ‘broadly acceptable’ 
(Buchanan and Congleton, 2006: 18; Buchanan and Brennan, 2000a: 35) regardless of 
participants’ specific positions. 
Looking through this constitutional window, the subject of this article appears more clearly. 
The fundamental rules governing the division of the fiscal burden need to be evaluated as if 
they could have emerged from unanimous contract by rational individuals who have limited 
knowledge about their later positions (Buchanan and Brennan, 2000a: 26; Brennan and 
Hamlin, 1995). Within a setting of constitutional choice, unanimity will only be reached on 
decision-making procedures that ‘all can live with’ (Rawls, 1980: 519), meaning they are 
acceptable regardless of the position one occupies under them (Kohlberg, 1981: 190-201). For 
instance, unanimity would not be reached to institute a political practice in which a dictator 
can exact all other citizens at his command (Buchanan and Tullock, 1999: 62–63; Buchanan 
and Brennan, 2000a: 35). Uncertain about one’s prospective position, agreement is likely to 
revolve around rules that do not threaten specific groups, and offer protection against the 
abuse of political powers. Indeed, the legitimacy of a tax system depends on the presence of 
constitutional requirements that specifically prohibit political rulemaking of the kind under 
scrutiny here. As no player is certain about where he will be positioned in the political game, 
constitutional choice will oppose rules whereby the subset of persons who make government 
decisions can realize ‘fiscal gains’ at the expense of those outside the ruling coalition. Put 
positively, justice requires fiscal procedures that are acceptable to a wide range of positions, 
including those outside the realm of power.  
Given this perspective of justice, I investigate the requirements for political rulemaking in 
order to shield the resulting policy from manipulation by affluent organizations and 
multinationals (who ‘buy’ the policy they find profitable), more modest economic parties 
(which extract public resources via their influence over voting procedures) and politically well-
organized economic players (e.g., unions, the agriculture industry and lawyers) that are close 
to the decision-making process. Rather than describing the controversial rules or proposing a 
specific policy outcome (i.e., a specific division of the fiscal burden, for instance zero tax on the 
lowest income brackets), I focus here on the procedural requirements that define how a 
collective decision should be taken. Given the political reality as sketched at the start, and given 
the increasing attention paid to the justice of Western  tax systems, I explore the following 
question:  
Which formal requirements can turn tax policy – currently a domain with winners 
and losers, and rules that reflect the self-interest of one group over that of others – 
into a genuine collective project that takes into account the interests of all members of 
society?  
The rest of this article is divided into four parts. Section 2 seeks to bridge between ideals of 
justice on the one hand, and fiscal reality (including our policy question) on the other hand. 
Translating the demands of justice into political reality requires us to model fiscal processes as 
determined by self-interested agents, acting under majority rule. Taking these behavioral and 
institutional constraints into account, Section 3 sets up a behavioral model that predicts the 
legislative dynamics arising under a simplified version of our current tax system. In particular, 
tax exemptions under a weak majority rule requirement are predicted to lead to fiscal 





investigates how the constitution can protect the legislative machinery from penetration by 
specific interests, and shape the legislative stage to be more oriented towards the goals of all 
citizens. In particular, I argue that in order to liberate taxation from fiscal exploitation, and to 
reconcile taxation and public finance with the general interest, taxation should follow the 
precepts of generality, of which of tax uniformity is the best account. Section 5 connects the 
findings of this article with traditional theories of justice, and sets the stage for further research 
on the value of these theories within the domain of tax justice.  
2.  Bridging ideals of justice with fiscal reality: enter public choice 
 
Since it is in the nature of philosophy to reveal general (moral) principles, and thus raise the 
level of abstraction, few political philosophers write directly on taxation. Although it is hard to 
find a systematic, detailed account on the issue, taxation remains at the heart of each theory of 
justice. Murphy and Nagel (2002) describe the tax system as the ‘most important instrument 
by which a political system puts into practice a conception of economic or distributive justice.’ 
In this sense, while philosophers tend to hide from the practical implications of their theories, 
fiscal principles inevitably appear on the horizon of any view of distributive justice. 
Sufficientarianism’s view that the state must assure a certain minimum for all clearly provides 
the underpinnings of a tax-free income bracket (Frankfurt, 1988, 134-158). Luck-
egalitarianism’s appealing arguments, related to why unchosen elements should not define our 
opportunities, require (fiscal) governments to compensate for the effect of natural endowment 
within social environments, justifying a tax on the market value of people’s talents (Dworkin, 
1981; Roemer, 1993; White, 1999).59 Equally, many Rawlsians depict progressive taxation as 
an elaboration of the difference principle, making those who are more fortunate contribute to 
those who are less well off (Thorndike and Ventry, 2002: 17).60 An interesting newcomer in 
recent decades is left-libertarianism, which holds that whereas distributive justice ought to 
leave the gains generated by our personal labour untouched, resources like land, animals, 
water, minerals or coal are to be distributed equally. The latter boils down to marginal rates of 
100% on what a person appropriates in excess of his equal share of the world’s natural 
resources, and a 0% tax on profits generated by using those resources or one’s personal talent 
(Vallentyne, 2000: 11-14).61 Finally, Ingrid Robeyns’ upcoming ‘limitarianism’ (2016: 1) states 
that it is ‘morally objectionable to be rich,’ and we have a moral duty not to have ‘too much.’ 
Justice, in other words, ‘equals a top marginal taxation rate of 100%’ (Robeyns 2016: 33) on 
everything we own or gain above a specific level. 
All of these accounts of justice clearly condemn current fiscal politics. Each theory can provide 
separate moral arguments as to why our current tax codes – in which one’s power in the 
                                                          
59 Various fiscal proposals have been worked out by luck-egalitarians to compensate for luck in talent: Dworkin 
proposes an obligatory insurance system that makes the more talented pay a polis that gets transferred to the less 
talented, Roemer’s egalitarian planner wants to divide the population into groups according to talent and apply 
different rates, and White’s egalitarian earnings subsidy scheme equally applies rates on actual earned income that 
differentiate by earning potential.  
60 I mean here that some authors connect the difference principle with progressive taxation, and that indeed an 
argument can be made, as is done by Thorndike and Ventry (2002). Fried (1999: 184–186) also suggests that 
progressive taxation sits well within the Rawlsian framework. It has to be mentioned that many different tax systems 
can be part of a just Rawlsian society, and Rawls (1999a: 246) himself mentioned a preference for a consumption 
tax. Whether the difference principle is satisfied clearly depends on the overall social and economic structure of a 
society, not on taxation alone. As Freeman (2007: 229) points out, the appropriate tax scheme is defined by ‘the 
application of these principles to the particular circumstances of a well-ordered society.’  
61 This is the classical form of left-libertarianism, which dates back to Henry George and Thomas Paine. It seeks to 
correct for the unfair appropriation of the world’s resources through property taxes. It normally does not entail 





political process is the decisive element for the division of the tax burden – are unjust. Yet these 
theories proclaim alternative distributive outcomes that are completely independent of the 
decision structure that generates these results. Distributional objectives are debated in 
isolation, and taxation appears as a sort of ‘black box’ that can be called upon to install the 
normative goals ‘without the need to consider the more detailed properties of the ‘black box’ 
itself’ (Hamlin, 2017: 2). Disregarding how prevailing institutions actually make decisions, 
Buchanan and Brennan (2000a: 128) describe distributive justice as the question: ‘If I were 
assigned the task of dividing the pie, what should I do?’ Whether the answer lies in liberating 
those in need (sufficientarianism), compensating for circumstantial luck (luck-egalitarianism) 
or abolishing the wealth of those who have too much (limitarianism), distributions indeed 
appear to be something a single agent can choose (Buchanan and Brennan, 2000b: vxii). 
Likewise, in advancing distributive ideals, the orthodox philosophical approach often implies 
what we could call ‘the benevolence postulate’: certain state competences are necessitated by 
the distributive ideal, and this distributive agent is assumed to act spontaneously according to 
that goal (Wagner, 2016: 13) and fill in the given competences with a single-minded dedication 
to follow the dictates of distributive justice. The government’s powers to tax talents, 
expropriate the rich, or define ‘sufficiency’ are seldom examined in the context of how it deals 
with opportunistic behavior, as the political subject(s) is – often implicitly – modeled to only 
slice the pie according the distributive ideal. Theorizing on romanticized tax theories, 
Buchanan and Congleton (2006: 87) state: ‘nowhere in the whole of this approach to taxation 
is there any recognition that persons and groups will invest valuable resources in the politics 
that may operate to produce favorable or unfavorable tax treatment.’  
Although these accounts can enlighten and guide properly motivated individuals, and be the 
subject of philosophical analysis, ideal distributive outcomes do not form a helpful point of 
departure for our more practical normative endeavor. Looking at how to improve real-world 
decision processes in fiscal matters, recommendations of justice commence with a descriptive 
analysis (Thrasher, 2014). If we want to carry the requirements of justice to the political level, 
we need to trace the empirical elements that actually characterize political reality (Buchanan, 
2000b: 133). Modeling the political world that is actually deciding on the issue at stake requires 
taking into account at least two matters that are neglected in the traditional philosophical 
model. First, distributive decisions are never unilateral choices. Although despotic regimes are 
conceivable, the distribution of ‘the pie’ in democratic regimes is not decided by a single agent. 
In democracies, the division of fiscal obligations ‘emerges’ from a complex interaction of 
various individuals. Moreover, different parties will come to an agreement under the majority 
requirement. Their agreement will not be identical to any individual’s preferred outcome, but 
will consist of a ‘meshing’ of the preferences of various parties.62 In this sense, the democratic 
process is only expected to lead to a specific ideal outcome if all parties forming a majority hold 
it as their personal preference. The second neglected matter is that, although benevolence in 
politics is theoretically conceivable, fiscal reality illustrates that this assumption is shaky. More 
precisely, the question I am trying to resolve arises from the observation of the opposite, as 
empirical data reveals that distributions are no pure realization of any distributive ideal, but 
often result from the attempts of individuals who are decisive in the process to attain their own 
self-interest. Though a thorough description of the controversial tax rules that typify our 
current tax codes is beyond the scope of this article, the introduction reveals that the 
‘distributive agent’ is not benevolent, and that individuals and groups adopt various strategies 
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to influence the distribution of fiscal shares in order to acquire private gain. Hence, I do not 
assume people undergo an ontological metamorphosis when they enter the political arena, and 
will therefore advance the ‘economic postulate’ within the legislative process (Buchanan and 
Musgrave, 1999). The sphere in which people find themselves does not alter their motivations, 
and the political arena (like the marketplace) can be consistently modeled as an environment 
with self-interested agents.63 In this sense, the democratic process is only expected to lead to a 
specific ideal outcome if this ideal outcome also happens to serve the self-interests of the 
decisive parties. This rejection of the ‘benevolence postulate’ in public finance has two 
important implications. First, concerning benefits (i.e. public spending), the members of a 
society are expected to influence the political process to acquire the type of public goods they 
desire, and to maximize the amount (Buchanan and Tullock, 1999: 132–149). Second, in terms 
of costs (i.e. taxation), people will avoid expenses they do not want, and try to minimize the 
amount. This necessarily means that, under the assumption that their consumption of public 
goods remains equal, citizens will try to minimize their tax share (Buchanan and Congleton, 
2006: 90). 
On the basis of these assumptions, with the goal of modifying fiscal decision processes so that 
the outcome embodies the interest of all parties involved along the contractarian-
constitutional requirements of justice, I address the phenomenon of rulemaking in fiscal 
matters. In particular, I examine how the rule requirements – the rules that regulate the 
validity of legislation – are constitutive for the behavior of legislators within fiscal processes, 
and thus for the type of consecutive legislation that will prevail in a democracy (Buchanan and 
Brennan, 2000a). In particular, I analyze the legislative dynamics under one form of rule 
requirement (Section 3). Based on this analysis, I elaborate what type of constitutional 
regulation is required (Section 4) to safeguard the general interest in tax matters.  
3.  The political economics of tax exemptions  
 
3.1.  Legislative patterns under a simplified majority constraint 
 
In our search for the proper constraints for rulemaking, the following step models how 
individuals will behave under one type of fiscal decision rule. Moreover, I focus on a much-
celebrated constraint in Western politics: the majority requirement. Under this requirement, 
for a tax policy to be legitimate, it needs to be approved by a majority of the voters. The 
operation of fiscal exemptions under this requirement deserves particular attention. According 
to the constitutional choice perspective mentioned in the introduction, rational individuals will 
want to have insights into the legislative patterns that tend to emerge when majorities 
dominate rulemaking and are allowed to tax different groups of people in different ways. As in 
Buchanan’s Calculus of Consent, and later work from which I draw inspiration, I employ four 
simplifications (1999: 132-149). First, I assume a situation of direct democracy, in the sense 
that each citizen can vote on the legislation in question, in order to avoid addressing 
information problems or other complexities in a representative democracy. Second, I assume 
no constitutional control over the produced legislation: I isolate the emerging patterns under 
the majority rule. Third, I assume that a very strict spending policy prevails. Assuming the 
production of public goods that create an equal value for each citizen, I focus on the taxing part 
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of the ‘fiscal exchange.’64 Lastly, in order to focus on the particular incentives that different 
groups face, I limit the imaginary polity to three political and economic groups (Buchanan and 
Congleton, 2006: 30). How this stark and simplified model is valid to understanding real-
world problems, as mentioned in the introduction, is discussed Section 3.2.  
Imagine now the following situation: a Township has liberated itself from external dominance 
and is free to organize its own public system. Its spending policy is assumed to generate an 
equal amount of goods (for instance security, general road maintenance or a basic income) for 
each citizen.65 The Township’s funding decisions are to be decided by an unrestrained majority 
rule: policies that are supported by more than half of the inhabitants (i.e. 51%) are 
implemented. The Township has an economic product of 100,000 and can be socio-
economically divided into three subgroups: 20 entrepreneurs, each of whom earns 2,000 
(40,000 total); 20 fisherman (earning 1,750 each or 35,000 total) and 20 workers (1,250 
each or 25,000 total). For reasons of simplicity, I assume no economic growth. Due to the 
inheritance of previous legislation, a flat tax of 20% currently prevails, which raises 20,000 for 
the government. However, having gained sovereignty, new arrangements are possible. The 
outcome value of the government activity is estimated at 23,000 – raising a value of 383 per 
capita. From a public choice perspective, this levying rule would be particularly unstable. As I 
will describe, successive cycles of majorities will tend to emerge, which can be predicted to 
minimize their tax debt by using fiscal exemptions.  
A first coalition is made between the fisherman and the workers, who historically had close 
ties. Forming a government – called ‘labour’ – they decide to put the general tax up to 22% 
(exacting 8,800 from the entrepreneurs) but to lower taxation for their own two groups to 19%. 
The general revenue during coalition labour is now 20,200, but the members of the majority 
contribute proportionally less.  
Table 1: Coalition Labour 
                                                          
After a four-year term, the entrepreneurs manage to convince the workers to form a new 
alliance, called ‘freedom.’ They increase general taxation to 25% (extracting 8,750 from the 
fisherman) but ‘in order for the economy to prosper’, they opt for specific measures: the 
workers (4,750) maintain the tax break from labour, but the entrepreneurs (7,600) get a 
‘freedom break’ of up to 19%, and can henceforth minimize their fiscal costs. Due to the extra 
contributions from the minority, the overall revenue increases – but this only causes a small 
increase in spending value to 23,500. 
                                                          
64 Buchanan also isolates the funding part of the exchange from the expenditure. For instance, Buchanan and 
Tullock (1999: 137) focuses on spending decisions by a majority under the presumption of an equal property tax on 
all citizens, in, and on the reverse situation. Nonetheless, I acknowledge the two-sidedness of the fiscal account, i.e. 
that taxation is part of public economics sensu latu, and that the justice of taxation depends on the consequent 
distribution of public goods among the constituency. See for instance: Buchanan (2000b: 133-149).  






                                                   Table 2: Coalition Freedom 
             
The next term is ruled by a new coalition between the fisherman and the workers. Their project 
is called ‘social justice.’ To raise the level of basic income, they put a ‘fairness tax’ on 
entrepreneurs of 32% (12,800), and the fisherman (7,000) and workers (5,000) get a ‘fairness 
exemption’ down to 20%. The additional revenue – now 24,800 – gets spent poorly (value: 
24,000). Collective action is a societal loss, but is profitable for members of the majority, who 
pay 12,000 but consume 16,000. This is in sharp contract with the entrepreneurs, who pay 
12,800 but consume only 8,000.  
 Table 3: Coalition Social Justice 
             
Before the Township loses its sovereignty, due to bad economic results and internal struggles 
over fiscal issues, a final coalition is made between entrepreneurs and fisherman called ‘green.’ 
Their tax program abolishes both the ‘fairness exemption’ for workers and the higher basic 
income, and introduces a general ‘environmental tax’ of 35% (extracting 8,750 from the 
workmen). However, to give entrepreneurs the leeway to adopt new ecological techniques, they 
get a tax break of 22% (8,800). The fishermen (7,000) are able to retain their ‘fairness 
exemption’ in this government. These fiscal measures do not create any surplus, and the value 
of public spending falls back to 23,000. At this stage, public policy ceases to be beneficial, even 
for the majority, since it consumes 15,333, but contributes 15,800. Nonetheless, the coalition 
is soothed by the fact that the fishermen maintain their tax breaks, and that the entrepreneurs 
better their situation sharply: whereas they lost 4,800 under the ‘social justice’ scenario (paid 
12,800, consumed 8,000), this cost is now minimized to 1,134.  
Table 4: Coalition Green 
   
The previous cycles of coalitions are instructive to understand the political behavior that will 
occur under a weak majoritarian restraint. Ab initio, the entrepreneurs, workers and fisherman 





security, general road maintenance or a basic income to exceed possible costs. However, this 
initial prospectus gets trumped by the opportunity of coalitions under majority rule: while all 
parties could benefit from cooperation, each individual party could benefit maximally by 
shifting the costs of the public goods onto the other party. The following patterns emerge under 
the unrestrained majority rule:  
1. Since there is no substantive constraint, each party is tempted by a ‘take-all scenario.’ Under 
the hypothesis of an equal benefit model, self-interested agents are incentivized to engage in 
fiscal exploitation, meaning they build coalitions until a majority has been formed, and realize 
profits by transferring the cost of public goods to the minority (Buchanan and Tullock, 1999: 
139). This is exemplified by the labour coalition.  
2. This dynamic leads to a situation in which Pareto-inferior public activities become profitable 
for majority coalitions (Buchanan and Tullock, 1999: 141-142, 168; Gwartney and Wagner, 
1988: 18). Since the (fiscal) revenue exceeds the spending value, at the societal level collective 
action is loss making for the community. Nonetheless, as they can shift the fiscal burden onto 
those outside the realm of power – i.e. fiscal exploitation – public action continues to be cost 
effective for those in government, as illustrated by the ‘tax justice’ coalition.  
3. Flowing from the previous, the practice of discriminatory taxation tends to encourage public 
overinvestment (Buchanan and Tullock, 1999: 166; Gaus, 2011: 544). The ruling majority will 
only appreciate its own marginal costs when judging increments in public spending. Since 
these costs can be minimized due to externalization via tax exemptions, there is an incentive 
for deficit spending. For instance, the tax reform from the ‘tax justice’ coalition is not 
profitable, meaning that total revenue (24,600) exceeds total spending value (24,000), yet it 
appears so for the majority.  
4. Importantly, over time, this process will turn tax policy into a negative-sum game, even for 
the majority (Gaus, 2011: 542; Gwartney and Wagner, 1988: 19). The horizon of possible 
options of each member is dominated by the justified fear of ending up in the minority, which 
can only be avoided by being in the majority (Buchanan and Congleton, 2006: 91). Once they 
end up in the majority, members of each coalition have a strong incentive to shift the fiscal 
burden onto the minority. Within a dynamic perspective, the chain of successive formations of 
fiscal exploitation will cause rising general taxation. As the ‘green’ coalition illustrates, this 
leads to the point at which majorities do not even gain in absolute terms, but simply profit by 
avoiding an even bigger loss. Public policy turns into a game of cost minimization, rather than 
creating advantages for each member. 
As the above-mentioned scenario points out, fiscal legislation under majority rule can be 
simplified as a variant of the prisoner’s dilemma: while cooperation pays, cheating is 
encouraged. Moreover, since there is no assurance that the other party will not cheat (i.e. create 
a tax benefit) in the next round, each government is pushed to create a fiscal benefit when 









Figure 1: Tax exemptions as a prisoner’s dilemma in a one-shot scenario 
  
A and B represent a majority and a minority, respectively. Majority A can think of a cooperative 
scheme that equates the costs of public goods for society as a whole, represented by Cell I. 
Although cooperation pays, the majority can benefit the most by lowering taxation on its own 
group and shifting the costs of public goods onto the minority. Moreover, rational agents are 
expected to opt for the options mirrored in Cell III. As highlighted by Buchanan and Congleton 
(2006: 28), prospective majority coalitions will always select an alternative that will generate 
distributional advantages for their members. The result is that legislation takes the form of a 
‘taking’: one party wins by extracting from the other. 
Figure 1 only partly describes the mechanisms produced by majority rule, as it focuses on the 
one-shot scenario, in which a game of winners and losers emerges. Importantly, given the 
occurrence of various cycles, the institutionalization of tax benefits as exemplified by 
successive governments creates a dynamic whereby everybody loses – even those in the 
majority (Gaus, 2011: 542). Moreover, everybody will be in the minority at some point, and 
thus become subject to fiscal extraction. What is more, the game established by tax exemptions 
under a weak majoritarian constraint creates a ‘downward spiral.’ As mentioned by Hayek 
(2011: 441) and Gaus (2008: 195), majorities lack incentives to explicitly consider the long-
term significance of their decisions. In the competitive and aggressive competition for tax 
exemptions, the biggest threat is being in the minority. Short-sightedness is rational, and the 
agents of each successive government have a strong incentive to cheat. In the long run, this 
‘rational’ succession of tax exemptions, ever-rising tax rates and public overinvestment (due to 
the externalization of costs) will render the provision of public goods a negative-sum game, 
leading to situation in which all members will lose in absolute terms, though they will lose 
relatively different amounts (Gaus, 2011: 545). Within each game (i.e. one-shot majoritarian 
coalitions) parties will compare their tax level with that in the former government and with 
that of the other group, rather than with point 0 or some economic optimum. Although the 
‘green’ coalition contributes more than it receives, it is still better off than the minority. So, 
after a sequence of games, collective action will tend to represent an absolute loss, which will 
inevitably turn out to be an absolute loss for each member, i.e., both the majority and minority. 









Figure 2: Tax exemptions as a prisoner’s dilemma after various cycles of 
majoritarian coalitions  
 
 
3.2.  Legislative patterns in a complex majoritarian democracy 
 
Why would rational participants be hopelessly trapped in the game? After all, individuals have 
a certain interest in withholding from fiscal exploitation, as they are aware that political gain 
in this round can be met with severe extraction in the next one (Buchanan and Brennan, 
2000a: 135). The incentive to overcome the dilemma is strengthened by the long-term 
destructive effects of exploitative majorities. Indeed, empirical work (Ostrom and Ostrom, 
2014: 167-209) suggests that groups are actually creative and often solve social dilemmas by 
setting up complex arrangements that monitor and sanction the use of common resources. For 
a couple of reasons, prevailing politics do not, and are not predicted to, solve the conflict. As 
repeatedly found in institutional economics (Buchanan, 1965; Ostrom and Kizer, 1982: 71), the 
emergent individual strategies are also determined by the number of individuals. Because of 
the intimate relationship between one’s own behavior and the expected choices of others, small 
groups foster cooperation (Ostrom et al., 1994: 319). However, with an increase in the size of 
the group, individuals become anonymous parts of big entities, and realize that their own 
‘ethical’ choices do not increase the probability that others will follow the norm (Buchanan, 
1965: 9). Hence the possibility of enforcing cooperative strategies through social interaction 
diminishes starkly in a polity of millions of people (Ostrom and Ostrom, 2014: 190). The 
incentive to defect further increases as the number of factions grows. In a three-group game, 
the fiscal duty of each party and the costs of fiscal exploitation are both identifiable and 
substantial. As society becomes more complex, majority legislation is expected to take the form 
of a compromise between various successful groups, and to involve adopting a list of tax 
benefits that result in huge profits for the beneficiaries and small costs for everyone else 
(Butler, 2012: 62). Self-governance through communication and informal sanctioning 
becomes highly unlikely in a complex legal order in which an interminable range of 
exemptions, obtained by unidentifiable individuals, exerts marginal and incalculable costs on 
the total group (Ostrom and Ostrom, 2014: 181, 193). This effect is exacerbated by the 
institution of representative democracy, whereby individuals secure their interests indirectly 
by trading votes for fiscal favors (Butler, 2012: 58-59). This ‘exchange’ decreases the chances 
of monitoring, as information asymmetry results in a situation in which the vast majority has 
no knowledge of the fiscal rules, or their destructive effect.  
So reality is no doubt more complex than the model, but, unfortunately, not in the sense that 
we could expect a solution to merge out of the game endogenously. Despite the prevalence of 





model successfully explains the essence of tax policy in a majoritarian democracy. The behavior 
of political agents and subsequent legislative patterns are a function of the rules that define 
when a valid agreement has been reached (Buchanan and Brennan, 2000a: 3). Moreover, any 
system in which economic matters are decided by anything less than unanimity, in the absence 
of any other constitutional requirement, creates the possibility of private gains for some, at the 
expense of others (Buchanan and Tullock, 1999: 85-96). In fiscal matters, the opacity of an 
unrestrained majority rule regarding the division of fiscal shares creates and attracts profit-
seeking political groups (Buchanan and Tullock, 1999: 285-286). An infinite array of political 
profits appears on the calculus of different groups in society, as fiscal extraction can be realized 
by finding partners with which to build a majority that adopts various fiscal privileges for the 
respective groups, the costs of which can be shifted to the rest of the constituency. This pressure 
for private gains from majoritarian procedures helps us understand the prevailing fiscal 
institutions described by the tax literature (Peeters et al., 2017). In particular, the aggressive 
struggle for benefits, the emergence of the booming lobbying industry, the segregation of the 
electorate into voting blocs, the ability of small interest groups to capture concentrated benefits 
while dispersing marginal costs, a chaotic tax code riddled with a maze of exemptions and 
deductions, and the appearance of many loopholes are patterns generated by an unrestrained 
majority rule. In the emergent state of legal anarchy, a general distrust in (fiscal) politics 
complicates the situation even further (Ostrom and Ostrom, 2014: 192).  
4.  Tax uniformity as a constitutional tool 
 
4.1.  The quest for justice: enter the constitutional perspective  
 
The majoritarian scheme induces parties to engage in fiscal extraction from the rest of society 
– ultimately transforming collective action into a negative-sum game. This procedure degrades 
politics to an arena of conflict in which all parties enter into an exploitative logic – to the 
detriment of the whole community. This analysis brings us back to our main aim: to create a 
sphere of fiscal politics that is immunized against these exploitative activities and generates 
acceptable results for all participants. Given the former, we need to focus on which types of 
constraints can rescue the game so that the players are not programmed to engage in 
exploitation. While each member of the Township will participate in a ‘downward spiral’ at the 
political level, at the constitutional level discussed in the introduction, each member wants to 
design a system of collective action that cultivates prosperity and promotes the overall interests 
of all participants (Buchanan and Tullock, 1999: 285; Thrasher, 2014: 37). To help answer this 
question, it is useful to refocus on the problematic case. Looking at both the Township and 
current fiscal politics, there are two crucial elements at work.  
First, each player has knowledge of his or her own situation. The Township and our society 
are composed of combative interest groups that are formed around particular characteristics 
such as income and type of business. Economic characteristics are prevalent, and members 
with equal legal (workers, entrepreneurs, functionaries or unemployed groups) or economic 
(earning power) status will coalesce into separate political parties, factions within a party, 
lobby groups or more informal interest groups. Cartels will thus revolve around a shared 
characteristic, which will form the benchmark for each faction to calculate the potential pay-
offs of the political measures at stake. As evident in the situations of fiscal anarchy described 
above, each group will isolate its situation in order to calculate its profit on a particular issue.  
The observation of this process relates to what John Rawls had in mind when he construed his 





income, talent, ethnicity or view of the good life (Rawls, 1999a: 11). Indeed, the ‘original 
position’ distinguishes itself from the Township and our societies because, due to a lack of 
knowledge regarding their own economic or ethical interests, individuals in the original 
position cannot advance proposals tailored to their personal situation (Gaus and Thrasher, 
2015: 46). Instead, these individuals are optimally positioned to choose the principles of 
justice, meaning that ‘no one is able to design his principles to favor his particular condition’ 
(Rawls, 1999a: 11). Rawls’ contribution indicates that from a contractarian-constitutional 
perspective, procedures where dominant partisan interests determine the division of the fiscal 
burden are not acceptable.  
While the endeavor of this paper is Rawlsian in many regards, it has a more practical 
objective.66 Rawls models an imaginary constitutional choice process, populated by 
participants who are blinded on whether they are workmen, fishermen or entrepreneurs. In 
this paper, constitutional principles are chosen within a more realistic contractual setting, in 
which participants are aware of whether they are workmen, fisherman or entrepreneurs, yet 
logically uncertain about their position under prospective majoritarian cycles and their future 
income streams.67 Another nuance relates to the content of the agreement. Whereas Rawls 
identifies the conclusive principle that ought to regulate the distribution of economic shares in 
society, I examine which procedural constraints could improve the democratic choice process 
when its members are deciding on a distributive issue. Therefore desired end-state 
distributions of income, for instance those maximizing the amount of goods for the least 
advantaged, do not represent my first aim. I am looking for rules that promote the interest of 
all players, irrespective of the substantial conception of justice that will drive their future 
factions.68 While modeling decision-makers as ignorant of their position, talent and view of the 
good life is theoretically powerful, it remains a thought experiment: participants deciding on 
the distribution of fiscal shares are not actually choosing behind a veil of ignorance. Thus while 
looking for procedural regulations that could enhance the operation of real-world decision 
processes, I have to acknowledge that collective action will be decided by people with 
knowledge of their own situations. Nonetheless, a second element is at stake in real-life 
situations and in the Township. Not only do people tread on the political level with knowledge 
of themselves, cartels are formed around rules that cover this particular situation. What defines 
the individual calculus in the political arena is not only that participants know themselves, but 
equally the responsiveness of legislation to this situation. The type of legislation that emerges 
in the Township – and in our current tax codes – distinguishes between locational, 
professional, financial, industrial and behavioral elements. Indeed, where thought 
                                                          
66 By this I mean that constitutional principles can only be discovered by a rational choice process in which 
participants choose principles under some form of uncertainty. See Gaus and Thrasher (2015).  
67 In other words, in order to reveal the true principles of justice, Rawls employs ‘ignorance’ – a condition under 
which imaginary choosers have no knowledge of their own identity. Here, I introduce a realistic yet limited form of 
‘uncertainty’: players have full information on their current circumstances, yet, due to the permanent or quasi-
permanent nature of constitutional rules, they are unaware of their specific position under the operation of the 
prospective alternatives, and thus of the precise effect of the alternatives on their future situation. Yet remarkably, 
Rawls did not always assume a veil of ignorance. In ‘Justice as Fairness’ (Rawls 1999b: 47–72) he characterizes the 
original position as a setting in which players have full information of their circumstances. See also Gaus and 
Thrasher (2015), Buchanan and Brennan (2000a: 46) and Buchanan (2000b: 146, footnote 7).  
68 By this I do not mean that the situation of the poor should be maximized, or that the gap between rich and poor 
should be minimized. The requirements of justice I am aiming for need to be compatible with individuals holding 
various (unknown) preferences over specific outcomes. Therefore my test does not aim to ‘create’ a specific outcome, 
but merely to ‘discover’ practical procedures that avoid outcomes as characterized in the introduction and, more 
positively, to promote outcomes that are acceptable to all positions. On procedural evaluation and value subjectivity, 





experiments rule out knowledge regarding personal characteristics, these elements are brought 
into existing politics as decisive yardsticks for the application of rules.  
It is one thing to accept that people enter the political arena as real people, with knowledge of 
their circumstances and goals, yet it is quite another to accept that these particularities are 
objectively embedded in the law as decisive conditions for the differential application of a rule. 
This leaves us with one remaining possibility – to cut the string on the rules side. The rule 
requirement that deserves attention is not that rules are created by people who are ignorant of 
their characteristics, but that the rules themselves do not refer to such characteristics, and 
hence apply to all members equally (Rawls, 1999b: 54).69  
4.2.  The virtues of generality in taxation 
 
The range of options that arises when parties negotiate on legislation is a product of the 
procedural rules that define a valid agreement. And a participant’s calculus can be expected to 
revolve around such options that emerge on the horizon of possible agreements. But what if 
the object of that calculus (i.e. prospective legislation) is required to be indifferent to any 
personal, economic or worldview-like characteristics, and to apply to all members of a given 
jurisdiction equally? 
4.2.1.  Generality as an ethical certificate  
 
This generality requirement builds a minimal ethical standard into legislation (Rawls, 1999b: 
54).70 It precludes the assignment of privileges, where those in charge take advantage of their 
momentous power to promote only their liberty or restrict only the behavior of others. Whereas 
majority ruling will always entail both rulers and legal subjects, the constraint at stake assures 
that the rulers respect the fundamental notion of equality – and thus create rules that apply to 
all members equally. The type of agreements that will subsequently govern society will be 
reciprocal: the legislative rights and duties will be distributed equally to both the majority and 
minority. The ethical value of generality, and its implications for the assignment of equal 
liberties, is clear-cut. Imagine, for instance, an Islamophobe party using the political field to 
halt the influence of Islam in public. One very effective measure might be to limit the freedom 
of speech for any kind of opinion that relates to the Koran – a possibility under the 
unrestrained majority rule (Buchanan and Congleton, 2006: 6). Under the requirement of 
generality, such a measure vanishes as a possible agreement, even if it had majority support. 
The only variant of the measure could be to limit the freedom of speech for all worldviews 
equally. The Islamophobe factions in society can only restrain Muslims in a mutual exchange 
in which they forfeit their own worldview in an equal fashion. It is easy to see that generality 
forms an important ethical check on the political–legislative stage. The demand that 
governments and legislators need to formulate Kantian maxims rather than discriminatory 
measures rules out the most severe forms of injustice that the rather amoral majority rule could 
produce. It ensures that minorities will be respected in matters in which majority members 
would like to be respected themselves.  
                                                          
69 Rawls, when employing a model affiliated with the one here, equally stretched the importance of the requirement 
of generality: ‘… each person will propose principles of a general kind which will, to a large degree, gain their sense 
from the various applications to be made of them, the particular circumstances of which being as yet unknown’ 
(1999b: 54). For an extensive elaboration, see Gaus and Thrasher (2015: 45). Here I investigate the specific value of 
these kinds of requirements.  
70 See ‘Justice as Fairness’ in Rawls (1999b: 54): ‘having a morality must at least imply the acknowledgment of 





4.2.2.  The meaning of generality in tax matters 
 
The Kantian demand to think of legislation that would be desirable as universal law is more 
than a pure deontic maxim. The fundamental precept that decisions generated by the subset 
of persons that make up the government need to ‘apply equally’ to everybody is intended to 
promote the interests of those who are outside that membership, alongside the contractarian-
constitutional demands outlined in the introduction. Nonetheless, the precise translation of 
generality into tax matters remains unresolved. To engender outcomes acceptable to all 
positions, decisive majorities can only pass tax rules that do not distinguish between personal 
circumstances, and apply equally throughout the constituency. But how do we operationalize 
that demand? Furthering on the dominance of income taxation in many legal systems 
(Bhandari, 2017: 2), I analyze the constraint that majorities ‘need to tax income equally’: what 
proposition demands universal application here? I explore three options here: (1) an equal rate, 
asking the same proportion from each participant; (2) an equal absolute number, asking the 
same amount of money from each participant; or (3) an equal progressive structure, applying 
the same system of differentiated rates for different income brackets, to each participant. The 
alternative patterns in fiscal outcomes this generates will be illustrated by going back to the 
Township.  
1. Tax uniformity  
I define generality as tax uniformity or the equal-rate principle (rather than, for instance, an 
equal absolute contribution or progressive rate structure). A majority can impose any tax rule, 
as long as it consists of a tax rate that applies to all members’ incomes equally. Each faction is 
now determined to calculate its preferred policy within the confines of a strictly uniform 
applied rate.  







Figure 3 shows the consequence of the strict symmetrical distribution of tax shares : a tax rate that is 











Table 5: Distributive options under tax uniformity 
        
Table 5 depicts the feasible options (the columns display the inputs and outputs of each group, and the 
optimal tax level is indicated in bold) for each group for a certain rate, under the general observation of both 
increasing and decreasing marginal utility (cf. ‘spending value’) of public goods.  
 
As discussed previously, under the unrestrained majority rule, an interminable range of 
legislative measures can potentially produce pay-offs for each group. Moreover, each majority 
formed could literally ‘invent’ endless legislation to improve its situation. Table 5 reveals how 
the landscape of possible political agreements for coalitions is sensibly limited by the 
uniformity restraint. Moreover, uniformity demands strict symmetrical contributions from all 
members: when a proportion of income is exacted from one member of society, the same share 
will be imposed on other members. This crucially alters the legislative dynamic in three ways:  
1. The optimal tax rate for each group is not undetermined or dependent on how much one can 
make others pay, but appears a priori as a given number (i.e. the ‘single-peaked preference,’ 
which is indicated in bold for each group). Crucially, this preference automatically determines 
the tax duty for the other groups. The workmen’s preference does not depend on in-game 
negotiations: their desired rate is 14%, and uniformity will force them to propose 14% for the 
entrepreneurs as well.  
2. It is particularly remarkable that the preferred tax rates for the three different groups tend 
to congregate around the same point. Where in the previous situation the range between 
different rate levels greatly enlarged (e.g. entrepreneurs paying 35%, the rest contributing 
22%), the confines of uniformity limit this range to only 2% (between 14 and 16). It is easy to 
see how any majority coalition would put taxation within that range. Henceforth, majority 
under a generality will more heavily favor the median voter’s preference (Buchanan and 
Congleton, 1999: 137). 
3. Whereas under an unrestrained majority rule the optimal options for one group represent 
severe losses for another group, here the optimal numbers for each group separately are also 
profitable options for the other group. Moreover, the ‘minimum optimum’ (i.e. entrepreneurs 
favoring 14%) and the ‘maximum optimum’ (i.e. workers favoring 16%) both include profitable 





Abstracting somehow from our Township, the precise economic effects of uniformity 
undisputedly depend on the distribution of income throughout the population, the given 
preferences regarding the activities of the state and the value of the public goods produced. At 
the level of constitutional choice, individuals do not have knowledge of these matters. From 
their perspective, they will need to screen three general working properties of uniformity: 
1. Uniformity minimizes fiscal exploitation. Moreover, no player can abuse his political power 
by purely taking from the relatively powerless. In respect of the symmetrical distribution of tax 
shares, any rise in taxes on minorities will be paralleled by an equal proportionate rise in tax 
shares on the player’s own group (cf. Figure 3). As such, generality-as-uniformity tends to 
promote fairness since the harm a measure could cause to others becomes internalized in the 
calculus of the rulemaker as a personal cost. 
2. The majority will extend the size of the budget only to the point at which marginal benefits 
to the majority are estimated to equal marginal taxes on the majority (Buchanan, 2000b: 142). 
Since governments properly internalize their costs, generality induces efficiency throughout 
public action. This means that overall, loss-making projects (cf. coalition ‘tax justice’) become 
equally costly for majorities. The ruling majority will contribute proportionally when judging 
increments in public spending, which discourages overinvestment (Gwartney and Wagner, 
1988: 18). 
3. Although there is no assurance that each application will always be beneficial to each income 
group, since such benefits depend on specific political-economic particularities, uniformity, as 
a general rule, promotes positive-sum games. Under the symmetrical assignment of tax shares 
throughout the constituency, options that appear profitable to the government have a relatively 
high chance of being beneficial to those outside the realm of power (Cf. Figure 3). As such, the 
uniform application of tax rates throughout the constituency promotes general efficiency, 
as it spurs majorities to opt for policies that hinge on the direction of the Pareto frontier.71  
2. Lump sum taxation  
The second option regards the equal distribution of an absolute number, often coined ‘lump 
sum taxes.’ The expected outcomes are a function of the rules defining how majorities can make 
valid fiscal legislation. Looking at the Township, which pattern of outcomes can be predicted 
when majorities are restrained by the universal distribution of an absolute number? In Table 
6, the rows represent the same overall revenue and personal benefits from public action as in 
the previous option, yet now this is generated by the universal exaction of an equal amount of 
money (cf. ‘input’).  
 
 
                                                          
71 Efficiency is conceptualized here as the Pareto norm: no one can be made better off without making someone else 
worse off (Gaus: 2010). Uniformity compensates for the departure from the unanimity requirement within a 





Figure 4: Distributive options under lump sum taxation 
   
  Figure 4 shows the consequence of demanding an equal absolute number from each group : each tax 
policy  generates the same absolute amount of profits each group.  
 
Table 6: Distributive options under lump sum taxation
 
Table 6 depicts the feasible options (the columns display the inputs and outputs of each group, and the 
optimal tax  level is indicated in bold) for each group for lump sum taxation, under the general 
observation of both increasing and decreasing marginal utility (cf. ‘spending value’) of public goods. The 
optimal tax level for each group is indicated in bold, being a contribution of 266.  
 
The distributional outcomes generated by lump taxes have much in common with uniform 
taxation. The optimal tax level for each group is single peaked (each group has only one 
preference), and discretion over another’s tax liability is foreclosed: what is optimal for one 
group automatically generates the tax duty for the other groups. Even more, the optimal tax 
level now is simply the same for each group (i.e. 266, the equivalent of a 16% tax in the previous 
example). Lump sum contributions put taxation on a par with markets, as taxes function as 
‘shadow prices for goods and services provided by the state’ (Fried, 1999: 160) and henceforth 





Yet a careful analysis of Table 6 reveals that some change did occur. The optimal tax level is 
now a universal exaction of 266. Compared to a uniform tax, which generates the same amount 
of output benefits for each member (i.e. 350, see row 16% in Table 5), lump sum taxation 
involves a tax cut for entrepreneurs of 54 (they pay 320 under a uniform tax) and a tax raise 
up to 66 for the workmen (who pay 200 under the uniform tax). From a comparative 
perspective, a lump sum tax holds as a transfer of liabilities to the lower-income groups. But 
even when assessed on its own merits, taxation in absolute numbers fails to hold as an ‘equal 
treatment’. Due to its insensitivity regarding how much a person earns, taxation in absolute 
numbers is specifically harsh on the workmen: 250 out of 1,250 vs. 250 out of 2,000 for the 
entrepreneurs.72 Although no one can precisely draw the curve, the existence of a negative 
marginal utility of income is intuitively and empirically sound: the first dollar earned has a 
higher subjective value than the 2.000th dollar earned. Admitting the variance in interpersonal 
utility curves, at a general level, one can nonetheless state that under lump sum taxes, the lower 
an individual’s income flow, the more value they will transfer to the common fund.73 Because 
of this, the first working property of lump sum taxes is – again, generally speaking – that they 
create at least some distributional bias in favor of the higher-income groups. A second 
operational element is, however, more relevant to the current discussion. Not only do lump 
sum taxes entail a distributional bias, at the extreme, lump sum taxes empower the richest 
group to squeeze the lowest-income groups dry. Even in our fairly income-even Township, the 
entrepreneurs and fishermen can put the tax at 1,250, to the detriment of the workmen. Now 
imagine the workmen earn 1,000, the fisherman 20,000 and the entrepreneurs 50,000. Here 
the latter two groups can put the lump sum at 1,000, hereby expropriating the workmen of all 
income, without experiencing severe losses themselves. Interestingly, such an unfair practice 
is ruled out under uniformity: taking everything from the workmen is checked by being 
stripped oneself.74 Hence, due to the unequal effect (caused by its blindness regarding how 
much a person earns), not only will a lump sum tax realize distributive gains for the higher-
income groups. When they fall outside the dominant coalition, lump sum taxes put the lowest-
income groups at the political mercy of the rest of the constituency. From a contractarian-
constitutional perspective, when selecting procedures leading to outcomes that are acceptable 
to various positions, parties will want to  prevent this risk.  
3. Progressive taxation 
The higher one’s income flow, the less one is affected by an absolute contribution. But does this 
insight not demand us to go further than a universal rate structure? One could say 25% of 1,000 
is not the same as 25% of 10,000. Indeed, the negative marginal utility of income has also been 
advanced to justify progressive taxation: the higher the income, the less one sacrifices, and 
thus the higher the required marginal rate (Diamond and Saez, 2011; Hettich and Winer, 1999: 
112). Additionally, if not a translation of equal treatment, its justification lies in redistribution: 
progressive rates as a means of demanding more from those who are more fortunate, arguably 
an application of the demands of fairness (Thorndike and Ventry, 2002: 17).75  
                                                          
72 A seminal insight of this kind convinced J.S. Mill to state that everybody should bear the same utility loss and to 
elaborate his ‘equal sacrifice’ principle. See Mill (1917: 804).  
73 In other words, the estimation is that the interpersonal variance in utility curves does not suggest that individuals, 
choosing the constitutional principles of taxation, would deny this insight.  
74 Majorities could do this when they are able to discriminate in terms of spending, which they are not in my 
example. See Buchanan and Brennan (2000b).  





I do not seek here to determine whether these theoretic justifications do in fact support 
progressive taxation.76 I focus instead on expectable outcomes once tax rules are unleashed in 
real life. It is possible that those deciding on the distribution of tax incidence will be dedicated 
to the principle of marginal utility, and the doctrine of equal sacrifice when voting on tax 
brackets and tax rates. They might also be inspired by theoretic schemes of redistribution, 
stating the point at which the richer classes should transfer higher amounts to the common 
fund. But this paper started with the observation that groups are often driven by more profane 
considerations. Progressivity crucially alters the nature of the alternatives that appear on an 
individual’s calculus. In particular, the ability to tax different income brackets at different rates 
gives majorities renewed power to transfer the fiscal burden onto other groups. Going back to 
the Township, the constraint of progressivity allows the workmen and fishermen to, say, put a 
rate of 15% on the ‘first’ 1,750 any person earns, and a universal rate of 76% on the second 
bracket, above 1,750. Note that this would create exactly the same distribution as under the 
‘social justice’ coalition: workers’ pay 5,000, fisherman 7,000 and entrepreneurs 12,800, with 
societal overinvestment and severe losses for the entrepreneurs re-occurring in the public 
domain.  
 
Table 7: Distribution under progressivity 
 
The example above signals progressivity’s weaknesses compared to the uniformity account. 
Moreover, the legislative liberty to tax different income brackets at different rates will generate 
asymmetrical distributions of tax shares between different income-groups.  As the choice of 
one’s own tax liability does not automatically determine the excise applicable to other income 
groups, politically dominant coalitions have discretion to realize pure distributive gains. As the 
example suggests, lower- and middle-income groups are incentivized to maximize profits by 
shifting the burden of public action onto the high-earning minority. This reignites, albeit to a 
more limited degree, the issues to which uniformity appeared as a check, since fiscal 
exploitation, overinvestment and the problem of inefficiency (meaning the rule does not 
promote outcomes that are beneficial to all members) will characterize the domain of public 
action. Nonetheless, compared with the practice of fiscal exemptions and the prevailing legal 
arrangements, progressive rates, when applied universally, clearly represent an improvement. 
First, groups are only allowed to differentiate the applicable rate on the basis of one element: 
income. Second, the differentiation of fiscal duties is clearly limited, as it only applies to a 
proportion of the income of a specific group, i.e. the portion that exceeds a specific benchmark 
cut-off, here 1,750. This means that under progressivity, fiscal extraction becomes more visible 
                                                          
76 In particular, equal sacrifice does not necessarily entail progressive taxation, as proportional (or uniform) taxes 
could ‘catch’ the effect of decreasing marginal utility, since proportionality clearly demands more from those who 
have higher income flows. The elasticity of marginal utility needs to be relatively high for it to justify progressive 
taxes, and many authors gauge uniform taxation to be sufficient to satisfy the equal sacrifice principle. See Young 






as it demands comparatively high rates. In current politics, progressive rates on all income 
would be a step towards more generality, and represents a reasonable account of generality.  
The essential question that remains is thus whether risk-averse contractants with limited 
knowledge about their future position prefer the ‘political security’ not to be discriminated 
against and the economic benefits offered by uniformity, or whether they opt for ‘socio-
economic security’ for low- and middle-income groups to benefit from the distributive bias 
delivered by progressivity. Answering this question requires gauging both the negative and 
positive spillovers of both institutions, and thus falls outside the scope of this article. The true 
answer may even be beyond the scope of theory, as the very trade-off it implies can only be 
performed by real people. After all, rational choice models are nothing but a simulation of real 
choice.  
5. On distributive justice and taxation: some concluding remarks 
 
Barbara Fried is right: to the extent that distributive justice is about proclaiming distributive 
ideals, tax uniformity fails to be any account of justice. And those ideals are not without value: 
if we could divide the pie ourselves, we would likely not ask the same proportion from people 
holding different sized pies. The particular insensitivity that tax uniformity generates with 
respect to each person’s biological endowment, economic level or source of income seems to 
run against the core of many theories of justice that have been developed in recent decades.  
That said, Amartya Sen (2009: 22, 67, 86) claims that theorizing about justice needs to focus 
on how social structures actually work – and not on how we imagine they work in thought 
experiments. In this way, tax justice is not something ‘out there’, waiting to be objectified by a 
benevolent despot. In reality, there is not only one person slicing, and the majority that makes 
up the slicing committee likes pie too. The relevant question is not to imagine what one would 
do ‘if’ only he were decisive in the slicing process. Although once in a while academics go into 
politics, if tax justice is ever to be realized, it will ‘emerge’ from a process in which multiple, 
mainly self-interested, agents settle the distribution of tax shares against a prevailing set of 
rules. Justice, according to this account, is not some independent ideal but relates to the 
internal quality of the very rules that will determine how that process takes place. Theorizing 
on fiscal justice involves screening which effect competing tax rules will exert on those who are 
in a position to determine the distribution of fiscal shares. Rules that are ‘just’ are the ones that 
generate outcomes that are ‘broadly acceptable’ and appear beneficial to all prospective 
positions.  
Once we have unveiled the black box, and properly mapped the machinery that generates the 
distribution of tax shares within a democratic community, the stage is set for further research. 
In order to gauge the value of traditional theories of justice (cf. Section 2) within the domain 
of taxation, a proper estimation of the type of transfers they would generate in a democratic 
environment with self-interested agents is needed. Future research should explore the effect 
of tax rules implied by, for instance, sufficientarianism or limitarianism, on the dominant 
majority. If the political power to determine a tax-free income bracket, or to tax a specific 
income bracket at 100%, creates fiscal outcomes that hold as a good proposal for all prospective 
positions, they satisfy the constitutional requirements as articulated in this article. Ideal 
theories involving tax rules that put groups outside the ruling coalition at risk of fiscal 





This article illustrates how generality-as-uniformity satisfies this constitutional test, as it 
generates fiscal outcomes that benefit those inside and outside the realm of power, alongside 
generalized criteria of fairness and efficiency. As explained in Section 4.2.2 (and displayed in 
Figure 3 and Table 5), these working properties flow endogenously from the rule itself, whereby 
fiscal harm to others is likely to damage the rulemaker. Choosing behind a veil of uncertainty, 
generality-as-uniformity thus ensures participants that those deciding on the distribution of 
fiscal shares will produce a policy pattern acceptable to all players, regardless of their position. 
To the extent that distributive justice entails assuring an outcome that ‘all can live with’ (Rawls, 








Akerlof G (1978) The economics of “ tagging ” as applied to the optimal income tax, welfare 
programs, and manpower planning. American Economic Review 68(1): 8-19. 
Alexander R et al. (2009) Measuring rates of return for lobbying expenditures: an empirical 
analysis under the American Jobs Creation Act. Journal of Law & Politics 25(4): 401–459.  
Alston L et al. (1996) Empirical Studies in Institutional Change. Political Economy of 
Institutions and Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Anderson M et al. (1990) Behind the veil: The Political Economy of Constitutional Change. In: 
Crain M and Tollison R (eds) Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Economics. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, pp. 89 – 100.  
Andrews W (1983) The Achilles Heel of the Comprehensive Income Tax. In Walker C and 
Bloomfield M (eds) New Directions in Federal Tax Policy for the 1980s. Cambridge: Ballinger, 
pp. 278-285.  
Aristoteles (1941) In The Basic Work of Aristotle. New York: Random House, pp. 553-619.  
Atkinson T (2015) Inequality. What Can Be Done? Harvard: Harvard University Press.  
Attas D (2006) Fragmenting property. Law and Philosophy 25(1): 119-149. 
Avi-Yonah R (2000) Globalization, tax competition, and the fiscal crisis of the welfare state. 
Harvard Law Review 113(7): 1573–1676. 
Bach S et al. (2014) A Wealth Tax on the Rich to Bring Down Public Debt? Revenue and 
Distributional Effects of a Capital Levy in Germany. Fiscal Studies 35(1): 67– 89. 
Banham G (2012) Kant and the Ethics of Taxation. Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public 
Policy 513(3): 301-72 . 
Bankman J and Shaviro D (2015) Piketty in America: a tale of two literatures. Tax Law Review 
68(3): 453–517.  
Bankman J and Weisbach D (2007) Consumption Taxation is Still Superior to Income 
Taxation. Stanford Law Review 60(3): 789-802. 
Bastiat F (2011) The Bastiat Collection. Auburn: The Ludwig Von Mises Institute.  
Baumol W (1972) On Taxation and the Control of Externalities. The American Economic 
Review 62(3): 307-322. 
Becker L (1977) Property Rights: Philosophical Foundations. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
Bederman D (2010) Custom as a Source of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Benn S (1988) A Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  






Bhandari M (2017) The Philosophical Foundations of Tax. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Bienstman M (2014-15) Vergroening fiscaliteit: de tijd is rijp. Samenleving en politiek (3): 33-
37.  
Boettke P et al. (2011) Quasimarket failure. Public Choice 149(1-2): 209-224.  
Bouckaert B (2004) Algemene Rechtsleer. Bronnen en functies van het recht. Antwerpen: 
Maklu.  
Boudreaux D and Pritchard A (1993) Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the 
Constitutional Amendment Process. Fordham Law Review 62(1): 111-162. 
Brannon G (1986) Tax Loopholes as Original Sin: Lessons from Tax History. Villanova Law 
Review 31(6): 1763– 85.  
Brennan G and Hamlin A (1995) Constitutional political economy: the political philosophy of 
homo economicus? The Journal of Political Philosophy 3(3): 280–303. 
Brennan G and Lomasky L (1993) Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral 
Preference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Brown F (1996) ‘Complete’ Accrual Taxation. San Diego Law Review 33(4): 1559-1680. 
Brown L et al. (2015) The benefits of a relational approach to corporate political activity: 
evidence from political contributions to tax policymakers. The Journal of the American 
Taxation Association 37(1): 69–102. 
Buchanan (2000a) The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund. 
Buchanan (2000b) The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty. Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund. 
Buchanan and Tullock (1999) The Calculus of Consent. Logical Foundations of Constitutional 
Democracy. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 
Buchanan J (1959) Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy. The 
Journal of Law & Economics 2: 124-138.  
Buchanan J (1965) Ethical rules, expected values, and large numbers. Ethics 76(1): 1–13. 
Buchanan J and Brennan G (2000a) Reason of Rules. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 
Buchanan J and Brennan G (2000b) The Power To Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal 
Constitution. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 
Buchanan J and Congleton R (2006) Politics by Principle Not Interest: Towards 
Nondiscriminatory Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Buchanan J and Musgrave R (1999) Public Finance and Public Choice. Cambridge: MIT Press. 





Callahan G (2002) Economics for real people: an introduction to the Austrian school. Auburn 
(Ala.): Mises Institute. 
Caron P (2015) Thomas Piketty and Inequality: Legal Causes and Tax Solutions. Emory Law 
Journal Online 64: 2043– 72. 
Caron P and Repetti J (2013) Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate Tax to Reduce Inequality 
and Spur Economic Growth. Pepperdine Law Review 40(5): 1255-1290.  
Center for Representative Politics (2016) Profile for 2016 election cycle for Apple. Available at: 
https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000021754 (accessed 23 November 
2017). 
Christians A (2013) Putting the reign back in sovereign. Pepperdine Law Review 40(5): 1373–
1414.  
Christians A (2017) Trust in the tax system: the problem of lobbying. In: Peeters B, Gribnau H 
and Badisco J (eds) Building Trust in Taxation. Cambridge: Intersentia, pp. 151–172.  
Christman J (1994) The myth of property: toward an egalitarian theory of ownership. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Cingano F (2014) Trends in Income Inequality and Its Impact on Economic Growth. OECD 
Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 163. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jxrjncwxv6j-en (accessed 30 August 2015).  
Coase RH (1960) The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1–44. 
Cohen G (1995) Selfownership, Freedom, and Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Committee of Public Accounts (2013) Tax avoidance: the role of large accountancy firms. 
Report by the House of Commons, 26 April 2013. London: The Stationery Office Limited. 
Available at: https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/public-accounts-committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/tax-avoidance-role-large-tax-
accountancy-firms-follow-up/ (accessed 23 November 2017). 
Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (2015) Wealth Tax Proposal. Available at: 
https://www.acv-online.be/acv-
online/Actueel/Campagnes/Vermogensbelasting/Vermogensbelasting.html (accessed 5 
October 2015).  
Corporate Europe Observatory (2017) Lobby planet: our guide to the murky world of corporate 
EU lobbying. Available at: https://corporateeurope.org/lobbyplanet (accessed 23 November 
2017). 
Credit Suisse (2014) Global Wealth Report 2014. Zurich, Switzerland. Available at:  
economics.uwo.ca/.../credit-suisse-global-wealth-report-2014.pdf (accessed 30 August 2015).  
Cunningham N and Schenk D (1992) Taxation without Realization: A “Revolutionary” 





Davies J (2009) Wealth and Economic Inequality. In Salverda W et al (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Economic Inequality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 127-149 
Davies J et al. (2010) The Level and Distribution of Global Household Wealth. The Economic 
Journal 121(551): 223–254. 
De Standaard (2014) De Kloof. De Standaard, 8 - 13 September 2014.   
De Vos M (2015) Ongelijk maar Fair. Tielt: Uitgeverij Lannoo Campus.  
Decreet houdende bepalingen tot begeleiding van de aanpassing van de begroting 2015. 
Belgisch Staatsblad, 15 juli 2015.  
Decreet houdende de Vlaamse Codex Fiscaliteit. Belgisch Staatsblad, 23 december 2015.  
Delmotte C (2016) Vermogens- en vermogenswinstbelasting geëvalueerd vanuit recht op 
eigendom. Tijdschrift Fiscaal Recht 503: 521 – 534.  
Delmotte C (2017) The right to autonomy as a moral foundation for the realization principle in 
income taxation. In Bhandari M (ed.) The Philosophical Foundations of Tax Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 281-302.  
Delmotte C and Verplaetse J (2017) What is wrong with endowment taxation? Self-usership as 
a prerequisite for legitimate taxation. In Peeters B, Gribnau H and Badisco J (eds) Building 
Trust in Taxation. Cambridge: Intersentia, pp. 51-72. 
Diamond J (1993) New Guineans in their Natural World. In Wilson EO and Kellert S (eds), The 
Biophilia hypothesis. Washington (D.C.): Island press, pp. 251-274. . 
Diamond P and Saez E (2011) The case for a progressive tax: from basic research to policy 
recommendations. Journal of Economic Perspectives 25(4): 165–190. 
Dickenson D (2007) Property in the Body: Feminist Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Dorling D (2014) Growing Wealth Inequality in the UK is a Ticking Timebomb. The Guardian, 
15 October 2014. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/15/wealth-inequality-uk-ticking-
timebomb-credit-suisse-crash (accessed August 30, 2015).  
Dworkin R (1981)  What is equality? Part 2 : Equality of resources. Philosophy & Public Affairs 
10 (4): 283-345. 
Elkins D (2010) The Myth of Realization: Mark- to- Market Taxation of Publicly - Traded 
Securities.  Florida Tax Review 10(5): 375– 407. 
Ellickson R (1991) Order without law: how neighbors settle disputes. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Engler M (2003) A Progressive Consumption Tax for Individuals: An Alternative Hybrid 





Engler M and Knoll M (2003) Simplifying the Transition to a (Progressive) Consumption Tax. 
Southern Methodist University 56(53): 53– 81. 
Essers P (2017) International tax justice between Machiavelli and Habermas. In Peeters B, 
Gribnau H and Badisco J (eds) Building Trust in Taxation. Cambridge: Intersentia, pp. 235–
264. 
European Commission (2015) Tax Fraud Invasion Index. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/fight-against-tax-fraud-tax-evasion_en (accessed 30 
October 2015).  
Feinberg J (1984) Harm to Others. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Feinberg J (1986) Harm to Self. New York: Oxford University Press.   
Flemish Christian Democratic Party (2014) Election Manifesto. Available at: 
www.cdenv.be/3dplan (accessed 5 October 2015). 
Flemish Green Party (2014) Election Manifesto. Available at: www.groen.be/download-het-
groen-programma (accessed 5 October 2015).  
Flemish Socialist Party (2014) Election Manifesto. Available at: www.s-p-
a.be/media/uploads/files/programma14.pdf (accessed 5 October 2015). 
Fletcher M (2015) White People Have 13 Dollars for Every Dollar Held by Black Americans. 
The Washington Post, 12 December 2015). Available at: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/get-there/wp/2014/12/12/white-people-have-13-
dollars-for-every-dollar-held-by-black-americans/?utm_term=.6f4aa2dc7d3e (accessed 30 
August 2015).   
Frankfurt H (1988) Equality as a moral ideal. In Frankfurt H (ed.) The Importance of What 
We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 134–158. 
Fredriksen K (2012) Less Income Inequality and More Growth— Are they Compatible? Part 6. 
The Distribution of Wealth. OECD Economics Department Working Papers No 929. Paris: 
OECD Publishing. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k9h28t0bznr-en  (accessed 30 
August 2015). 
Freeman S (2007) Rawls. London: Routledge.  
Fried B (1999) The puzzling case for proportionate taxation. Chapman Law Review 157(2): 
157–196.  
Fried B (2003) Proportionate taxation as a fair division of the social surplus: the strange career 
of an idea. Economics and Philosophy 19(2): 211-239.  
Friedman D (1990) Price Theory. Nashville: Southwestern Company.  
Furby L (1991) Understanding the Psychology of Possession and Ownership: A Personal 
Memoir and an Appraisal of Our Progress. In Rudmin FW (ed.) To Have Possessions: A 
Handbook on Ownership and Property, Special Issue of Journal of Social Behavior and 





Gaus G (2005) The Place of Autonomy within Liberalism’. Anderson J and Christman J (eds) 
Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 272– 306. 
Gaus G (2008) On Philosophy Politics and Economics. Belmont: Wadsworth Cengage 
Learning.  
Gaus G (2010) Ownership, and the Redistributive State: Justificatory Liberalism’s Classical 
Tilt. Social Philosophy & Policy 27(1): 233-275.  
Gaus G (2010) The Idea and Ideal of Capitalism. In Brenkert G and Beauchamp T (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Business Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 73-100. 
Gaus G (2011) The Order of Public Reason. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Gaus G and Thrasher J (2015) Rational choice in the original position. In Hinton T (ed.) The 
Original Position. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39–58. 
Gergen P (1994) The Effects of Price Volatility and Strategic Trading under Realization, 
Expected Return and Retrospective Taxation. Tax Law Review 49(2): 209– 68. 
Gray J (1993) Post-liberalism: studies in political thought. New York: Routledge. 
Grey T (1980) The Disintegration of Property. In Pennock R and Champman J (eds), Nomos 
XXII: Property. New York: New York University Press, pp. 69-85. 
Gwartney J and Wagner R (1988) Public Choice and Constitutional Economics. Greenwich, 
CT: JAI Press. 
Haig R (1921) The Federal Income Tax. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Halperin D (1997) Saving the Income Tax: An Agenda for Research. Tax Notes 77: 967– 77. 
Hamlin A (2017) What political philosophy should learn from economics about taxation. 
Available at: 
https://scholar.googleusercontent.com/scholar?q=cache:aRf_EcVRKOEJ:scholar.google.co
m/&hl=nl&as_sdt=0,5 (accessed 26 November 2017). 
Harrison J and Theeuwes J (2008) Law and Economics. W.W. Norton & Co.: New York. 
Hayek F (1945) The Use of Knowledge in Society. The American Economic Review 35(4): 519-
530. 
Hayek F (1976) Law, Legislation and Liberty. Volume 2: The Mirage of Social Justice. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hayek F (2007) The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Hayek F (2011) The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Heap S (2017) Behavioural public policy: the constitutional approach. Behavioural Public 





Heen M (1994) An Alternative Approach to the Taxation of Employment Discrimination 
Recoveries under Federal Civil Rights Statutes: Income from Human Capital, Realization, and 
Nonrecognition. North Carolina Law Review 72(3): 549-618. 
Hettich W and Winer S (1999) Democratic Choice and Taxation: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hobbes T (1976) Leviathan. London: Penguin Books.  
Hoeller P (2012) Less Income Inequality and More Growth – Are they Compatible? Part 4. Top 
Incomes. OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 927. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Available at:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k9h28wm6qmn-en  (accessed 30 August 2015). 
Hohfeld W (1913) Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied in legal reasoning. Yale Law 
Journal 23(16): 16-59. 
Holmes S and Sunstein C (1999) The cost of rights: why liberty depends on taxes. New York : 
Norton. 
Honore A (1961) Ownership. In Guest A (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, pp. 107-147. 
Hume D (1963) Essays : moral, political and literary. London: Oxford University Press.  
Huth EJ, King K and Lock S (1988) Uniform requirements for manuscripts submitted to 
biomedical journals. British Medical Journal 296(4): 401–405. 
Ingraham C (2015) If You Thought Income Inequality Was Bad, Get a Load of Wealth 
Inequality’. The Washington Post, 21 May 2015. Available at: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/05/21/the-top-10-of-americans-
own-76-of-the-stuff-and-its-dragging-our-economy-down/?utm_term=.87d8273a2789 
(Accessed 30 August 2015).  
Jallai A (2017) Restoring stakeholders’ trust in multinationals’ tax planning practices with 
corporate social responsibility. In Peeters B, Gribnau H and Badisco J (eds) Building Trust in 
Taxation. Cambridge: Intersentia, pp. 173–200.  
Kaplow L (2008) The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics. Princeton University Press: 
Princeton.  
Kirchler et al. (2017) Wealthy tax non-Filers in a developing nation: the roles of taxpayer 
knowledge, perceived corruption and service orientation in Pakistan. In Peeters B, Gribnau H 
and Badisco J (eds) Building Trust in Taxation. Cambridge: Intersentia, pp. 355-376.  
Kirzner I (1985) Discovery and the Capitalist Process. Chicago: Chicago University Press.  
Kohlberg L (1981) The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of 
Justice. San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row.  
Krugman P (2014) Gouden tijden voor de rijken,MO Paper 86, 28 April 2014, p. 3. Available 





Kwall J (2011) When Should Asset Appreciation Be Taxed? The Case for a Disposition Standard 
of Realization. Indiana Law Review 86(1): 77-118.  
Lagarde CH (2014) Economic Inclusion and Financial Integrity – an Address to the Conference 
on Inclusive Capitalism, 27 May 2014. Available at:  
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2014/052714.htm (accessed 30 October 2015).  
Land S (1996) Defeating Deferral: A Proposal for Retrospective Taxation. Tax Law Review 
52(1): 45– 118. 
Lansley S (2012) Why Economic Inequality Leads to Collapse. The Guardian, 5 February 2012. 
Available at:  https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/feb/05/inequality-leads-to-
economic-collapse (accessed 30 August 2015).  
Leeson P (2009) The Laws of Lawlessness. Journal of Legal Studies 38(2): 471-503. 
Lehner M (2000) The European Experience with a Wealth Tax: A Comparative Discussion. 
Tax Law Review 53(4): 615– 692. 
Lemmens W and Badisco (2017) Taxation and Ethics: an Impossible Marriage? In Peeters B, 
Gribnau H and Badisco J (eds) Building Trust in Taxation. Cambridge: Intersentia, pp. 119-
137.   
Locke J (1948) The second treatise of civil government and A letter concerning toleration. 
Oxford: Blackwell.   
 
Logue K and Slemrod J (2008) Genes as tags : The tax implications of widely available genetic 
information. National Tax Journal 61: 843-863.  
 
Mack E (1988) The Ethics of Taxation: Rights versus Public Goods. In Lee D (ed.) Taxation 
and the Deficit Economy: Fiscal Policy and Capital Formation in the United States. San 
Francisco: Pacific Research Institute, pp. 487-514.  
 
Malinowski B (1978) Crime and Custom in Savage Society. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul.  
 
Maloney M (1988) Distributive Justice: That is the Wealth Tax Issue. Ottawa Law Review 
20(3): 601– 35. 
 
Mankiw G and Weinzierl M (2010) The optimal taxation of height: A case study of utilitarian 
income redistribution. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2(1): 155-176.  
 
McCaffery E (2005) A New Understanding of Tax. Michigan Law Review 103(5): 807-938. 
 
McMahon M (2004) The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation. Boston College Law Review 
45(5): 993– 1128. 
 
Menger M (1950) Principles of Economics. Glencoe: The Free Press. 
 






Mirrlees (1971) An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation. The Review of 
Economic Studies 38 (2): 175-208 
 
Mirrlees J (2010) Dimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Mirrlees J et al. (2011) The Mirrlees Review: Conclusions and Recommendations for Reform. 
Fiscal Studies 32(3): 331-359.  
Munzer S (1990) A theory of property. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Murphy L and Nagel T (2002) The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Murphy L and Nagel T (2002) The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Musgrave R and Musgrave P (1989) Public Finance in Theory and Practice. McGraw-Hill: New 
York. 
Myles G (1995) Public economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Nozick R (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. Blackwell, Oxford. 
Nussbaum M (1987) The Fragility of Goodness. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
O’ Neil M (2017) Survey Article: Philosophy and Public Policy after Piketty. Journal of Political 
Philosophy 25(3): 343-375. 
Obama White House Archives (2013) Remarks by the President on Economic Mobility. Speech 
from 4 December 2013. Available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2013/12/04/remarks-president-economic-mobility (accessed 5 October 2015). 
Obama White House Archives (2015) FACT SHEET: A Simpler, Fairer Tax Code That 
Responsibly Invests in Middle Class Families. Speech from 17 January, 2015. Available at: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/17/fact-sheet-simpler-
fairer-tax-code-responsibly-invests-middle-class-fami  (accessed 5 October 2015). 
OECD (2011) Divided we stand : why inequality keeps rising. Paris: OECD Publishing.   
OECD (2015) Base erosion and profit shifting. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ 
(accessed 30 October 2015).  
OECD (2015) Economic Survey of Belgium. Available at: www.oecd.org/belgium/economic-
survey-belgium.htm (accessed 30 August 2015).  
Ostrom E and Kizer L (1982) The three worlds of action: a metatheoretical synthesis of 
institutional approaches. In Ostrom E (ed.) Strategies of Political Inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: 
Sage, pp. 56–88. 





Ostrom E, Gardner R and Walker J (1994) Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.  
Ostrom V (1997) The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerability of Democracies. Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
Ostrom V (2008) The intellectual crisis in American Public Administration. Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press.  
Otsuka M (2000) Self-Ownership and equality: a Lockean reconciliation. In Steiner H and 
Vallentyne P (eds) Left Libertarianism and its Critics: The Contemporary Debate, Palgrave 
Publishers Ltd.: New York, pp. 149-173.  
Padover S (1953) The Complete Madison: His Basic Writings. New York: Harper & Brothers 
Publishers.  
Parfitt D (1997) Equality and Priority. Ratio 10(3): 202– 21. 
Parliamentarian commission on fiscal reform (24 February 2014) Report on Fiscal Reform. 
Available at: www.lachambre.be/FLWB/PDF/53/3343/53K3343001.pdf (Accessed 5 October 
2015).  
Peeters B, Gribnau H and Badisco J (2017) Preface. In Peeters B, Gribnau H and Badisco J 
(eds) Building Trust in Taxation. Cambridge: Intersentia, pp. v–vii. 
Piketty T (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First century. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press. 
Piketty T and Saez E (2012) A Theory Of Optimal Capital Taxation. National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper 17989. Available at: 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17989 (accessed 10 October 2015). 
Pipes R (1999) Property and Freedom. London: Harvill. 
Plug E et al. (1999) If we knew ability, how would we tax individuals? Journal of Public 
Economics 72(2): 183-211.  
President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board (2010) The Report on Tax Reform Options: 
Simplification, Compliance and Corporate Taxation. Washington DC: PERAB. Available at: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2010/08/27/perab-tax-task-force-report 
(accessed 14 February 2018). 
Rakowski E (2000) Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified. Tax Law Review 53(3): 263-376.  
 
Rawls J (1978) A Theory Of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Rawls J (1980) Kantian constructivism in moral theory. The Journal of Philosophy 77(9): 515–
572.  
 







Rawls J (1999b) Collected Papers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
 
Rawls J (2001) Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Repetti (2000) It's All About Valuation. Tax Law Review 53(4): 607-614. 
Repetti R (2001) Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth. New York University Law Review 76(3): 
825– 73. 
Richter B et al. (2009) Lobbying and taxes. American Journal of Political Science 53(4): 893–
909. 
Ridley M (1997) The Origins of Virtue. London: Penguin books. 
Robeyns I (2016) Having too much. In Knight J and Schwarzberg M (eds) Wealth: NOMOS 
LVI. New York: NYU Press, pp. 1–44. 
Roemer J (1993) A pragmatic theory of responsibility for the egalitarian planner. Philosophy 
& Public Affairs 22(2): 146-166. 
Rose C (1996) Property as the Keystone Right? Notre Dame Law Review 71(239): 329-369. 
Rosen H (2004) Public finance. In Rowley C and Schneider F (eds) The Encyclopedia of Public 
Choice. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 252–262.  
Rothbard M (2006) The Libertarian Manifesto. Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute.  
Saez E (2002) The desirability of commodity taxation under non-linear income taxation and 
heterogeneous tastes. Journal of Public Economics 83: 217 –230.  
Samuelson P (1947) Foundations of Economic Analysis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Samuelson P (1954) The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 36(4): 387-389. 
Scarborough J (1994) Different Rules for Different Players and Products: The Patchwork 
Taxation of Derivatives. Taxes 72(12): 1031– 49. 
Schenk D (1995) Taxation of Equity Derivatives: A Partial Integration Proposal. Tax Law 
Review 50(4): 571– 642. 
Schenk D (2004) A Positive Account of the Realization Rule. Tax Law Review 57(3): 355-396. 
Schizer D (1998) Realization as Subsidy. New York University Law Review 73: 1549– 626.  
Schmidde D (2009) Responding to the Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory Landscape. 
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 14(4): 709-770. 
Schmidtz D (2010) Property and Justice. Social Philosophy and Policy 27(1):  79-100.  
Scholes M et al. (2009) Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach. Upper Saddle 
River: Prentice Hall. 





Sen A (2009) The Idea of Justice. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard. 
Shakow D (1986) Taxation without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation. University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 134(5): 1111-1205.         
 
Shakow D and Shuldiner R (2000) Comprehensive Wealth Tax. Tax Law Review 53(4): 709-
770. 
Shavell S (2004) Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law. Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge.  
Shaviro D (2000) Inequality, wealth, and endowment. Tax Law Review 53(3): 397-421.  
Shaviro D (2004) Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax. Tax Notes 
103: 91– 113.  
Shaviro D (2007) Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus. Stanford Law Review 60: 745 
– 788.  
Shoven J and Taubman P (1980) Saving, Capital Income, and Taxation. In Aaron J and Boskin 
M (eds), The Economics of Taxation. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, pp. 203– 221.  
Shuldiner R (1992) Consistency and the Taxation of Financial Products. Taxes 70(12): 781– 
93. 
Simons H (1938) Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal 
Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Slemrod J (1990) Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 4(1): 157-178.  
Smith A (1976) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of Wealth of Nations. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Stark (2005) Enslaving the Beachcomber: Some Thoughts on the Liberty Objections to 
Endowment Taxation. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 18(1): 47-68.  
Steiner H (1994) An Essay on Rights. Oxford: Blackwell.   
Stigler G (1987) The Theory of Price. New York: Macmillan.  
Temkin L (2000) Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection. In Clayton M and 
Williams A (eds) The Ideal of Equality. Houndmills: Macmillan, pp. 126-161. 
Thorndike J and Ventry D (2002) Tax Justice: The Ongoing Debate. Washington DC: Urban 
Institute Press.  
Thrasher J (2014) Ordering anarchy rationality. Markets and Morals 5(1): 30–46. 
Tomasi J (2012) Free Market Fairness. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Tran-Nam B and Evans C (2014) Towards the development of a tax system complexity index. 






Tuck R (1979) Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development. Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge. 
United States Supreme Court (1819) McCulloch / Maryland, 6 March. 17 U.S. 316. 
Vallentyne P (2000) Introduction: Left-libertarianism: a primer. In Vallentyne P and Steiner 
H (eds) Left-Libertarianism and Its critics: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Palgrave, 
pp. 1–23.  
Vallentyne P (2012a) Taxation, redistribution and property Rights. In Marmor A (ed.) The 
Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law. New York: Routledge, pp. 291-301. 
Vallentyne P (2012b) Left –Libertarianism. In Estlund D (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 152-168.  
Van Dun F (2008) Het fundamenteel rechtsbeginsel [The fundamental principle of law]. Re-
issued by Murray Rothbard Instituut VZW, Antwerp. Available at: 
http://www.rothbard.be/bestanden/boeken/FRB.pdf (accessed 30 August 2015).  
Van Oven J (1948) Leerboek van Romeinsch privaatrecht. Leiden: Brill. 
Van Parijs P (1997) Real Freedom for All: What (if anything) Can Justify Capitalism? Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.  
Vos C (2017) Conflict of trust: EU member states’ fiscal sovereignty and the ideal of the internal 
market. In Peeters B, Gribnau H and Badisco J (eds) Building Trust in Taxation. Cambridge: 
Intersentia, pp. 89–115.  
Wagner R (2016) Politics as a Peculiar Business. Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political 
Economy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.  
Waldron J (1988) The right to private property. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Waldron J (2010) Socioeconomic Rights and Theories of Justice. NYU School of Law, Public 
Law Research Paper Nos. 10-79. Available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1699898 (accessed 30 October 2015).  
Walloon Socialist Party (2015) Wealth Tax Bill. Available at: 
www.dekamer.be/flwb/pdf/54/0770/54K0770001.pdf (accessed 5 October 2015).  
Weisbach D (1999) A Partial Mark- to- Market Tax System. Tax Law Review 53(1): 95– 136. 
Wenar L (2011) Rights. In E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available 
at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/rights/ (accessed 5 October 2015). 
Wet houdende maatregelen inzake versterking van jobcreatie en koopkracht. Belgisch 
Staatsblad, 15 juli 2015.  
Wetboek Inkomstenbelasting. Mechelen: Kluwer 






Wijtvliet L (2014) Too Little, Too Late: The Uneasy Case for a Wealth Tax as a Means to 
Mitigate Inequality. Intertax 42(10): 632–643.  
World Economic Forum (2015) Top 10 trends for the world in 2015. Report 2015. Available at: 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/11/top-10-trends-world-2015/ (accessed 30 August 
2015).  
Young P (1990) Progressive taxation and equal sacrifice. The American Economic Review 
80(1): 253–266. 








Background: the emergent state of fiscal anarchy  
Most people – both scholars and laymen – seem to agree that prevailing Western tax codes do 
not approximate any ideals of efficiency or justice. Moreover, governmental inclination to 
maximize revenue, the political ambition to achieve dozens of policy goals through tax rules 
alone and the partisan attempts to tinker with the tax code through voting and lobbying have 
created (Wagner, 2016: 142): ‘the proverbial flood of exceptions and exemptions that creates a 
tax code so large that no one can read it and which creates nearly a unique tax liability for each 
tax payer’. Indeed, ‘our game’ of fiscal politics is characterized by an ever-increasing fiscal 
revenue, a widening array of governmental techniques to fund state activity, various strategies 
adopted by voters and interest-groups to minimize their burden, an accelerating number of tax 
lawyers and the increased relevance of the legal service-industry that wealthy clients use to 
circumvent their tax-obligations. In our capacity as a voter (trying to acquire lucrative tax 
exemptions), executive (maximizing fiscal revenue through custom-tailored taxes), 
functionary (executing fiscal measures), or attorney / consultant (e.g. monetizing legal 
complexity through fiscal optimization schemes) we all play our role hence we often acquiesce 
in the rules-of-the game. Indeed, as players within the game, we are required to safeguard our 
self-interests, and our behavior will often contribute to the labyrinth of tax bases and rates - 
paralleled by a maze of exemptions and derogations – that has emerged over time, the totality 
of which eludes the understanding of many lawyers, let alone that the taxpayers who are 
demanded to obey these rules fully grasp them.   
Back to basics: four research questions 
This PhD, however, mirrors the aspiration to ‘step out’ of this arena, and reflects on the 
fundamental rules that define fiscal politics. The domains of philosophy and political economy 
offer us techniques to move away from one’s position as a specific player (i.e. voter, 
functionary, executive, attorney) to a perspective that is external to the game, from which we 
can try to disclose arrangements ‘all can live with’ (Rawls, 1980: 519). Trying to approximate a 
more impartial perspective by using philosophical methods and behavioural models, we are 
driven by the question: “Which kind of fiscal principles could reflect agreement for all 
members of the body politic?”  When it comes to the basics of a fiscal constitution, it appears 
that the pillars – which are also our research questions – are threefold: 1) what can we tax (i.e. 
the tax base; 2) how can we measure that base (i.e. measurement-technique) and 3) what type 
of rate-structure we should we apply to this taxable entity (e.g. with exemptions or ‘uniform’). 
As the first question can be unraveled into two – respectively the admissible tax base for 
persons and capital – the four essays of this PhD will revolve around four questions.   
Conventional tax literature  
Dominant tax literature advances two ways to look at taxation. The first tradition is known as 
the theory of optimal taxation. Using a welfare-economic framework, scholars like Shaviro 
and Mankiw reveal the type of tax structure that raises money for the political process, while 
minimizing the negative effects on economic output. The outcome of these utilitarian flavoured 
models support a variety in tax bases, measurements according to market values and various 





skin color, gender, level of income, type of income; and in terms of the type of product 
purchased. The second stream is made up by tax fairness theorists. Scholars like Piketty, 
O’Neill or Robeyns attribute a redistributive role to the institution of taxation: in order to 
install a more fair distribution of wealth they propose the introduction of wealth taxes, 
measurement according to market values and highly discriminatory tax-rates, up to 100% for 
‘the rich’.  
Taxation without romance  
This PhD was written against the background realization that these dominant theories of 
taxation are romantic approaches to the issue, in the sense that their framework is only viable 
on (at least) two conditions: benevolence and omniscience. By this we mean that conventional 
tax theorist often assume that the tax rules will be executed by people who are exclusively 
motivated to do good, and are spontaneously oriented towards these (tax) rules’ moral goals 
(rather than to their own interests), and, secondly, these benevolent political players will have 
access to the necessary information to do so. These highly idealized presumptions in terms of 
motivation and knowledge explain why these theories often support wide types of 
governmental discretion, and hereby, in fact, contribute to the type of injustice and emergent 
anarchy that marks fiscal reality.   
The constitutionalization of tax policy  
Nurtured by a non-romantic perspective on the issue, this PhD explores the ‘avenue not taken’ 
by the conventional scholars. Assuming that the political sphere will be characterized by self-
interested individuals who, additionally, face severe information-constraints, we intend to 
bring ‘the constitutionalist approach’ to fiscal thinking. This methodology is characterized by 
the dual idea that governmental competences should be checked by 1) rights that limit its 
lawful domain and 2) rules that restrain its operation within the sphere it is allowed to act. 
Whereas the introduction of this doctorate will justify this methodology, the four essays that 
comprise this PhD will demonstrate this approach. Using both insights from philosophy and 
economics, each essay will establish specific rights or constitutional principles, and employ 
these to resolve the four research questions. The ensemble of these essays tentatively 
formulates the principles of a ‘constitutionalized fiscal policy’, the alternative to the present 
















Achtergrond: fiscale anarchie in de rechtsstaat  
Er heerst een consensus onder de meeste mensen – academici en leken – dat de vigerende 
Westerse fiscale systemen niet beantwoorden aan idealen van rechtvaardigheid of 
economische efficiëntie. De neiging van de overheid om fiscale inkomsten te maximaliseren, 
de politieke ambitie om dozijnen beleidsdoelen te verwezenlijken via belastingen en de druk 
van belangengroepen op het fiscaal recht creëerden (Wagner, 2016: 142) : “een 
spreekwoordelijke vloed van uitzonderingen en derogaties die leidden tot een fiscale wetgeving 
die zo uitgebreid is dat niemand hem kan lezen, en een schier unieke fiscale aanslag voor elk 
individu.” Inderdaad, ‘ons spel’ van fiscale politiek bestaat uit een steeds stijgend 
overheidsbeslag, een steeds breder amalgaam van fiscale maatregelen om overheidsactiviteit 
te financieren, specifieke strategieën van het electoraat en belangengroepen om hun fiscale 
lasten te minimaliseren, een toenemende hoeveelheid fiscalisten en de stijgende relevantie van 
juridische dienstverlening die rijke cliënten gebruiken om hun fiscale verplichtingen te 
omzeilen. In onze hoedanigheid van stemgerechtigde (trachten een lucratieve fiscale 
behandeling te verkrijgen), uitvoerende macht (maximaliseren van inkomsten via gerichte 
maatregelen), ambtenaar (doorvoeren van het overheidsbeslag) of advocaat / consultant 
(aanmunten van de fiscale complexiteit, o.a. via fiscale optimalisatie) spelen we allen onze rol, 
en aanvaarden we de regels van het spel. Inderdaad, als spelers zijn we genoodzaakt ons 
eigenbelang na te streven, en ons gedrag zal vaak bijdragen tot het labyrint van belastbare 
feiten en toegepaste tarieven die door de jaren heen ontstaan zijn, en waarvan de totaliteit het 
begrip van de meeste juristen ontsnapt, laat staan dat van de rechtsonderhorigen die geacht 
worden deze regels te gehoorzamen.    
Back to basics: vier onderzoeksvragen 
Dit doctoraat belichaamt de aspiratie om uit dit spel te stappen, en te reflecteren over de 
fundamentele regels die onze fiscale politiek bepalen. De gebieden van politieke filosofie en 
politieke economie reiken ons technieken aan om ons te verplaatsen van onze positie als 
specifieke speler (i.e. stemgerechtigde, bureaucraat, minister, advocaat, consultant, ..) naar 
een positie extern aan dat spel, van waaruit we beginselen kunnen trachten te ontwaren ‘waar 
éénieder mee kan leven’ (Rawls, 1980: 519). Wanneer het aankomt op de fundamentele 
beginselen van ons fiscaal systeem – tevens de onderzoeksvragen van dit doctoraat - kunnen 
we drie zuilen onderscheiden: 1) wat kunnen we belasten (i.e. belastbaar feit); 2) hoe kunnen 
we deze basis valoriseren (i.e. meettechniek) 3) welke type belastingtarief wordt er toegepast 
(uitzonderingen of uniform ?) Gezien de eerste vraag kan worden ontdubbeld in twee – de 
aanvaardbare fiscale basis voor respectievelijk personen en kapitaal – bestaat dit doctoraat uit 
vier essays aangaande vier onderzoeksvragen.  
Traditionele fiscale literatuur 
De internationale literatuur levert twee manieren aan om naar fiscaliteit te kijken. De eerste 
traditie is gekend als Theory of Optimal Taxation. Op basis van een kader uit de 
welvaartseconomie, identificeren economen zoals Shaviro en Mankiw het soort fiscale regels 
die de financiële opbrengsten voor de staat maximaliseren, én tegelijkertijd de verlieseffecten 





verscheidenheid in belastbare grondslagen en discriminatoire tarieven, zowel in de 
inkomstenbelasting als de BTW, bijvoorbeeld op basis van hoogte, huidskleur, gender, 
inkomensniveau, oorsprong van het inkomen; of type product dat wordt geconsumeerd. De 
tweede stroming bestaat uit tax fairness theorists. Bijdragen zoals die van Piketty, O’Neill en 
Robeyns hameren voornamelijk op de herverdelende rol van belastingen: om een eerlijkere 
verdeling van de welvaart te bekomen stellen ze vermogensbelastingen voor, alsook een 
valorisatie volgens pure marktwaarden; en hogere tarieven op het inkomen van “de rijken” (tot 
100% van het inkomen).  
Belastingen zonder romantiek 
Dit doctoraat werd geschreven vanuit de realisatie dat deze dominantie theorieën romantische 
perspectieven betreffen, in de zin dat hun methodologie twee voorwaarden omvat: goedheid 
en alwetendheid. Hiermee bedoelen we dat de conventionele belastingtheorie veronderstelt 
dat belastingregels zullen worden uitgevoerd door mensen die uitsluitend gemotiveerd zijn om 
‘goed te doen’, en die spontaan gericht zijn op de morele doelen van deze belastingregels 
(eerder dan op hun eigenbelang) en, ten tweede, dat deze welwillende individuen toegang 
zullen hebben tot de nodige informatie. Deze geïdealiseerde assumpties in termen van 
motivatie en kennis verklaren waarom deze theorieën vaak erg ruime discretionaire 
bevoegdheden betogen, en hierdoor in feite indirect bijdragen tot de onrechtvaardigheid en 
fiscale anarchie die we in de realiteit vaststellen.  
De constitutionalisering van het fiscaal recht  
Gevoed door een niet-romantische benadering, verkent dit doctoraat de ‘vergeten route’ 
binnen de traditionele literatuur. Veronderstellend dat de politieke sfeer zal worden 
gekenmerkt door op eigenbelang gerichte individuen die, daarenboven, beperkt zijn in kennis, 
brengen we de ‘constitutionele methode’ binnen in het fiscaal denken. Deze aanpak is 
gekenmerkt door het dubbel idee dat de bevoegdheden van de overheid dienen te worden 
beperkt door 1) rechten die haar legitieme handelingssfeer beperken 2) constitutionele 
voorschriften die haar acties gaan reguleren in de sfeer waarbinnen zij toegestaan is om te 
handelen. Daar waar de inleiding van dit doctoraat deze methodologie zal justifiëren, zullen de 
overige vier essays van dit doctoraat deze methodologie gaan toepassen. Op basis van modellen 
uit de politieke filosofie en gedragseconomie zal elk essay een recht of constitutioneel 
voorschrift aantonen, en deze vervolgens aanwenden om één van onze vier onderzoeksvragen 
op te lossen. De totaliteit van deze essays tracht de beginselen van een ‘geconstitutionaliseerd 
fiscaal beleid’ vast te leggen, het alternatief voor de huidige anarchie: een uniform tarief 
toegepast op elk gerealiseerd inkomen, zowel uit arbeid als kapitaal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
